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**Analysis of Workforce Statistics Says KGB, MVD
Numbers Deceptive**

91UF0815A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 6 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by Vadim Pervyshin under the rubric "Social Statistics. Life of the Army": "Unknown Figures and People: Analysis of Even Open Data Shows—The Special Services Are Lying To Us About Their Size"]

[Text] In the USSR, everything is concealed from the Soviet people—from information about space flights, the degree of radioactive contamination, the destruction of Baykal, Aral, and Ladoga, the harvest campaign in the country, vodka, and armaments, to the number of people born and deceased.

The logic behind this is simple. The less people know, the less they are informed, the easier it is to govern and lead them: One does not have to think for oneself—the "leaders" and "upper echelons" are doing the thinking for them. This is how we have lived through 73 years, blindly believing each word of the leaders. When the light dawns on us, however, there are no limits to our astonishment.

Just recall the exalted titles of USSR Goskomstat [State Committee on Statistics] reports on the results of socio-economic development in the country during the years of perestroika that were published annually at the end of January in all the central newspapers simultaneously.

1. "New Major Step in Economic Development"—on the 1985 results, when the national economy was moving nowhere, reaping the fruits of the stagnation period. Published in all central newspapers on 26 January 1986.

2. "Quality and Tempo to the Five-Year Plan"—on the 1986 results, although by then both quality and tempo were a thing of the past. Published 18 January 1987.

3. "On the Road of Economic Reform"—on the 1987 results, when a dead-end road for the development of the national economy was chosen. Published 23 January 1988.

4. "Economic Reform—Tempo and Reserves"—on the 1988 results, when economic collapse became evident. Published 21 January 1989.

5. "To Accelerate the Economic Recovery"—on the 1989 results, when the sad result of socioeconomic development in the country could no longer be covered up by falsified figures. Published 28 January 1990.

Therefore, imagine the astonishment of our public, sparsely informed and feeding on the subsistence ration of permitted information, when at the end of January 1991 it could not find the Goskomstat's sparse reports anywhere: not in PRAVDA, not in IZVESTIYA, not in other central newspapers. On the results of 1991—not a word! Silence!

Only one newspaper (EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN, 24 January 1991) somewhere in the back of the issue, on the ninth (!) page, published Goskomstat's report titled "The USSR Economy in 1990." What we have is a clear attempt to hush up the most important statistical data on the national economy: Labor productivity dropped by three percent in comparison with the previous year, national income, by four percent; industry did not deliver 17.7 billion rubles worth of goods to consumers; contract obligations were not fulfilled by every fourth enterprise. Less sugar beet was harvested this year than last—only 81.2 million tons; only 83.3 percent of potatoes—63.7 million tons; and only 88.8 percent of raw cotton, vegetables, sunflower, linen, fruit, and berries.

Despite the proclaimed glasnost and openness of all publications, the USSR Goskomstat in reality reduced publications and limited the information on all current statistical data in natural indicators. This trick of the governmental agency is easily explained: The absolute volume of production in all main industry branches and in agriculture fell by 20 to 30 percent in comparison with the stagnation period.

No comments on the complete failure of the "five-year period of perestroika—five years of acceleration" came from the celebrated Abalkins, Aganbegians, and Citaryans—the same blind leading the blind of perestroika who, with their experiments, advice, and proposals destroyed the national economy and brought Soviet society to the brink of ruin.

By the end of 1990 we understood that no matter which branch of the national economy we look at, each ekes out a miserable existence. Agriculture is in complete decline. Industry is not capable of setting up the manufacture of disposable syringes or fixing the existing production of medicines and medical supplies, printing equipment, or bread-baking equipment... Transportation cannot handle the freight. Communications are not working. The question that comes to mind is: Who is doing what in our country? Let us explain and, to be more convincing, let us look at the figures. While we are at it, let us try to calculate the number of special services personnel.

The 12 January 1989 census showed the following composition of the USSR population by age and sex (in 1,000's):

	Total	Men	Women
Total	286,730	135,360	151,370
Age up to 16	78,360	39,816	38,544
Working age	159,555	82,316	77,239
Retirement age	48,815	13,228	35,587

There are 16.010 million more women in the total population than men, although during the last 28 years there were more boys born than girls, and there are 1.272 million more boys than girls in the under 16 age group. In the working age group, there are 5.079 million more men than women.

There were a total of 199.694 million voters in the country. People over 18 comprise 69.6 percent of total population; of them, 91.136 million are men (67.3 percent of all men) and 108.558 million are women (71.7 percent of all women). The higher the percentage of voters, the older the population. For instance, in Leningrad the voters comprise 72 percent of the population, while in Moscow, with its multimillion army of pensioners, they comprise 76.2 percent.

There are 59.7 million pensioners in the country; of them, 44.3 million receive retirement pensions, 6.6 million, disability pensions, and 5.4 million, loss of provider pensions. Although 48.8 million people are eligible for a retirement pension, 4.5 million of them continue to work without applying for it.

Of the total number of disabled (6.6 million people), 2.5 million are of working age and do not work. In addition, 1.3 million people of working age do not work because they receive preferential pensions.

Thus, the total work force of working age people is (in 1,000's of people):

Working age—159,555

Disabled—2,500

Nonworking retirees—1,300

Total—155,755

In the retirement age group, eight million pensioners work; also, 360,000 teenagers aged 14 to 16 work. Thus, total labor resources of the country comprised (in 1,000's of people):

Working teenagers aged 14 to 16—360

Working people of working age—155,755

Working people of retirement age—8,000

Total—164,115

This result—164.1 million people—is virtually identical to the USSR Goskomstat data: "The labor resources of the country comprised 163.9 million people" (reference book "National Economy of the USSR" for 1989, p. 47).

And here is who is doing what in the national economy of the USSR (in millions of people and as a percentage share):

Total workforce	139.3	100 percent
1. Material production sector	100.5	72.2
1.1 Industry,	39.8	28.6
including machine building and metal cutting	19.5	14.0
1.2 Agriculture,	25.4	18.2
of them, kolkhoz members	11.6	8.3
1.3 Construction	15.1	10.8

1.4 Transportation and communications	10.3	7.4
1.5 Other industry branches	9.9	7.1
2. Nonproduction sector	38.8	27.8
2.1 Housing and municipal services	5.7	4.1
2.2 Health care and physical fitness	7.8	5.6
2.3 Education, arts, culture	13.8	9.9
2.4 Science and scientific services	4.6	3.3
2.5 State administration organs apparatus	2.5	1.8
2.6 Other branches	4.4	3.1

Those not engaged in the national economy comprised 24.8 million people.

Of this number, 11.7 million students over 16 years of age were in school full time (in millions of people):

Students in general education schools—3.20

Students in secondary vocational schools—2.92

Students in technical schools—2.49

Students in institutions of higher education—2.85

Students in college preparation courses—0.05

Graduate school and doctorate students—0.05

Students at schools and courses—0.14

Total students—11.70

If we subtract students from the total number of people not engaged in the national economy, we arrive at the figure of 13.1 million people. This residual figure includes the military, MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and KGB personnel, prisoners, housewives, and clerics.

It is known that in 1989 there were:

prisoners—880 thousand people

housewives—2.5 million people

clerics—60 thousand people

Total—3.44 million people

Thus, the number of uniformed forces at the service of the state was $13.1 - 3.44 = 9.66$ million people whom the state FEEDS AND CLOTHES FREE OF CHARGE.

The number of our "defenders-dependents" is practically equal to that of the entire work force of the transportation and communications branch, and only slightly less than the number of all kolkhoz members.

Thus, we have calculated that for every 1,000 people there are 485 workers gainfully employed in the national economy, 208 pensioners, 273 boys and girls under 16, and 34 dependents.

It is known that in 1989 the size of the military was 4.5 million people; in addition, 329,000 people served in military construction units, 220,000 in border guard troops, 200,000 in railroad troops, and 200,000 in the MVD Internal Troops. This comes to a total of 5.449 million people. From this, it follows that the number of staff employees of the KGB and the MVD is 9.66 - 5.449 = 4.221 million people. This is more than the number of employees of special services in all 150 capitalist countries together.

To prove the validity, uniqueness, and veracity of our calculations in regard to the numbers of KGB and MVD employees, let us recall for comparison one of the KGB's favorite subsidiary firms—the German "Stasi"—former Ministry for State Security of the German Democratic Republic. At the beginning of 1990, under public pressure, the GDR published the data that the "Stasi" employed over 98,000 staff officers. In addition, six million East Germans had been involved in the activities of the GDR KGB to some or other degree as secret informers, and dossiers on another six million Germans were kept in "Stasi" archives. Knowing that the population of East Germany was 16.5 million, of which there were 4.5 million children under 16, the "Stasi" umbrella covered not just every other adult German but EVERYONE who was not working for the KGB.

Between March and December 1990 Germany was shaken by a powerful wave of mass disclosures of secret informers and agents of the "Stasi." Among those who came to light were tens of parliament deputies and ministers. The latest "victim" was a secret agent with a code name "Cherny"—former GDR Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere.

It seems that soon our uninformed public will, too, find out with amazement the names of hundreds and thousands of domestic informers among people's deputies of all ranks (there are more than two million of them) and leaders of new parties and movements. Using the same ratios between the size and employment of the population in special services in East European countries, created in the image of the KGB, we will arrive at the conclusion that no less than two million people are employed by the KGB.

Is it clear now why we are so poor and shy?

Kalugin on Markov Murder, KGB Relations with Bulgarian Intelligence

91UF0850A Moscow *DEMOKRATICHESKAYA ROSSIYA* in Russian No 5, 19 Apr 91 pp 6-7

[Interview with Oleg Danilovich Kalugin by Mark Deych: "Oleg Kalugin Grants an Interview to Mark Deych: A School for Assassinations"]

[Text]

***Oleg Kalugin's New Revelations**

***The Secret of Georgiy Markov's Assassination**

***Spies at Lubyanka**

***A Murder at Someone Else's Hands**

[Deych] Oleg Danilovich, in an interview for Radio Liberty's London correspondent, you reported several interesting details about how the KGB helped Bulgarian State Security to prepare the assassination of Bulgarian Writer Georgiy Markov. What you reported caused a sensation in Bulgaria where the issue of Bulgarian State Security's illegal activities and its ties with the KGB are literally being discussed everywhere: on the streets, in homes, and in parliament. Could you add some details about the Markov Affair?

[Kalugin] Unfortunately, I am not familiar with the Radio Liberty broadcast on this issue because what was transmitted on the Markov Affair was taken from the manuscript of my book and there actually is an episode in it that is connected with the Markov Affair and with the preparation of his assassination. But unfortunately, I do not know how it sounded over the air waves. Therefore, I will simply set forth how I recall these events, how they began and how they developed.

Sometime at the beginning of 1978 a business conference took place in KGB Chairman Andropov's office at Lubyanka with few people in attendance including, besides Andropov, the then former KGB Intelligence Chief Kryuchkov (he is deputy KGB chairman), Kryuchkov's First Deputy Vice Admiral Usatov and Foreign Counterintelligence Chief Oleg Danilovich Kalugin. We discussed various issues of a routine nature and, during the course of this discussion Kryuchkov reported that he had received Bulgarian Minister of Internal Affairs Stoyanov's request to assist our Bulgarian friends in the physical elimination of Bulgarian Dissident Georgiy Markov who at one time was close to Zhivkov's family, had enjoyed their trust and had later left for the West and begun working for the BBC obviously on the grounds of political differences.

When Kryuchkov reported Stoyanov's request, Andropov perceived it in an extremely peculiar manner; he stood up and silently walked around the office and later said quite harshly and unambiguously—"I oppose political assassinations! I oppose us becoming involved in a matter which later cannot be forgiven, I am opposed!"

And then Comrade Kryuchkov said in a suppliant tone—"Well, Yuriy Vladimirovich, you will come to appreciate how we, how Comrade Stoyanov will answer Comrade Zhivkov, it looks like the Soviet Union's state security organs either do not trust Comrade Stoyanov or their attitude toward Comrade Zhivkov has become cooler and they will not be able to understand our negative answer." After this argument, the chairman, having thought it over once again, said: "Fine, then do it this way—no personal involvement whatsoever, render technical assistance, send instructors, provide all

required weapons, guns and poisons if necessary, let the Bulgarians do everything themselves."

Well, I, as a Directorate chief, having been present at that time naturally heeded the leader's words and after the conference was completed, I went to my headquarters at Yasenevo and from there I summoned the security service chief, then Colonel Sergey Mikhaylovich Golubev and gave him the assignment to contact the Directorate leadership. So, we call it the operational-technical directorate within whose framework special laboratory No 12 has operated for a long time now, for many decades, and the laboratory is engaged in preparing various special substances to physically eliminate people and to harm their health, including death. And therefore, when six months or even more ago, I said these same words, I specifically had Markov's assassination in mind. And at that time, I recall that all of the press—Western and Soviet—demanded details from me. I said: "I will talk in due time."

But it is most curious that today it is as if the Soviet press has become silent and it is suddenly not reacting at all to this report with the exception of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA which, frankly speaking, with bold youthful ardor nevertheless obtained interviews-commentaries from me with regard to KGB Press Center statements that, as usual, accused me of slander, thank God, but not for divulging a state secret!

[Deych] Incidentally, is it impossible to prefer charges against you?

[Kalugin] Well, in principle, anyone can prefer charges against me or against any citizen. In general, no intelligence service in the world ever admits assassinations and only documented or eye-witness testimony that is adequately convincing placed the executors of such actions at the pillory.

[Deych] Is the story that you are telling right now about the Markov Affair not a state secret?

[Kalugin] No, it is not a state secret, it is—as a matter of fact—a political assassination that was committed at the request of Bulgarian Leader, President, and Secretary General Zhivkov. It occurred without a trial, investigation, or sentence in Bulgaria, it was "fraternal assistance and solidarity with our Bulgarian comrades" and is essentially criminal in nature. I think that Zhivkov is the primary criminal in this matter. Stoyanov is also responsible for this matter but naturally he could hardly resist, this would have meant his retirement. Kryuchkov bears total moral responsibility because he actually convinced the KGB chairman to resort to this step. Incidentally, if we had more common sense and a sense of historical method, and I think that each statesman must think about this, we could have rejected the Bulgarians' request while telling them that we, since Stalin's death, have already not been involved with such matters for a long time. Therefore, excuse us, you can do what you

want yourselves. It would have been easy to refuse them and no one would have rebuked us. But how could we refuse Comrade Zhivkov!

[Deych] Oleg Danilovich, I will permit you to turn to those events about which you were speaking. You dwelled on the fact that you summoned Golubev to your office....

[Kalugin] I invited Golubev to my office, he drove to the operational-technical directorate and, using the Chairman's verbal order, obtained the required briefing from our technical specialists. And then he left for Sofia along with another comrade who was also my coworker.

There, he conducted the briefing for the Bulgarian comrades. The Bulgarians attempted to use the weapons they received on a prisoner who had been sentenced to death in order to observe in practice how Soviet poisons work. They injected the poison into the condemned prisoner using an umbrella-type pistol which is fired at a short distance and which pierces the clothing and the skin. The bullet dissolves in several hours and there are no traces other than a tiny entry hole after 24 hours. So the man will die from heart failure in a day or two. There are much more "tranquil" and quite persuasive methods to end someone's life and these poisons can be used even during an operation and can be introduced through food and drink. They exist in the form of special ointments that are applied on objects, say, on an automobile's steering wheel. And incidentally, this is what was proposed to eliminate Markov. This was the initial undertaking. But later our technical specialists thought that an accident was possible here. "And suddenly someone else and not Markov will open the door of the automobile, say, his relatives or friends, and then there will be a totally different victim!" Well, in order to avoid such an unforeseen situation, they decided to resort to a weapon which in the end would bring Markov to his grave in London—to the "umbrella." The Bulgarians carried out this action. Naturally I do not know who did this. They were Bulgarian intelligence agents who operate in Western Europe. Intelligence Chief Vasil Kotsev personally directed the operation. Incidentally, I recently learned that he died in an automobile accident. I was very surprised at this because it rarely occurs that intelligence chiefs die in automobile accidents. It seems to me, although I am asserting this based on speculative conclusions, that Comrade Kotsev probably was involved in more than just the Markov Affair. I even know reliably that he participated in the Kostov Affair. Kostov was a Bulgarian intelligence major who ran away to France and against whom an assassination attempt was organized on the Paris Metro. But the attempted assassination failed because the bullet turned out to be defective. And Kostov himself, having obviously been placed somewhat on guard by Markov's sudden death, turned to the doctors and the doctors discovered precisely this very bullet with the undissolved poison. And this became the subject, as far as I recall, of very animated and, I would say, sensational reports in the West, in any case in the French and English press.

But I must say that all of the operation's participants received awards. Golubev received a Bulgarian Order, I do not really which one, in my opinion it was the Combat Order of the Red Banner. I was also in general a participant and I cannot pose as innocent, I received a personal Belgian Browning from the hands of Minister of Internal Affairs Stoyanov with a bronze plaque attached to the weapon on which is inscribed: From Minister Stoyanov to General Kalugin, O.D. That is the history of the Markov Affair in brief.

[Deych] Oleg Danilovich, You mentioned the person sentenced to death on whom the poison that was intended for Markov was tested....

[Kalugin] As far as I know, Chebrikov participated in examining that issue but I was not present. Chebrikov was the curator of Laboratory No 12 and supervised work in the area of physically eliminating people.

At that time, some modifications were made in the technology, I do not know specifically which ones, but I know that Golubev returned to Sofia. As I recall, he was there a total of three times. This entire story, which began in 1978, sometime in the Spring if I am not mistaken, lasted six months. I am sure that my Bulgarian colleagues were very upset that they could not in any way bring their undertaking to a conclusion. Comrade Zhivkov is always asking: "Well, when, why, where are the results?" There were no results. All of us waited very impatiently. Finally a result was achieved.

[Deych] Oleg Danilovich, what did your personal involvement in this operation consist of?

[Kalugin] My personal involvement consisted of the fact that I invited Golubev and issued him the KGB Chairman's and Kryuchkov's order. That is all. Well, also of course my presence during all of the discussions and conversations where my involvement and words were not required. All of this was actually done by two people: Kryuchkov persuaded and the chairman, while resisting, approved.

[Deych] Oleg Danilovich, what in general can you say about the KGB's relations with Bulgarian State Security?

[Kalugin] They were relations of fraternal friendship. The Bulgarians never hid anything from us. They turned to us with all of their questions which nearly rattled them. We never refused them assistance.

[Deych] Oleg Danilovich, the next question, although you have already partially answered it. Former Bulgarian Minister of Internal Affairs Dimitr Stoyanov said in a DUMA newspaper interview that Kalugin was a KGB agent who subsequently, that is several years ago, began to work for British intelligence. What did your contacts with Stoyanov consist of?

[Kalugin] Stoyanov, as I already said, gave me that very Browning. I have a photograph in which Stoyanov is handing me the Order of the Red Banner. It is true that this award is not associated with this matter. In the

photograph, Comrade Andropov is standing to one side and is attentively observing what is transpiring.

As for Stoyanov's accusation, I am making allowances for his age when certain changes occur in the organism and possibly he has me confused with Gordiyevskiy. Naturally, I do not know precisely what he had in mind.

[Deych] The Bulgarian press wrote that the materials of the Georgiy Markov Affair were destroyed by three people—General Nanek Serdzhiyev, chief of Bulgarian State Archives; General Vlado Todorov, chief of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] 1st Administrative Department; and, General Stoyany Salovyy, former minister of Internal Affairs. Did you know any of them? If yes—what can you say about their ties to the KGB?

[Kalugin] I know Vladlen Todorov, he was Intelligence Chief Vasil Kotsev's first deputy. He was aware of the operation. He absolutely precisely knew how it was being carried out and by whom. He was a true friend of the Soviet Union and carried out the minister's and intelligence chief's orders. I think that he could not relate in any more detail how the Bulgarians carried out this entire operation.

[Deych] You did not know the two others?

[Kalugin] No. I never took part in archival matters. We had a specialized exchange on intelligence policy—this was Kotsev, Todorov, and on archival policy—the appropriate Soviet representatives from the KGB who are engaged with archives. So, we always observed the principle of narrow and limited contact that is linked with specific knowledge and a definite sphere.

[Deych] The current Minister of Internal Affairs Khristo Danov has stated that a KGB representative was present at all Bulgarian MVD Collegium sessions and that no decisions were made without his approval. What do you think, is that so and, secondly, how many KGB agents were there in Bulgaria?

[Kalugin] That is completely correct. Ivan Savchenko, who was the KGB representative to Bulgaria for many years and, incidentally, my neighbor, was actually present at all Bulgarian MVD Collegium sessions. He provided advice and consultation. As the senior comrade, he supervised their activities, although naturally he could not formally interfere. Essentially, he was the senior chief, if I can express it that way, and the Bulgarians recognized his seniority in some places from the point of view of operational-political matters.

Incidentally, I need to say that Savchenko himself did not particularly like Zhivkov and I recall that, in personal conversations with me in 1978-79, he said that this man will not bring any good to Bulgaria. This is the entire camarilla which existed around Zhivkov at that time, beginning with his daughters, the one who had died early and the other one who naturally conducted an unworthy life style and created a cult of this little czar, total gentleman and infallible leader of the country.

[Deych] And what can you say about the number of KGB agents in Bulgaria?

[Kalugin] Incidentally the KGB secret service was small. Our missions in socialist countries were all more or less identical: they numbered no more than two dozen men. The Berlin staff where we had several hundred men stood out. All of the others were negligible. Actually the entire staff was engaged in coordinating the activities of some Bulgarian service or other with the appropriate service from the Soviet side. But the Bulgarian services were structured, like the majority of socialist countries' organs, on the Soviet system. Therefore, each agent carried out his function with reference to which KGB directorate he represented in Bulgaria. For example, there was political intelligence, 1st Main Directorate; there was counterintelligence—2nd Main Directorate; and 5th Main Directorate on culture, the church, and ideology; archives—on archives; and, military counterintelligence. That is, each had its own representative and all of this was under one roof.

The next leader after him was Vladlen Fedorov. As far as I know, he is no longer in Bulgaria since relations with the Bulgarian services have been broken or at least have not received the old, former direction in activities and today I cannot say anything about is being done there.

[Deych] Oleg Danilovich, did Bulgarian State Security carry out any special tasks on assignment from the KGB?

[Kalugin] Well, I do not know if it did carry out such tasks. But I do not exclude that possibility because the degree of cooperation was great and there could have been individual cases when it would have been more convenient to suggest, say, that Bulgarian or Czechoslovakian intelligence do something themselves.

[Deych] Could Bulgarian State Security agents have acted on instructions from the KGB without informing its own leadership about this?

[Kalugin] Do you have the Bulgarian leadership in mind?

[Deych] Yes!

[Kalugin] This could have happened but it would have been special cases. We always, along with the official relations, also cultivated secret relations with individual intelligence service agents. Many agents, including Bulgarian intelligence service agents, sent information associated with behind-the-scenes activities by their side and provided an assessment of their leadership. That is, they introduced our agents into the atmosphere of their own internal problems. And this type of work was always highly valued. That is, I confirm that Bulgarian agents, just like others, Czech, German, I have the GDR in mind, went far beyond the framework of official cooperation.

[Deych] Please tell me were KGB agents, if you know, among the highly placed leaders of the Bulgarian Communist Party?

[Kalugin] I am sure that there were no such agents. The Soviet Communist Party ran the Bulgarian Communist Party, if you can express it that way, that is, the Bulgarian Communist Party, like many others, was subordinate to a single center—Moscow. And what the CPSU leadership said was law for any Eastern Europe communist party for long years and decades. You know what happened with Yugoslavia when Marshal Tito decided not to subordinate himself to orders from Moscow. All of the remaining parties acted appropriately—they went along with the Kremlin's policy. So the KGB could not, neither according to status nor according to the actual state of affairs, have any sort of agents in the Bulgarian Communist Party leadership. It is another matter that the leader of the KGB, that same Savchenko, could have personal relations with anyone of the Central Committee secretaries and maintain hospitable relations with him, visit him and at the same time clarify issues associated with the situation in the Bulgarian leadership but nothing more.

[Deych] You mentioned the name of Golubev. According to your information, he was the instructor sent to Bulgaria in order to train Bulgarian agents. Can you tell us any more about the skills and professional orientation of this man? Do you have any information about his contacts in Bulgaria?

[Kalugin] Golubev is a quite curious individual. He grew up in the KGB and primarily specialized in exposing foreign agents within intelligence. I need to say that until 1982-83, his efforts, by the way, like my own, because I was his chief, were quite unsuccessful. And we did not succeed in exposing a single CIA agent in the KGB system. But in the 1980's former CIA Agent Lee Howard appeared who voluntarily arrived at the Soviet embassy and revealed much information which resulted in numerous arrests. To a significant degree—they were KGB agents, intelligence agents, and Sergey Mikhaylovich Golubev burned his hands on this because Howard's testimony was inadequate, we can argue, to conduct complex measures to gather information on guilt. He received the rank of general. Golubev was distinguished by his extreme suspicion. He worked in Washington at one time and hit a light pole while drunk and ended up at the police station. Any Soviet citizen would have been immediately recalled for that. But former KGB Rezident A.T. Kireyev saved him. Later, Golubev worked in Cairo. In Cairo he also ended up drunk at the police station after a fight and he spent the night there. After that he returned to the Soviet Union. And despite all of this, he remained working at the KGB and reached certain heights. When I had already left Moscow for Leningrad, I learned about a case when he was found dead drunk in his own office with an open safe at 4 a.m. when the duty officer was making his rounds of the building at Yasenevo. Kryuchkov called him on the carpet at that time and Golubev, as other people describe it, and I do not know if they were present there or not, fell down on his knees and begged Kryuchkov for mercy. That is, Kryuchkov made Golubev into his own domesticated dog and from then on he faithfully served

Kryuchkov. And ultimately, thanks to Howard, he managed to achieve definite results. That is the biography.

[Deych] And what can you say about his professional skill?

[Kalugin] I do not think that it was that high. In general, in intelligence, the counterintelligence section was not distinguished by its skill. Gathering information on one's own citizens and then again on KGB agents and suspecting your own colleagues and officers.... Even we were not psychologically prepared for that. And the subsequent numerous exposures alone showed that, alas, that it turns out there are more spies in our own environment than in any Soviet civilian organization. Alas, these are the paradoxes of our lives!

[Deych] The USSR KGB Press Service recently stated that the Committee For State Security never had anything to do with Bulgarian Writer Georgiy Markov's assassination and, moreover, the KGB Press Center statement stated that you will most probably be charged with slander. How would you comment on this statement?

[Kalugin] I have already said that no world intelligence service ever admitted involvement in the assassination or complicity in this type of action. The KGB has generally never admitted anything and when 105 citizens were expelled from England—this was a provocation of English intelligence after the betrayal of Lyalin, the KGB agent in London. When they caught our people red-handed in New York, Washington, and other places—these were naturally FBI and CIA provocations. In my opinion, the KGB has not even admitted that Merkader was an NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] agent and directly, personally participated in Trotsky's assassination. I think that I can summon a dozen people who were aware of what was going on. I hope there are also witnesses from the Bulgarian side. I personally am ready to testify at any court under oath. Then it will be clear to any man that the assassination was committed using that type of weapon and this has generally been documented. In particular, the bullet was removed. Western intelligence has it. No intelligence service of the world could prepare one like it because no other one has been involved with it besides the CIA which had the potential and used it and prepared poisons to resolve issues maybe of a similar nature. Only the KGB, which has been involved with this since the 1930's, has sent dozens of men to their deaths using various weapons. I think that we should not have any doubts here.

[Deych] Oleg Danilovich, well nevertheless if you are charged with slander, how will you prove that your accusations are true?

[Kalugin] I think that I will prove it using the information I have at my disposal, that is while describing the details which cannot be fabricated, by naming the names of people who are alive (not like Andropov) and who can, incidentally, participate in confirming what I have said. I am also counting on this.

Humane Practices at Corrective Labor Institutions Sought

91UN1703A Kiev *PRAVDA UKRAINY* in Russian
23 May 91 p 3

[Interview with V.M. Korneychuk, lieutenant general in the militia and first deputy minister of internal affairs for the republic by V. Kuybin, date and place not specified: "And the Colony Must Be Humane"]

[Text] [V. Kuybin] Vladimir Mikhaylovich, in recent years the correctional labor system has found itself on the horns of a dilemma: on the one hand, it is subjected to harsh criticism in the mass media with demands being made for this sphere to be humanized in the most radical manner, and on the other, society, alarmed by the increase in crime, including organized crime, demands strict measures with regard to people who have violated the law.

[Korneychuk] Opinions of this kind can flourish only where legal awareness is at a low level and where there is reluctance to delve deeply into the information now being openly published concerning the activities of the correctional labor institutions and judicial practices. It is enough to consider the following figures. In recent years the structure of punishment measures applied to those who are convicted has undergone change. The number of those sentenced to imprisonment has been sharply reduced. In 1981 they amounted to 51.9 percent of all those convicted in our republic, while in 1990 they amounted to 34.5 percent. Judges have begun to apply more frequently those punishment measures which are unrelated to deprivation of liberty. Moreover, in 1985 and 1987 thousands of people were given the opportunity to return to their homes and families as a result of the amnesty.

At the initiative of the republic's Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) several dozen restrictions have been abolished in the last two or three years. They concern such "details" as permission for convicts to wear short hair styles as well as more substantial things: changes in the procedures for granting visits with relatives, for acquiring food stuffs and other necessary objects, and for receiving parcels and messages. We have now introduced in the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet a proposal for an amnesty to be held in connection with the adoption of the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Ukraine. However, I will not anticipate events. The people's deputies will have the last word. The restrictions which previously were noted on the permit of those released from a correctional labor institution (ITU), and which in essence encroached upon their rights, have been removed. The practice of sending people suffering from chronic alcoholism and drug addiction for forced treatment has been changed, and the length of time spent at an LTP [medical, labor treatment center for alcoholism] has been reduced.

The humanization of criminal punishment is by no means just empty noise. With each year it is becoming more specific in content. Unfortunately, there still exists a need to stop certain legal offenders with very harsh

measures. In practice this is what happens. For the commission of such crimes as premeditated murder, serious bodily injury, rape with aggravating circumstances and robbery with extreme violence, more than 90 percent are sentenced to imprisonment, and, moreover, for lengthy terms as a rule.

[Kuybin] However, despite the steps taken in the direction of humanization and the existing differentiation in the execution of criminal punishment, many professionals consider that the correctional labor system is in a serious crisis.

[Korneychuk] Crisis phenomena are present. Over an extended period of time we cannot achieve a reduction in the level of recidivist crime. Every fourth person who has served a sentence commits a crime again. Undoubtedly there is evidence of this in the recent instances of pressure on prison administrations, which have taken the form of hostage taking, group disobedience, vandalism by convicts and attempts to organize so-called strikes in the colonies. Our staff members are increasingly confronting attempts to revive various kinds of robber traditions within the convicts' environment.

The tension in the mutual relations between convicts and the staff personnel is not diminishing. One must say that the currently existing forms and methods of educational work with convicts have proved to be ineffective. The system of using convict labor is in disarray. We are faced with growing instability in the production relations which enterprises have with the ITU's under the conditions of emerging market relations. The practice of relying on the re-education of convicts through socially useful labor alone, which developed over many years within the ITU's, cannot but fail to arouse dissatisfaction.

All these phenomena provide evidence that one cannot count on success using the old legal, economic and organizational foundations of the correctional labor system. Changes are necessary.

[Kuybin] As far as I understand you, Vladimir Mikhaylovich, we are talking about reform in the sphere of criminal punishment.

[Korneychuk] Yes, that is exactly what we are talking about. The situation has been carefully and comprehensively analyzed. On the basis of this analysis we have worked out—taking into account the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Ukraine, and the minimal standards for the treatment of prisoners adopted by the UN—a program entitled "Basic Directions in the Reform of the Criminal Punishment System in the Ukrainian SSR." On 29 October 1990 the program was approved by the collegium of the Ukrainian SSR MVD and presented to the government of the republic. The reform is aimed at the social re-orientation of criminal punishment with consideration for international acts concerning human rights, the principles of legality, humanism, democratism, justice, differentiation and individualization of educational influences on convicts. A new criminal punishment code of the Ukrainian SSR

is being actively formulated. No other path except the path of reform exists. And we need to move along that path in a persistent, planned manner without stopping. A draft of the basic criminal legislation for the USSR and the union republics was recently published. It is being discussed quite actively in professional circles.

[Kuybin] Could you, if only briefly, dwell on the key aspects of this document?

[Korneychuk] So far the discussion concerns a draft legislative act. But the contours of the future criminal punishment system are already visible. First of all, it stipulates a broad range of punishments not related to the limitation or deprivation of liberty. Sanctions such as censure, fines, deprivation of the right to engage in certain occupations and activities, correctional work and the confiscation of property are called for. Imprisonment will be the more severe punishment. In this case the discussion concerns the serving of sentences in institutions which are now called special headquarters (spetskomendatory). And a new form of punishment—apprehension—will appear in the criminal punishment legislation.

[Kuybin] And which changes will affect the colonies directly?

[Korneychuk] For the first time there is talk about establishing Union correctional labor institutions. Those convicted of crimes against the state, participants in organized criminal groups, persons whose death sentences have been commuted to imprisonment, and certain other categories of criminals will serve their sentences in these institutions. According to the draft, the responsibility for organizing other types of correctional labor institutions is shifted to the jurisdiction of the republic-level organs.

As I have already said, a new criminal code for the republic is being worked out. In this regard the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs has introduced the appropriate proposals. We are proposing that people convicted of violent crimes and people who do not present a particular danger to the community in this regard not be held together. We also oppose putting in the same colony leaders from the criminal environment, malicious violators of the punishment regulations, and convicts with law-abiding intentions. For all types of colonies we stipulate gradual changes in the conditions under which convicts are kept. If a convict conducts himself in a disciplined manner and has a conscientious attitude toward work, then restrictions on his movements within the institution and even beyond its boundaries may be removed. For persons who do not want to start down the road of correction, conditions of strict isolation will be stipulated. But in any case we do not intend to restrict convicts' correspondence, nor do we intend to use the deprivation of visiting privileges as a penalty.

In order to maintain convicts' socially useful ties we shall strive to have the overwhelming majority of them serve

their sentences in places near where they lived before their arrest. It is thought that this kind of measure will help many convicts maintain ties with their families and their labor collectives and that it will be easier for them to rebuild their lives after their release.

The new approach to isolation conditions for convicts will, in our view, help to create the necessary preconditions for improving the situation in places where people are incarcerated. In this regard, we need openness. Let everyone who is concerned by the fate of convicts have an opportunity to visit the colonies and to converse with those serving their sentences. This can only work to the benefit of the the spiritual and moral renewal of people who are removed from life.

[Kuybin] And will adjustments be made in the organization of convicts' socially useful labor?

[Korneychuk] They are absolutely essential. Here we will take the route of increasing as much as possible the convicts' personal interest in the results of their labor. I see nothing terrible in having a convict who either does not have to pay compensation or who has already paid it beginning to earn decent money through honest labor. The program calls for an improvement in the working conditions in places of incarceration, as well as moral and material incentives for it.

[Kuybin] Have other initiatives been taken to improve the republic's correctional labor system?

[Korneychuk] We have already mentioned some of them to you, especially steps to humanize the serving of sentences. But we have been successful in some other areas as well. For example, an experiment carried out at several colonies to break detachments into smaller units was successful. It is one thing for a counsellor to have 100 people under him but another to have 50. At present the breaking up of detachments into smaller units has affected colonies in three oblasts. We will gradually expand this practice.

And psychologists, who are a type of specialist new to us in the colonies, have appeared. We are carrying out a great deal of work to improve daily living conditions. The renovation and construction of visiting quarters are being strictly monitored by the leadership of the ministry and the main administration for correctional affairs. We are working to improve the medical service for convicts. All of these components of our system must be implemented in accordance with the generally accepted norms of humane treatment and international rules.

At the same time one must not ignore the fact that certain categories of convicts, especially those who do not wish to start down the path of moral self-purification and correction, interpret our measures aimed at the humanization and democratization of the conditions under which sentences are served as a one-way street and are attempting to oppose their administrations. Many centuries of human experience testify that opposition and confrontation are not the best form of mutual

relations. We think—and this is the main condition of the reform being carried out—that relations between the personnel in the correctional institutions, the military and the people serving sentences must be built on mutual understanding, mutual trust and mutual respect. Only on this basis can one untie the knot of problems which have accumulated in the ITU system.

Now, when the first steps have been taken to implement reforms in the correctional labor system, all convicts must strictly observe the existing legislation and the conditions of their punishment. After all, we can hardly achieve the principles of humanization in a one-sided manner. At the same time, the law enforcement organs will stop in the most decisive and energetic manner any kind of extremist, illegal actions in places of incarceration within the framework of those powers which the law grants them. Those serving sentences must have no illusions on this score.

We cannot state today that we are ready to rid society of criminal recidivists. But we are obligated to begin working at a level which meets present-day standards.

Ukrainian Deputy Procurator on Rising Contraband

91UN1593A Kiev *PRAVDA UKRAINY* in Russian
17 May 91 p 3

[UKRINFORM interview with Ukrainian First Deputy Procurator D.A. Usatov: "Contraband is Ruining the Republic;" date and place not given]

[Text] At the beginning of his conversation with the UKRINFORM correspondent, Ukrainian SSR First Deputy Procurator D.A. Usatov cited the following data: last year, Ukrainian customs authorities initiated nearly 16,000 smuggling cases, during which they confiscated smuggled goods worth nearly 27 million rubles, including 10 million rubles' worth from 9,000 Soviet citizens. Compared with the preceding year, the number of such cases and the amount of the valuables confiscated have doubled.

[Correspondent] Dmitriy Aleksandrovich, these figures reflect a trend, do they not? But after all, every effect has its cause...

[Usatov] In recent years we have done away with unjustified restrictions on international communication; thus, there has been a significant increase in the number of Soviet citizens visiting foreign countries, and foreigners traveling to the USSR. In 1990, 12 million people proceeded across the state border in the western oblasts of the Ukraine alone (which is a million more than in 1989), and the number of vehicles crossing the border has increased several times over. Unfortunately, however, not everyone who enjoys these expanded opportunities for tourism and private business trips observes the established regulations for the import and export of consumer goods. And one can say without exaggeration that smuggling is becoming one of the most widespread and dangerous types of crimes in our republic; it is

undermining the economy, aggravating the shortage of consumer goods, increasing speculation, and illegally enriching various kinds of smart operators.

[Correspondent] Do you have any specific examples?

[Usatov] Quite a few. And at the same time we are confiscating valuables worth significant sums from citizens: for example, pearls worth 94,000 rubles, from S. Korepanov, a senior scientific fellow at the Odessa State University, who was convicted of smuggling; and video and audio cassettes and other household goods worth more than 2,000,000 rubles, from Z. Losevich, a citizen of the Republic of Poland. Foreign-made wristwatches worth 140,000 rubles, hidden in specially-adapted compartments on their buses, were confiscated from drivers V. Mashik and V. Tsiptak of Mukhachevo ATP 12106.

In ten days during the month of February alone, customs officials at the Mostiska customs inspection point in Lvov Oblast confiscated from citizens of the Republic of Poland over 2,000 TV sets, radios and tape players; 20,000 electrical household appliances and washing machines; 280 gasoline-powered chain saws [benzopil]; 32,000 items of bedding; 13 tons of meat products, 15,000 cans of food, 120,000 eggs, and 20,000 liters of alcoholic beverages. It is altogether clear that these negative phenomena are exacerbating the already-complex situation in the republic's domestic consumer market, and are causing significant economic harm.

[Correspondent] How do you define the term, contraband?

[Usatov] Contraband is the illegal transport of goods and other valuables across the state border of the USSR, having concealed them in special compartments, or using false customs documents and other papers, whether carried out in large quantities or by a group of persons or by misuse of one's official position. Illegal transport of goods occurs when it is accomplished without the knowledge of the customs institutions, without the appropriate permission, or by means of concealing them from customs inspection (for example, failure to report them on the customs declaration). Contraband in the amount of 10,000 rubles and over is considered major. In addition, in every discrete case, the question is decided in consideration of the historic and artistic value of an item of contraband, and its significance to the national economy.

[Correspondent] What sort of liability is prescribed for it by law?

[Usatov] The law prescribes administrative and criminal liability for smuggling, for citizens who have reached age 16. In accordance with Article 209 of the Ukrainian SSR Codex on Violations of Administrative Law, those found guilty are assessed a fine in the amount of 50 rubles, while responsible officials are fined up to 100 rubles with confiscation of the articles of contraband, the means of transport and other means intended for transporting

articles of contraband across the border, or for concealing them. More serious cases of contraband are punished in accordance with Article 70 of the Ukrainian SSR Criminal Codex, by incarceration for a period of three to ten years, with confiscation of property, with or without exile [ssylka] for up to five years.

[Correspondent] Are Soviet citizens on trips abroad as tourists or by invitation allowed to export manufactured goods and food items, and Soviet or foreign currency; and if so, in what amounts?

[Usatov] In accordance with customs regulations, citizens of the USSR temporarily traveling abroad on official or personal business (for example, by invitation), on tourist trips, for relaxation or treatment, are allowed to take with them articles for personal use, which must then be brought back to the USSR. At the same time, the purpose of the visit, the time of year, and the length of their stay, are taken into consideration. In addition each person traveling abroad is allowed to take with him as souvenirs and gifts single items of goods with a total value of 30 rubles retail, and may also carry up to 30 rubles cash in Soviet currency per person, without the right to spend them abroad. This sum shall be entered in the customs declaration, and upon their return the money is subject to be brought into the USSR once again.

It is forbidden to take out radio-electronic goods and electric household appliances; sewing, washing and knitting machines; cameras, refrigerators and vacuum cleaners; furs and carpets; automobile spare parts and building materials; caviar, coffee and cocoa; meat and meat products; sugar, oatmeal, and certain other goods and products.

Jewelry and other household items made of precious metals and gems are allowed to pass through customs only for personal use, and must be recorded on the customs declaration; these items must be brought back to the USSR upon one's return. It is authorized to take out foreign currency previously acquired by legal means, and also that received at the USSR Foreign Economic Bank and other specialized banks on the basis of certification or customs declaration.

[Correspondent] But how do things stand in those cases when citizens go abroad for a permanent place of residence?

[Usatov] Here there are different conditions. Citizens resettling at a permanent place of residence abroad may take out of the USSR items which belong to them and which are intended for their personal use.

It has been established that a person may take out an automobile, a motorcycle, motor scooter or moped (one unit per person), and spare parts and accessories for them. A family is allowed to take home radio-electronic equipment; sewing, washing and knitting machines; a refrigerator, vacuum cleaner and domestic electrical appliances; and a camera (but not more than one of each item named).

Jewelry and other household articles made of precious metals, gems and pearls, may be taken out if their cost is calculated at no more than 5,000 rubles, per person, regardless of age, if they do not possess significant artistic, historical, scholarly or other cultural value. Food items may be passed through on the same basis established for citizens going abroad on personal matters.

At the same time I cannot help note that the existing law does not address with sufficient precision the question of the amount of consumer goods that fall under the category of "for personal use." Nor is the question resolved of responsibility for committing numerous violations in this connection. As a result, in essence a channel has appeared through which a significant amount of manufactured goods and food products from our consumer market, which everyone needs so badly, is crossing the border.

[Correspondent] I suppose that there are also plenty of facts on this regard too?

[Usatov] More than enough. I hope the readers will forgive me for such an excess of figures, but they are the best evidence. A study of the customs declarations of 115 citizens who departed via the customs posts of the Transcarpathian Oblast to take up permanent residence in the CSFR [Czech and Slovak Federal Republic] and Hungarian Republic in the first six months of last year, showed that they took with them 22 tractors, including 10 powerful T-150's valued at 18,000 rubles each, 18 motor blocks, 42 garden huts, 65 trailers, 43 wood-working lathes, 24 motorboats, 27 cement mixers, 35 gasoline powered chain-saws, 440 cubic meters of sawn lumber, 3,150 sheets of roofing slate, 1,200 square meters of parquet flooring, and other items.

In September 1990, at the Reni customs post in Odessa Oblast, upon inspection of the baggage of citizen Kekh-nopulo who was leaving for Greece, the following items not listed in the freight documents were discovered: 193 carpets, 1,863 tablecloths, 9,000 meters of fabric, about 3,000 towels, 1,200 quilt covers, and electrical goods and cameras worth 160,000 rubles.

[Correspondent] But where on earth are these people getting such goods, which are in such short supply now? After all, the shelves in the stores are empty...

[Usatov] Materials from our investigations and inspections indicate that on the whole these goods are acquired right at the trade establishments, and at warehouses and stores. Numerous instances of misappropriation have been established on the part of trade workers who, taking advantage of their position, buy up the goods themselves in connection with trips abroad, or enter into criminal association with citizens traveling abroad.

Recently a group of responsible officials of the trade organizations in the city of Sumy were arrested (Ye. Drozdova, a department chief at the Oblkoopleskhozstroytorg [Oblast Cooperative Lumber and Building Materials Trade] depot; Ye. Kondratyeva chief

of the planning and economic department at the Sumy-drev Association; and others), for trying to send a shipment of electrical appliances to Poland, via other people, for resale (pumps, drills, chainsaws, irons). Last March G. Klimenko, senior commodity expert at the Dneproprudnoe Inter-regional Depot of the Zaporozhye Oblast Union of Consumers' Cooperatives, was arrested for systematically buying up items in short supply for shipment abroad. During the search, the following items were confiscated from her: 70 items of jewelry, 90 pairs of shoes, 50 watches, and other items worth over 50,000 rubles; also confiscated were \$3,000.00 U.S. and 500 German marks.

Also brought to criminal justice was a group of officials at a combine of the Zakarpatstroy public catering trust, headed by Yu. Glyudzik, the director. Clothing, linen and electrical appliances acquired from the wholesale depots were written off on false documents, after which these goods were acquired by trade officials for export abroad while on tourist trips.

[Correspondent] The press is reporting left and right that certain enterprises are shipping scarce raw materials abroad under the guise of waste materials; they sell them for a song, and receive in return household appliances, video and audio systems, instead of the equipment that is needed for production.

[Usatov] Yes, that is one type of contraband activity, which has become quite widespread of late. Certain administrators of state and cooperative enterprises conclude business deals that are not advantageous to our national economy with foreign firms, while selling them extremely scarce, stockpiled raw materials and goods as industrial wastes, or as their own production, and in return receive goods that are worth significantly less, such as household goods, which are often intended for personal use.

Last year N. Siryachenko, deputy general director of the Khimprom [chemical industry] Production Association in Sumy, was convicted for exporting more than 200 tons of titanium oxide worth more than 215,000 rubles from the USSR under the guise of waste materials; also A. Yakhnev, director of the Kamenets-Podolskiy Canning Factory, for purchasing household appliances and musical instruments in the FRG, instead of equipment, with state funds which did not belong to the factory (25,000 marks). At the present time, cases in this category are being investigated by the Ukrainian SSR KGB directorate in Transcarpathian, Nikolaev, Lugansk and other oblasts.

[Correspondent] How effective are we in interdicting contraband activities in the republic?

[Usatov] Depending upon the situation that has taken shape in this or that region, state customs inspection organs, or organs of the KGB and MVD are taking practical steps to step up the struggle with this dangerous type of lawbreaking. The Ukrainian SSR Procuracy and its organs in the localities are maintaining oversight of

strict execution of the laws directed against the battle with contraband. In 1990, about 13,000 persons were subjected to administrative liability for customs violations, including 8,000 Soviet citizens; 67 criminal cases were brought to court, and 23 persons were convicted; and, a considerable amount of valuables were confiscated from those who were detained.

One cannot keep silent about the fact that instances of bribery and malfeasance in office among customs inspection officials have been uncovered. The Ukrainian SSR Procuracy has brought to criminal liability I. Maslo, deputy chief of the Ukrainian Territorial Customs Inspectorate, for taking bribes in the amount of 8,000 rubles from Vietnamese citizens working in the Ukraine, for passing their cargo, in which there were motorcycles, medicines, ball-bearings, and food products worth a total

of 180,000 rubles, without officially conducting a customs inspection; Maslo was sentenced to imprisonment. The criminal case of A. Klyuchnikov, former senior inspector at the Kerchensk Customs Post, has been sent to trial; and the work of N. Moroz, an official at the Marnupolskiy Customs Post, is being investigated for illegal activities.

[Correspondent] What should have been done to step up the battle with contraband?

[Usatov] In our view, further improvement in legislation on these questions will undoubtedly help. Recently the USSR Supreme Soviet has adopted the USSR Customs Codex, and a law "On Customs Affairs in the Ukrainian SSR" has been sent to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet for examination. One would like to hope that they will be adopted as soon as possible.

Supreme Soviet Correspondent Notes Difficulties in Press Coverage

91UN1722A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 12,
Mar 91 p 18

[Interview with Anatoliy Stepovoy, co-chairman of the Association of USSR Parliamentary Journalists by Natalya Kishchik, date and place not specified: "Work in the Kremlin Is Becoming Dangerous"]

[Text] That is the conclusion which parliamentary journalists came to, and they have joined together in an association. One of those who initiated its founding is our colleague, newsman Anatoliy Stepovoy, who also became one of its five co-chairmen; the latter have undertaken to formulate the association's charter.

Anatoliy Stepovoy is 38, and has worked at IZVESTIYA for three years. His articles are frequently published on the front page; he sends them from the Kremlin straight into the paper. He is known as one of those at IZVESTIYA who has managed to overcome the barrier of publishing only official reports from the sessions, having won the right first to do his own reporting and now his own commentary. He is one of a small group of journalists who have come to the editorial department only recently, but who have already earned respect in what is—to put it bluntly—a difficult environment for making the front page on session days without fail, for his competence in what has been recently, the most popular subject—parliament. He knows all the deputies—their views and their misconceptions. He expresses his opinion openly.

I will not hide that I, recently a reporter in the information department at IZVESTIYA, who also wrote for the morning edition, frequently wondered how this person, who by no means resembles Hercules, had the strength to do so much hard work day after day. When I left late, I would meet him in the editorial office where he had just come from the session; when I arrived in the morning, I would meet him in the halls, taking material to the secretariat or already hurrying to the session. And he does not live nearby; he lives an hour away in Mytishchi. It is possible that respect for his night work regime is why he is among that very small group of people to have been given a couch in the office. But this is the only privilege which he enjoys at the office. His wife received the apartment in Mytishchi through her job as a specialist in English language and literature. In general, Anatoliy has a good family with an understanding attitude toward his work, and his wife herself has been working as a journalist for several years since she changed fields. Their sons (one is 12 and the other is 16) are quite independent and are not a cause for concern. The older one intends to study in the journalism department, and he shares his father's views, although they may argue in loud voices. However, as Anatoliy reassures us, the family does not deprive the future journalist of the right to his own opinion. The younger one says that he does not want the

kind of life that his dad has, and it is clear that he will do something in the field of commerce.

What else? Anatoliy has a pleasant, calm manner in conversation. He is able to carry on a dialogue and possesses the gift of being able to persuade people that his opinion is right. He dresses modestly. I know that he visited the West for the first time several months ago; he went at his own expense to Spain with a tourist group made up of journalists.

I took the report on the establishment of the Association of USSR Parliamentary Journalists as an appropriate occasion to ask Anatoliy what life and work are like for those who are called "parliamentary journalists" in the editorial offices.

[Kishchik] What do your professional obligations consist of, Anatoliy?

[Stepovoy] It is probably no secret that two years ago parliamentary journalism was farmed out to TASS. I think that those newspaper correspondents who in May 1989 were, along with our renewed parliament, beginning their work in the Supreme Soviet, had little or no idea of what this work involved. We had no traditions nor any experience in this area.

Everything began with the congress; at that time accreditation was quite broad and to a certain degree disorderly. Because the Supreme Soviet had no press center (it appeared in the summer of 1989), it is difficult to talk about the numbers of parliamentary correspondents at that time. Two years have passed, and of those who "covered" the First Congress of People's Deputies and the first session of the Supreme Soviet, only two to four people remain, no more.

This happened because (and this is an objective fact and not someone's whim or machinations) the parliamentary journalist has not been able to subscribe to the canons of Soviet journalism as it has developed. He has found himself between a rock and a hard place.

The Supreme Soviet, in whose press center we are accredited, sees our tasks, shall we say, in its own way. Those tasks are expressed in this formula: accredited journalists must support the authority of the parliament. The newspapers, however, are interested in having correct information from parliament; they have a legitimate desire to receive reports which convey the pulse of life and which present the opposing positions which are expressed at the sessions, in committee meetings and in the halls.

In summary, almost everyone with whom we started has left. And those who left were not inferior to the others, but they could not tolerate the stressful situation which is created when you have no back-up, when you are under "fire" every day.

And then there is another aspect. When the deputies know that their remarks in parliament will end up in the paper or on the television screen, they view them in a

different light. But the parliamentary correspondent is not a machine or a robot; those remarks are interpreted by a living person, they are "served up" with his own attitude, and at a specific, professional level. But the parliamentarians would like to look somewhat different, more attractive in the eyes of the public. Not all of the deputies have accepted the simple truth that we are not their "assistants"; that is, after all, what they have called the journalists.

[Kishchik] But let us return to the question of whether you are comfortable working in the Kremlin.

[Stepovoy] Judge for yourself. We attend sessions of the Supreme Soviet for eight hours, as the deputies do. But then there is another shift. We then go to the editorial office and write for the next issue of the paper. We finish at one or two in the morning. It is also necessary to write for the evening edition. Let us say that the first session finishes at 1200 and it is necessary to send the material immediately. It is no good to anyone later, it will not make the edition, and here a problem arises. What kind? You will not believe it. How do we send copy from the Kremlin? There is a problem with communications. The deputies also have a 30-minute break, and they also hurry to the telephones, of which there are very few.

[Kishchik] And how are matters with regard to information?

[Stepovoy] It was only in the first weeks and months of work in the Supreme Soviet that we, the representatives of the central newspapers, television and radio, each received a package with all the necessary documents. They included plans, possible speeches and appeals, that is, everything that the deputies themselves had at the beginning of the working day. And one did not have to work "from voice." But that did not last long. I must say that in the two years the press center of the Supreme Soviet has not only failed to improve, but has actually made our working conditions more difficult. This is not only my opinion but also that of my colleagues. At present they are distributing some things to us, but with a delay. Sometimes we do not receive documents at all; we get hold of them as we can.

[Kishchik] And your work place, you have a table? There is a place for journalists to sit in parliament? Do they "assign" you to the balcony?

[Stepovoy] Journalists are divided into two categories, those who can go to the balcony, and those who do not have this right...

Three monitors were set up in the lobby, and there is a table for the press center of the Supreme Soviet; it is headed by Arkadiy Afrikanovich Maslennikov. We had a little storeroom off the Maly Hall; we considered it our working place. But when we arrived for the fifth session, we saw that we had been deprived of even this little corner. They simply put us in the common hall in the foyer, where there are only three telephones in all...

[Kishchik] And how many journalists?

[Stepovoy] More than 200 journalists have been accredited, according to Arkadiy Maslennikov. However, if we are speaking openly, no more than 20-25 work regularly, every day. I am talking about Soviet journalists, but more than 100 foreign journalists have also been accredited.

But they have no problems. They have portable transceivers. They can connect up with any "point" on the planet. They open up what looks like a very simple bag; they print the text, and it is received some place where people are waiting for it. They do it in less time than it takes us to get in touch with our home base two steps away from the Kremlin.

Do not ask whether we have put these questions before the press center. We have. More than once we have suggested that our work should be shifted to the operational level enjoyed by parliamentarians in civilized countries, where the printing of all speeches is considered to be mandatory. Of course, the speeches would not be "corrected," but we would have the tape in 10-15 minutes, and there would be time to clarify the figures. The technology exists, but we do not have it. And as for working space, we are told that there is none available in the Supreme Soviet. But space is found for other services.

They have promised us that in time all this will be settled somehow, but time is moving on and the working conditions are constantly getting worse. We have already discussed these problems of the parliamentary press corps—it was in the fall of last year. At that time Ivan Dmitriyevich Laptev, chairman of the Council of the Union, gathered us all together. A detailed conversation took place. But there was no follow-up to it. It is true that even then Ivan Dmitriyevich supported the idea of establishing an association of parliamentary journalists. All the parliaments of the world have such associations, and now that we have one, we hope that at the forthcoming meeting with Ivan Dmitriyevich we will be able to return to the discussion of the details of our work and of our interaction with the Supreme Soviet as well as with the publications which we represent.

At that time, in the fall, Arkadiy Maslennikov was assigned to conduct the negotiations concerning the charter. But we have despaired of finding a common language with him; we do not get either a "yes" or a "no" from him, and time is passing. In addition, it is well known that pressure on journalists in the Supreme Soviet has increased of late, especially in the last three or four months. Reports published in various newspapers have frequently been scrutinized. Voices have been raised in favor of lifting accreditation for this or that journalist, who is inconvenient to this or that deputy or group of deputies. And we have ended up being threatened with loss of the right to exercise our profession. After all, a parliamentary journalist who is deprived of accreditation is in effect deprived of the opportunity to engage in

parliamentary—political—journalism! And we found ourselves to be completely without protection.

At a journalists' meeting which took place recently, two versions of the charter were proposed. And there are two alternatives for registering the association: within the Union of Journalists or within the USSR Ministry of Justice in order to become a juridical person. Five members of an organizing buro were chosen, and they were assigned to work out a draft charter. The reaction in parliament to the emergence of the Association of USSR Parliamentary Journalists is natural. They declared us to be left-wing extremists and imposters, who had seized the initiative within the press corps. We did not hide our intentions; however, despite an invitation from the Supreme Soviet, no one from the press center came to the organizing meeting.

[Kishchik] Let us clarify one more detail. Whose help are you counting on? How are you intending to protect the journalist who has found himself in an extreme situation? After all, judging by your words, it has indeed become dangerous to work in the Kremlin.

[Stepovoy] Once more I would like to say that it is not our task to enter into a confrontation with parliament. We have mutual interests. And it is most important of all to establish civilized, mutually acceptable relations based on laws which regulate the rights and obligations of journalists. But we have a "weapon" which is pretty good. It is called *glasnost*. Parliament is a very good school of political life. I have learned much there.

[Kishchik] Any school presumes acquisition.... But what have you personally had to reject?

[Stepovoy] Neo-Bolshevism. Bolshevism, it seems to me, is an intolerance of other opinions, which, unfortunately, is now being displayed among the democrats. It is the non-acceptance of different opinions and different thoughts. And the methods which the democrats are using today in the attempt to fight conservatism are no different from those which they are using to fight us. This frightens me and puts me on guard. I see as well the incandescence and the growth of personal ambitions. It would be good to avoid all this, at any rate when talking about common matters.

Need for New Press Distribution System Emphasized

91UN1754A Moscow *GOLOS* in Russian No 18,
13-19 May 91 p 10

[Article on Speech by Yevgeniy Manyakin: "You Want to Publish a Newspaper? Then Think About How to Distribute It"; "Concluding Remarks on the Journalists' Union Congress on a Confederative Basis"]

[Text] Leading Organs of the USSR Journalists' Union

Elected chairman of the USSR Journalists' Union on a confederative basis was Eduard Mikhaylovich

Sagalayev; first deputy chairman, Vladimir Valentinovich Sukhomlinov; deputy chairmen—Vsevolod Leonidovich Bogdanov, Journalists' Fund general director; Vladimir Makarovich Povolyayev, chairman of the Scientific-Creative Commission; and Nugzar Akakievich Popkhadze, chairman of the International Commission.

Elected executive secretary of the USSR Journalists' Union was Igor Alekseyevich Bondarenko, and secretaries—Vladimir Yegorovich Ganin, administrator of affairs; and Pavel Semenovich Gutontov, chairman of the Committee for the Defense of Free Speech and the Rights of Journalists.

Deputy USSR Minister of Communications Yevgeniy Manyakin (from his speech at the Congress):

As of this year, our ministry's losses for distribution of newspapers and magazines have amounted to approximately 600 million rubles per year. This year services for delivering the press have been nearly doubled, and now comprise from 50 to 70 percent of the face value for 1990.

Has this addition solved all our problems? Alas! The communications organs have received only an additional 350 million rubles; and the losses, as I said—are 600 million.

What awaits us in 1992? We are coming to the conviction that we must reject payment for services as a percentage of the face value. For the face value varies by publication; whereas the amount of work, regardless of the price of a magazine or newspaper, is the same. Therefore, the number of copies and the distance they must be shipped are important. Hence the tariffs, which the republics have already declared, will be differentiated. Thus, for example, delivery of newspapers to Kamchatka will be more expensive than delivery of publications printed and distributed in Moscow. We believe that the communication enterprises and publishing houses are correct in taking this position.

Expenses for press shipment services via rail transport have quadrupled; instead of eight kopeks per kilometer by mail coach, we must now pay 31 kopeks. Cost of shipment by air transport has tripled. As a result, this year we must pay these agencies an additional 400 million rubles.

The price of taxi service for transportation of mail in Moscow has increased from five rubles to 15, and the rental cost of postal facilities has increased by a factor of 10. A railroad mail coach, which only recently cost 50,000 rubles, today costs up to 200,000, and in the future will cost 500,000 rubles... And if delivery of a complete set of *PRAVDA* today costs 2.25 rubles, in the light of the above facts delivery cost will rise to 3.90 rubles; that is, a 70-percent increase. Where can we get that kind of money? And who will distribute newspapers and magazines today, if the highest tariff rate at the city post office is 140 rubles?

Such are the realities.

In order for a new publication to get into the subscription catalog, a contract with us must be concluded in May, and at that time we must decide on the prices and begin to print the catalogs; and between August and October, begin to take subscriptions.

What else must be done? Publishers, editorial offices and Ministry of Communications [MinCom] enterprises must immediately take action to abolish the taxes. After all, not one post office in the world is subject to taxation, because the post office is a service structure for the very widest strata of the populace. On the contrary, in many countries in the world, the post office receives subsidies. We must be more aggressive in publishing advertisements in the newspaper. In Finland, for example, one-fourth of the newspaper columns is devoted to advertisement; as a result, three-fourths of the edition is paid for by ads, and only one-fourth of its budget by subscription. Obviously, a sponsorship movement is needed for the assistance and salvation of the publications.

USSR MinCom, for example, in spite of its poverty, decided to take PIONERSKAYA PRAVDA under its wing; we shall distribute 4,000,000 copies on exceptionally favorable terms. Add to this all the magazines for the blind, and technical journals for the communications workers. We will partially subsidize the publishing houses printing magazines for communication enterprises. That is our contribution.

It is necessary to establish alternative services for press distribution. No one in our agency is fighting for monopolism. On the contrary. For we are at the limit of our capacity. We are refusing to distribute new publications. And we refuse because there is no transportation and no accommodations, and we have become poorer than we were before. In this situation, the creation of alternative services would be a blessing. Incidentally, they have already begun to appear. The weekly MARAFON is being distributed through "Sportloto" kiosks, and the magazine NASHE NASLEDIE [Our Heritage] via book stores. In Leningrad, a combined mail and publishing enterprise has been established...

This is one way. Another is—for the Publishers' Union to start thinking about a system for press distribution. And we are prepared to participate in this; for it is impossible to live on what we have today. Moreover, only in the Soviet Union are subscriptions made by communication workers. In all the rest, there is no middleman. Consequently, you may hire at your own expense one form of distribution or another, and be the master of your own publication.

From the Editor

Yes, esteemed readers, Yevgeniy Alekseyevich is absolutely correct: it is time to really think about an alternative service for distribution of the press. Otherwise, we shall not survive. If even today Soyuzpechat [national press association] takes up to 70 percent of the face value

from us for delivery, then tomorrow, with the increasing expenses for transportation and shipment, rental of postal facilities, and increased wages for mail personnel, they will demand from us twice the face value of a newspaper or magazine. And where shall we get the money?

Yevgeniy Alekseyevich proposes using advertisements more widely, allowing up to one-fourth of the space in the newspaper for ads. That is a fine thing. Only the deputy minister forget to say where on earth we can get such ads in a country in which there is absolutely nothing to advertise!

Comrade Manyakin was highly offended with the delegate from Leningrad who reported that the Soyuzpechat kiosks in the city on the Neva, instead of selling newspapers and magazines, were offering the purchasers chewing gum, stamps, medallions, tooth brushes, and charm bracelets... And why are they using these capacities, which, in the words of Yevgeniy Alekseyevich, are not sufficient for distribution of the press?

Incidentally, what is the sense in asking questions, if the deputy USSR minister of communication affirms that the tax for delivering the press in the country has risen by no more than 30 percent, and the people in the audience assure us that in Fergana Oblast it has jumped eleven-fold! That, they say, all the kiosks of Soyuzpechat are crammed with publications, and you can't even squeeze in another newspaper, when the audience insists that in Pskov, Novgorod, Murmansk and Arkhangelsk—there are not only never any new publications from Moscow on sale, but not even the traditional central editions!

This is a dialog among fools.

And how long can one stand with an outstretched hand? At the congress, statements were made about expanding commercial activity. Well, let us start with alternative services for press distribution; the moreso, that small starts have already been made. The first kiosks have appeared in Leningrad. In Kharkov and Rostov-na-Donu they can offer you the latest edition of independent publications from Moscow. A new agency is commencing its activity in Eastern Siberia and in the Far East... Moreover, they do not charge much for the distribution: 20-25 percent of the face value. And at the same time they do not complain, like Comrade Manyakin, that for such a modest fee, they fly into one's paper tube.

But new prospects lie ahead: newspapers from all ends of the earth—by communication satellite, by fax...

The old partner, whom we once considered the only light in the window, is leaving. Let us keep our spirits up, and establish new partners. The sooner we create them, the sooner Soyuzpechat itself will return to us with sensible proposals.

Rising Paper, Delivery Costs Imperil Newspaper Subscriptions

91UN1566A Moscow TRUD in Russian 22 May 91 p 1

[Article by Ye. Varshavskaya: "A Dialogue Is Better Than an Ultimatum. New Prices and Tariffs Will Affect Not Only Publishers and Readers, but the Soyuzpechat Itself"]

[Text] This could have been expected, despite the fact that unpleasantness is always unexpected. Economic calamities which rained down on the collectives of newspapers and magazines, and ultimately on the readers, are continuing. Complications with newsprint (first a shortage and then an astronomical price increase) have been exacerbated by difficulties with the delivery and distribution of the mass media. Having jacked up prices for delivery, the Soyuzpechat [Main Administration for Press Distribution of the USSR Ministry of Communications] refused, in the process, to deliver the newspapers to subscribers on days off and holidays. As a result, millions of subscribers were forced to cancel their subscriptions. A new blow has now been struck at those who nonetheless managed to spare money for their favorite newspapers or magazines in their family budgets in the form of a global price increase.

At a recent conference devoted to the organization of the subscription campaign for 1992, the USSR Ministry of Communications released new terms for service fees. The postal department proposed (if we may use this word for a categorical document) a contractual system and tariffs, justifying the need for higher service fees by citing higher rates for transportation by rail and by air.

It appears that, in keeping with monopoly logic, the leaders of the postal department decided to improve their own standing at the expense of publications and their readers. After all, the document prepared contains many truly surprising provisions, for example, on terms for including publications in the Soyuzpechat catalog. A newspaper or a magazine should pay 177 rubles [R] for every line of information plus R20 for any change in order to be honored by an entry in the catalog. If a publication which has forked over the money for the catalog would like to learn about the progress of the subscription campaign, it will have to be so kind as to pay an additional impressive sum of R4,200!

Having given in to the fashion of setting up every manner of funds, the Ministry of Communications made another original proposal: Organize an "insurance fund to pay for efforts to return funds if publications fold, to make changes in subscription terms, for the publication of periodicals behind schedule, and to refund money to subscribers for issues which have not been published." The ministry even determined a contribution—in the amount of a planned monthly press run for subscription copies.

Communications workers designed it as favorably to themselves as they could when they decided to charge

publishing houses for all losses due to copies unsold at retail. A negligent newsstand attendant may now disregard the sale of newspapers and magazines in peace: Publishers themselves will have to be liable for the return of unsold publications, whereas a "diligent" attendant may report even what he has sold as "unsalable," and pocket the proceeds.

Everyone understands that under present difficult conditions considerable efforts are necessary in order to survive, keep employees, and save the industry from peril. It is clear that things are not coming up roses in the Soyuzpechat itself either. The work of postal personnel is not becoming any easier, and their salaries have hardly increased along with last year's tariff increase. As the management of the agency reported, the agency would make nothing by virtue of the new contract; it would merely cover its outlay. However, do the managers of the department fail to understand that attempts to solve one's problems by the not too civilized method of bringing clients to their knees will merely exacerbate these problems, causing new difficulties for publishers and readers in the process?

After all, one cannot believe in earnest that profits of the communications industry will increase in direct proportion to the increase in the cost of their services. Last year's sad experience is more than just convincing. Prices for printed matter increased, and the circulation of many publications dropped abruptly when prices for newsprint and fees for postal services increased. The Ministry of Communications generated mere millions in additional profits instead of the expected billions of rubles.

The new document containing new tariffs, which has been distributed by the TsRPA [expansion not identified] Soyuzpechat, is a new blow not only at publishers and readers. This will definitely backfire against the Soyuzpechat itself. The circulation of many publications will drop to minimal levels, and many publications will just fold. What will the employees of the agency distribute then? Will the Soyuzpechat have to change its line of business? By the way, this process has already been initiated: It will suffice to look at the counters of newsstands which are piled with every manner of buttons, stickers, posters, and hair clips instead of periodicals...

Could this be "a way out?" However, what about glasnost then, so far the only accomplishment of perestroika? After all, accepting the new document would be tantamount to signing their own death warrant for many editorial offices. For example, the circulation of TRUD is tremendous, and the geography of its distribution embraces the entire country, all the way to outlying areas. Amounts which TRUD will have to give to Soyuzpechat have now been calculated. Two kopeks per copy, or R30,000 daily, will be necessary to have our newspaper delivered to Muscovites. Kyrgyz postal workers "requested" 10 kopeks per copy of the newspaper, and Lithuania and Estonia—nine kopeks... Let us

count now: Subscriptions to *TRUD* generate R255 million per year, less the self-cost of producing the newspaper—R192 million. On top of this, less a tremendous amount—R127 (!) million which will have to be paid to the *Soyuzpechat* for distribution. We end up R64 million in the red. However, in addition, the communications department is demanding that the publishing house pay R60 million, no more and no less, as a bond for accepting subscriptions...

There are only two ways out: Either to increase newspaper subscription rates substantially, or discontinue the publication of *TRUD* and print superprofitable detective stories and erotic brochures.

Both are unacceptable to us. We do not want to, and do not have a right to, violate our obligations to our readers and the friends of our newspaper. After all, subscribers will suffer in either case, because they will either stop receiving the newspaper, or they will have to pay a substantial amount for it.

Meanwhile, even before this, we were forced to increase the retail price for our newspaper from eight to 10 kopeks, once again because prices for newsprint and postal rates increased.

For the same reason, we decided to suspend the acceptance of subscriptions to our newspaper, having incurred the dissatisfaction of those who for some reason failed to subscribe to *TRUD* until the end of the year. In response to this criticism, the editorial office is resuming the acceptance of subscriptions for the months remaining until the end of the year, but at a price equal to that of retail this time. The editorial office will simply have no funds to purchase newsprint and pay for postal services otherwise.

Under the circumstances, publishing houses are entitled to take any measures in order to defend the interests of their readers.

At the conference at which the Ministry of Communications made its ultimatum, the publishing houses resolved to make a move in response: To engage in delivering and distributing the periodicals themselves by uniting in an association, bypassing the *Soyuzpechat*, and signing direct contracts with communications personnel in the field. However, this will hardly bring about favorable results under the current circumstances. After all, it would be better to come to an agreement rather than speak the language of ultimatums, and to find a solution acceptable to all on the basis of common sense and strict economic calculations.

Moscow Survey Ranks Popularity of Newspapers
91UN1977A Moscow *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*
in Russian 8 Jun 91

[Unattributed article: "NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Against the Backdrop of the Moscow Press: In Five

Months *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA* Has Become One of the Most Popular Publications in Moscow"]

[Text] Staff members of the Moscow division of the VTsIOM [All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion] conducted a survey of 2,716 Muscovites, in which the following question, among others, was asked: "Which newspaper, in your view, is the best?" The results of the answers to that question are presented in the table published below (with respondents broken down by sex, age, education and occupation, the results are given in percentages). In addition, in parentheses along with *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*'s results, the ranking that *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA* held for each class of respondent is indicated.

Without getting into the details of the results that are presented—the attentive reader can figure them out for himself—we would like to note certain facts that are very pleasant—we will not hide it—for those who produce *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*:

Moscow's youngest newspaper (it has been coming out for just five months; even *KURANTY*, *ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA* and *ROSSIYA* are several months older than *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*) has overtaken most of the other newspapers and newspaper-type weeklies in terms of reader popularity.

Occupying sixth place overall, *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA* is the only newspaper (granted, in addition to *ROSSIYA*) that—for reasons beyond the editors' control—does not offer subscriptions.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA has the lowest circulation per issue—once again, for reasons beyond the editors' control—(granted, it is tops in Moscow in terms of the number of copies sold through newsstands per month).

The publications that rank ahead of *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA* in popularity among Muscovites are either young people's newspapers, or specially directed newspapers (the trade unions' *TRUD*), or popular newspapers (many people consider that word a euphemism for "gutter").

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA was ahead of publications whose readership, in experts' view, is in many respects similar to ours—*IZVESTIYA*, *MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI*, and *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA was even more popular among readers with a higher education (fourth place, and only slightly behind the third- and second-place *KURANTY* and *ARGUMENTY I FAKTY*); among executives (third place, after *MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS* and *ARGUMENTY I FAKTY*, and only slightly behind them); among military personnel (third to fourth place, but what is most striking is that *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA* was more popular among that category of readers than *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*!); and among specialists (fourth place).

MEDIA AND JOURNALISM

Ranking	Newspaper	Total	Education						Occupation						Age					
			higher sec- ondary	incom- plete sec- ondary	exec- utive	mil- itary	spec- ialist	work- ers	office employees	stu- dent	pre- sident/ housewife	under 18	18- 24	25- 39	40- 55	over 55	Men	Women		
1	MOSKOVSKY KOMSOMOLETS	21.1	19.6	24.6	11.0	12.6	16.2	20.6	21.8	27.2	38.3	12.3	47.1	40.3	24.8	17.4	7.7	-19.0	23.3	
2	ARGUMENTY I FAKTY	9.1	9.7	9.0	6.8	13.8	13.5	9.8	8.8	8.0	10.9	6.7	20.6	9.9	10.5	7.8	7.9	9.3	8.7	
3	TRUD	8.7	4.2	11.0	19.4	5.2	6.8	4.9	13.4	10.0	2.2	11.9	2.9	3.0	7.5	8.2	15.0	8.6	8.8	
4	KURANTY	7.5	9.4	6.6	2.5	8.0	2.7	10.6	4.9	6.9	3.3	8.1	5.9	3.9	6.8	8.5	9.0	5.9	9.0	
5	KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVADA	6.3	6.4	6.6	3.8	7.5	5.4	5.2	5.6	8.8	9.8	4.2	5.9	6.9	8.2	5.5	4.0	7.1	15.6	
6	NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA	6.0	9.2	3.5	1.7(11)	11.5	6.1	9.6	3.5	3.6(7)	4.9	4.0(9)	0.0	3.0	5.9	8.2	4.9(8)	6.9	5.0(6)	
7	IZVESTIYA	4.1	5.0	3.4	3.0	5.2	8.1	3.9	4.5	3.1	1.6	4.8	0.0	0.9	2.6	5.9	6.0	5.4	2.9	
8-10	VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA	3.1	2.5	3.4	4.6	2.9	2.7	1.9	3.3	3.1	1.6	5.4	5.9	3.0	2.3	2.5	5.5	2.6	3.6	
8-10	MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA	3.1	2.5	3.3	4.2	1.1	1.4	2.0	3.5	4.0	1.6	4.6	0.0	1.2	2.1	3.6	5.3	3.2	3.0	
8-10	MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI	3.1	4.2	2.3	1.3	3.4	1.4	5.2	1.4	2.7	2.2	2.5	0.0	2.4	3.3	3.2	2.7	3.2	2.9	
11	KOMMERSANT	1.9	2.9	1.3	0.0	5.7	0.0	3.2	1.6	0.9	2.2	0.4	0.0	2.7	3.0	1.3	0.5	2.8	1.1	
12-13	ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA	1.7	2.0	1.1	2.5	2.9	5.4	1.5	1.4	0.9	0.5	2.5	0.0	0.6	1.2	1.7	3.1	2.3	1.1	
12-13	SOVETSKAYA ROSSYA	1.7	1.6	1.5	3.0	4.0	1.4	0.8	1.8	1.6	0.5	2.5	0.0	0.3	1.0	2.4	2.6	1.6	1.7	
14	PRAVDA	1.3	1.8	0.9	0.4	1.7	4.1	0.8	0.8	0.4	0.5	3.1	0.0	1.2	0.4	1.5	2.4	1.7	0.9	
15	LITERATURNAYA GAZETA	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.0	0.6	0.0	1.1	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.0	0.6	0.3	0.9	0.5	0.4	0.8	
16	RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA	0.5	0.1	1.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.1	1.4	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.4	
17	SOVERSHENNO SEKRETNAYA ZVEZDA	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.4	1.1	1.4	0.0	0.6	0.4	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.9	0.4	0.3	0.0	0.4	0.4	
18-19	KRASNAYA ZVEZDA	0.3	0.5	0.2	0.0	0.0	6.8	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.6	0.2	0.6	0.1	0.1	
18-19	ROSSIYA	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.1	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.4	

Like the absolute majority of other political publications, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA is hardly read at all by young people under 18. On the other hand, people from 18 to 55 prefer our newspaper over most others.

Five of the six publications that rank ahead of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in popularity are daily newspapers (on the other hand, we, because of the lack of the necessary printing facilities, come out only three times a week); they also publish daily and weekly television and radio broadcast schedules, which are very tasty bait for readers. NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA does not do that, and therefore it is less "practical," something of which we are well aware, of course. Starting next year NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA will become daily and will absolutely acquire this necessary accessory of the daily press, presenting it, of course, in the style of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA.

Finally, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA is one of Moscow's most expensive newspapers, which also makes it inaccessible for regular reading to many Muscovites, which we regret. Yet it is not we, but the favorable conditions in which the traditional (especially the party) press operates that have created this problem.

The survey results, which to some extent were surprising to us ourselves (although we had wanted to, we had not counted on so rapidly overtaking practically all the traditional "quality" publications) show that NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA is on the right track. Let us warn our readers and colleagues from other newspapers and weeklies that NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA does not intend to remain in sixth place. Our ambitions reach much higher.

Editor of Moscow Youth Paper on Commercial, Popular Success

91UN1806A Minsk ZNAMYA YUNOSTI in Russian
2 Apr 91 p 2

[Interview with MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS Editor in Chief Pavel Gusev, by ZNAMYA YUNOSTI correspondent Oleg Gruzdilovich; place and date not given: "The Phenomenal 'Komsomol Member'"]

[Text] A ZNAMYA YUNOSTI correspondent discusses issues of the press and others with Pavel Gusev, the editor in chief of a very popular capital newspaper, MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS.

[Gruzdilovich] It is a paradox, but true: Many Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] publications that in the past used to walk obediently in step with party ones have now found themselves on the opposite political pole from them. Both have lost some of their subscribers—this is particularly typical of the party newspapers. Against this background, the success of the newspaper MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS looks phenomenal—this may be the only mass youth publication that has increased its circulation during the last year...

[Gusev] Yes, we have added 300,000 subscribers, which brought us to the current total of more than a million and a half. I would like to note that, in 1983, MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS circulation was 120,000.

[Gruzdilovich] What is the secret of your success?

[Gusev] I do not know exactly, but it appears that we have been able to put together a newspaper that is read by everybody: all ages, and all political views. We are trying to reflect what is happening in a most multicolored fashion, and to be above events. We do not want to belong to any one party or any one point of view. We give forum in our newspaper to communists, monarchists, democrats, and anarchists. They argue and criticize each other; it appears as if the reader conducts a dialogue with them—and this is what he likes. Moscow is very politicized now; we are making use of it, but neither do we forget that the reader simply needs information and facts, that it is necessary to get away from politics more often—in this sense we also have things to offer.

[Gruzdilovich] In short, you consistently subscribe to the principle of wide representation of views...

[Gusev] Yes, but at the same time I am categorically against the term "independent newspaper." I think there are no independent newspapers. They are all dependent on somebody: an editor in chief, a founder, a party, and so on.

[Gruzdilovich] Who is MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS dependent on?

[Gusev] First of all, the editor in chief.

[Gruzdilovich] And the editor in chief?

[Gusev] On his own subjective views on life.

[Gruzdilovich] The newspaper has two cofounders. On the one hand, the editorial collective, on the other, the Moscow City Komsomol Committee. To what extent are you dependent on the second cofounder?

[Gusev] In essence we are not dependent on them; we have partnership relations; each is engaged in his own business; no political claims or interference on the grounds of ideological differences are possible in principle—this is written in the contract. Everything else can always be coordinated and resolved, which is what we are successfully doing. I think Komsomol organizations are not holding a grudge against us; they understand very well that if we remain a popular and widely read newspaper it will bring them more benefits than if we become a departmental leaflet that serves a small community of Komsomol functionaries. I emphasize again—they understand it.

[Gruzdilovich] When did your newspaper criticize Gorbachev for the first time, and on what occasion?

[Gusev] I think it was in 1987—we criticized Article 6 of the Constitution... How would it be possible to

remember? There is criticism directed at him in almost every issue, including an opinion that as a politician Gorbachev will not be able to do any more good.

[Gruzdilovich] What is the newspaper's attitude toward Yeltsin?

[Gusev] He is a very complex man; we do not idealize him and often criticize him. As a politician, he is also a man of limited possibilities.

[Gruzdilovich] When and why you do not publish materials written by staff members?

[Gusev] This does not happen. In principle, it is possible if the material is totally uninteresting, but we do not have people on our staff who write this way.

[Gruzdilovich] Is there anything that stands in your way as an editor in making the newspaper even better?

[Gusev] Yes, there is—the absence of our own material base. Because of this we have to limit our subscriptions—the printing house cannot manage a bigger run. This is the reason MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS cannot be purchased on newspaper stands. We are trying to resolve this problem: We earn money from advertising and commerce, conduct various competitions and festivals, invest money in profitable enterprises. What kind? Oh, this is a commercial secret. With the current cost of newsprint, were it not for advertising and were we not involved in commercial activities, we would have gone bankrupt. I will reveal one secret, though: Our newspaper's main income is from advertising—the more popular the publication, the more it can charge for advertising. Therefore, to me the policy of narrowing the audience through ideological limitations does not make sense. This can only hurt us—it is a shame not to understand this in our pragmatic times.

[Gruzdilovich] Are there conflicts on political grounds in the collective?

[Gusev] No, only on creative or personal grounds. This is permissible; all you need is skill in regulating conflicts. Of course, if the editor sees his role in administration, if he is an "organizer of class, ideological victories," he will inevitably do a lot of harm—people with a different political position will leave. The first priority should be creative issues. An editor's task is to ensure a creative atmosphere. Then the newspaper will have a solid collective, there will be subscribers, success, advertising, profits—there will be everything. There are many people working for MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS who are considered to be "star journalists" in Moscow. Any editorial staff would be happy to acquire these names, but they remain loyal to the newspaper. In half an hour I will conduct a brief meeting and then go to visit Aleksandr Aronov—he is ill and in hospital. I am up to my ears in urgent business, but it is truly more important to me to visit a sick colleague; everything else can wait... I want to emphasize once again: As an editor, I do not

care about my colleagues' political convictions. First and foremost is their creative talent, their rank, and my human relations with them.

[Gruzdilovich] What about your own political credo? I assume you are not a communist?

[Gusev] No, I am a CPSU member; I believe that only by being a party member can I fight its conservatism. As it is, the CPSU is built in such a way that it practically does not pay any attention to the outside criticism; one can only fight by being inside the party. At the same time, I do not consider myself an anticomunist. For me, communist ideals are ideals related to the Bible, because life in the paradise, Biblical life—this is communism. As to what form of statehood I consider to be best for Russia, my answer is—constitutional monarchy. We can only arrive at it through consensus, which is a very thorny road.

[Gruzdilovich] MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI recently published some material on the discussion between editors of—let me put it this way—leftist publications, in which you also participated. Among other things the discussion touched on the creation of a fund to aid publications in danger of going bankrupt because of the rising price of paper and other expenses. Is MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS ready to participate in the creation of such a fund?

[Gusev] In principle, yes. Perhaps it will be a bank, an association, or a league... It does look as though there is an effort to financially strangle the press that does not depend on party-state structures. It is easier to do so with television, but, as you can see, there are ways to get the newspapers in line, too. Democratic publications will not make it without mutual support.

[Gruzdilovich] By the way, is there something you do not like in the press?

[Gusev] The Moscow press is all right. There are all kinds of papers—left, right, conservative, radical, for any taste. They are quarreling and arguing among themselves, but this is normal. It is more complicated on the Union level. There the party press holds the leadership position; only Komsomol publications are more or less independent; the rest are dominated by the same point of view. This I do not like because this situation is propped up artificially.

[Gruzdilovich] Do you write often yourself?

[Gusev] Whenever I feel like it. Which happens more and more often. This is what kind of time it is now—one cannot stay silent.

NOVYY MIR Publishing Difficulties Examined

91UN1774A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 6 Jun 91 p 4

[Article by Yuriy Geyko: "Don't Ask for Whom the Bell Tolls: Neither Stalin, Nor Khrushchev, Nor Brezhnev Coped With This Journal..."]

[Text] Quite recently, in IZVESTIYA, in a small corner where they usually publish obituaries, there appeared a tiny little note to the effect that, instead of the last four issues of NOVYY MIR for the past year, its subscribers will receive a book by Yu. Dombrovskiy equivalent in value.

Perhaps soon another little note will be published about the subscribers of this year will receive—you see, during the past five months only two issues have been published...

The situation is unprecedented. During the 66 years of the journal's existence, it never came so close to perishing: On 6 December the fascists stood outside of Khimki, and on 8 December the next light blue issue of NOVYY MIR came out.

The patriarch and pioneer, the fighter of the long-suffering Soviet literature was beaten under Stalin, closed down under Khrushchev, persecuted under Brezhnev, and oppressed even after him, but it would appear, only the trident of the market will inflict the final mortal blow to it.

Telegram Moscow Kremlin Lukyanov Respected Anatolii Ivanovich The oldest literary-fiction journal NOVYY MIR is on the eve of bankruptcy... repeated appeals to the central committee of the party, the state committee for publishing houses, printing plants, and the book trade and to you personally are not leading to anything The situation is critical respectfully = Zalygin = 3 May 1990. Yurmala.

From history:

“NOVYY MIR”, Tvardovsky’s journal, is once again late in coming out, which, it appears, is explained by new incidents of oppression.”

(UNITA, January 1969)

What we read in IZVESTIYA is almost something of an obituary.

The unique phenomenon of domestic—not of culture even—reality under the name of NOVYY MIR agonizes on the threshold of the same new world for which it has furiously fought from its very birth.

Who among us, children of stagnation, did not search for and find in his blue books sometimes nuggets, sometimes layers of the truth? Whose arms have not trembled and has not had his breath taken away by the nearly obvious “state of lawlessness” with its litovannykh [not further identified] pages: “How did they let such a thing through? Well, fine fellows...”

Precisely it inflicted a shattering blow to military censorship, having printed, after a long and exhausting battle with it, S. Kaledin’s “Stroybat” [Construction Battalion]. Precisely it destroyed ecological censorship in the struggle against the reversal of the rivers. Precisely it opened the vice of atomic censorship, having been the first to tell the full truth about the Chernobyl tragedy—

G. Medvedev “Chernobyl Notebook” Now this work has been published in almost all languages of the world. It was precisely NOVYY MIR which for the first time at the top of its voice started to talk about the truth of our agriculture, at first through the essays of V. Ovechkin, and then—Yuri Chernichenko “The Combine Mows and Threshes”, having shaken its readers with the articles of N. Shmelev, A. Tsipko, and V. Selyunin about our economy.

It was NOVYY MIR which discovered Solzhenitsyn, and 30 years later in a most brutal struggle with the authorities returned his works to the Homeland, having abolished through this action of supreme courage even its majesty the political censorship.

Almost 20,000 readers abroad read NOVYY MIR, and this figure is a category higher than the indicators of any other domestic journals. The articles and columns of NOVYY MIR are becoming the basis of the textbooks of Soviet and Russian literature, history, and philosophical thought of our country of many of the world’s universities.

Throughout the life of NOVYY MIR, a breakthrough was not valor, not heroism or a campaign, but a method of existence.

What is most bitter is the fact that NOVYY MIR is printed in the printing press of the USSR PEOPLE’S DEPUTIES—how do they react to this scandalous barbarity? Will the flower, conscience, and pride of the Soviet people not be able to stand up for the flower, conscience and pride of Soviet culture?

I am turning over the pages of the chubby stenographic reports: Second session... fourth... part seven... part ten... twelve...—no, there is not a word about the dying journal.

Well! Yes these reports are in my hands and I have NOVYY MIR! Only in a white cover—and the format is the same, as is the volume, and the paper, and the NOVYY MIR print is familiar to the point of being painful... .

“Sergey Pavlovich,” I ask Zalygin, “and how many such NOVYY MIR issues do our elected representatives retail a month?”

“Approximately 18. But the circulation! You see—20,000. Where so many, who reads them and buys them—large libraries and some departments?”

“Yes, they are completely identical, these booklets, they are “in one stable”, a comparable quantity of them has been published during the 66 years of NOVYY MIR and during the two years of the current USSR Supreme Soviet, and perhaps it would not be unfounded to be mischievous on the subject of the significance of one or another “pile of paper” for the fate of our Homeland, but is it worthwhile?

I hold in my hands still another twin of the journal: The publisher, format, volume, paper and, as you already guess, the print are one and the same. Only here the cover is daubed with a blood-chilling picture of people in turbans attacking someone: "LUI ZHAKOLIO, 'POKORITEL DZHUNGLEY' [Explorer of the Jungle], novel, 'TIR'—secret, intrigue, risk. Advertising and publishing agency 'Yugo-Zapad', 200,000 copies. Sent to the printer February-April 1991. Price: R8.50."

And IZVESTIYA has a very large number of such bestsellers; according to the rumors, there must be 12 items of this TIR series alone! What shot of the TIR knocked the sixth, seventh, and eighth issues of the journal with Solzhenitsyn's "Rakovyy korpus" [Cancer Ward] out of the saddle? Oh, oh, oh. Again there was not enough paper!

Issue No 9, which contained 3 journalistic articles by Solzhenitsyn, did not appear at all. It was cancelled. Issues Nos. 10, 11, and 12 were also cancelled; it is in their place that Yu. Dombrovsky's collection will be sent out. And what do you think was to have been printed in these three ill-starred issues? Well, you are already guessing: A. Solzhenitsyn's autographical work "Bodalysya telenok s dubom" [The Oak and the Calf], the full text of which up to now has not been published even in the West. [The calf] butted-butted and finished butting...

And is NOVYY MIR not butting against the same oak now? And is it not breaking its horns, having decided to postpone "The Oak..." to the middle of this year: Here it is, a stone's throw away, and, you see, only two issues have appeared... The biography of Aleksandr Isayevich is terrifying to someone, oh how terrifying. Perhaps, even more terrifying than "Arkhipelag. . ." [GULAG Archipelago].

Telegram Moscow Kremlin Gorbachev Dear Mikhail Sergeyevich The journal NOVYY MIR is on the verge of complete catastrophe... Yefremov refuses to put out issues 10, 11, 12 for this year already paid for by the reader It is well known that precisely in these issues the autobiography of Solzhenitsyn was to have been published The non-appearance of these three issues is fraught with political scandal entailing international resonance I request your prompt intervention Zalygin October 1990.

From history:

"Before ordering tanks into Czechoslovakia, they should have been ordered into NOVYY MIR."
(Arkadiy Perventsev, May 1969)

You say, there is no paper? There is! Before me there is a document, according to which USSR Gosplan gave IZVESTIYA additional allocations and permission to use reserves. Do you think that the publishing house opened its reserves to NOVYY MIR or gave it only what Gosplan found? Who is behind this?

Perhaps, he who ordered that the cover with the announcement of A. Solzhenitsyn's Nobel Prize lecture be

scratched from the edition of NOVYY MIR? But perhaps another, who had sworn that "GULAG Archipelago" will not be published in the Land of the Soviets? Or a third, who had promised Zalygin "to pin on the accusation of a political case" for this publication? The names are known, but unfortunately we cannot name them—you will not be able to prove it.

The official version of the misfortunes of NOVYY MIR will sound like this: After the subscription campaign of the year before last, approximately half a million people subscribed to NOVYY MIR, and for this they prepared. Unexpectedly they prolong the subscription by a month, and in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY a small note appears, in which the deputy editor-in-chief of the journal, F. Vidrashku, talked about the fact that NOVYY MIR will fight to see to it that every one of its subscribers can obtain the collection of A. Solzhenitsyn's works in eight volumes. Precisely during this additional month the circulation of the journal exploded to over a million and set a record number for such publications, which even gained notoriety in the Guinness Book of Records.

But all those who dreamed about how to make short work of the journal turned out to have a remarkable cover: They themselves are guilty.

But why can those who so desire not have a look into the printing plant of IZVESTIYA, why can they not see what is being printed there, talk with the workers and listen:

Our daughter asks every day: "Where is NOVYY MIR, mamma?"—and here you see at once what pornography we are turning out for the cooperatives, especially at night, when there are no authorities and the eyes feel sick...

And here a letter to the president of the three editors-in-chief of the newspapers PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, AND TRUD and the two directors of the publishing houses PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA is published. Under the headline "The Subscriber Must Not Suffer" the non-appearance of papers and newspapers is explained by the paper shortage. It so happened that one of my meetings with Zalygin fell precisely on this day. Sergey Pavlovich looked more perplexed than usual:

"Of course, the publishers are right, the Law on the Press is imperfect, I have more than once talked about this in the Supreme Soviet. It "lifts up" the rights of journalists, but not a single word about the press business. The law should define the relations between publishers and suppliers, you see the paper-mill workers are the same publishers. All pretensions of making representations to the president are not allowed. For some reason cooperatives find possibilities of organizing cooperatives, but the press people are completely disconnected."

AND NOW our largest publishers through this letter have registered themselves not only as knights of glasnost and perestroika, but also as zealots of our readers' interests.

The only thing that can shake their brilliantly constructed fortress is one figure: The paper demand of NOVYY MIR during its past, record year did not come to even seven percent of the capacities of the IZVESTIYA Publishing House, and in this even less than that—less than three percent.

*Telegram Moscow Kremlin USSR President Gorbachev
Dear Mikhail Sergeyevich... The situation of the journal and the millions of its subscribers is perhaps worse If the situation with paper and the printing press for us will not change such a phenomenon of the country's and international culture as NOVYY MIR will cease to exist = Zalygin = 29 december 1990.*

From history:

“But what can I do?! Write to Brezhnev? I have twice. Suslov did not receive me three times, Demichev said that he himself will call about a reception, I waited impatiently, like a fool, for 14 days.

(A. Tvardovskiy, May 1969)

“You know,” says Zalygin, worrying, “I am surprised that the country’s leaders to whom we are sending telegrams will be silent.” You mean to say, you really never received replies to your telegrams from Gorbachev and Lukyanov? Lukyanov treats you very well, here is what he writes you at the end of last July when you here had already lost any hope for life: “To your journal, my very favorite one, which for many years has defended independent and deeply popular positions... With the very best wishes to you and the entire collective of NOVYY MIR. A. Lukyanov.”

“Not a single answer. And these words of Lukyanov from his letter, where the Supreme Soviet refuses to be our co-founder.”

“You know, I, you see, repeatedly met personally both with Gorbachev and Lukyanov and told him about our misfortunes and not once, believe me—not once in five years—I did not hear a refusal from anyone. All sympathize and promise, and we are perishing, losing authors and subscribers at a catastrophical rate.

“To the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade A. I. Lukyanov. Dear Anatoliy Ivanovich! I consider it necessary to report to you that the director of the IZVESTIYA Publishing House, Comrade Yu. F. Yefremov, consistently hampers the publication of the journal NOVYY MIR... On 15 May 1991, at a meeting in the editorial offices of NOVYY MIR, Yu. F. Yefremov declared that for 1992 the IZVESTIYA Publishing House will not take upon itself any obligations with respect to the journal. . . that he is breaking relations with us and will accommodate other publications on the printing base earmarked for NOVYY MIR... Respectfully, S. Zalygin. 16 May 1991.

This letter was never sent—Zalygin already no longer believes in letters or telegrams.

It ONLY remains FOR ME to add that in this great country, during the period of glasnost, NOVYY MIR only had a paper shortage of 400 tons a month.

And also to report that Jerry Mikkelsen, professor of Russian literature at the University of Kansas, who recently visited the editors, together with a group of famous American scholars, intends to turn through the Library of Congress to the entire world with an appeal to save the journal, because they consider it as a phenomenon not only of Soviet but also of world culture.

It is a shame!

Ukrainian Democratic Press Association Holds First Meeting

*91JUN1720A Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA
in Russian 21 May 91 p 3*

[Article by I. Ivanitskiy, ADPU member: “If One Kilogram of Paper Costs One Kilogram of Meat—It is Time to Unite!...” Notes from the constituent assembly of the Ukrainian Democratic Press Association (ADPU)]

[Text] ...And so, here we are in the conference hall of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences. It is morning. A small dialogue is going on at the registration table.

“Here is my trip authorization, here is my official letter from the editorial collective confirming my authority. But I want to say right away that I am not in agreement with the Charter draft.”

“Then why are you here?...”

And really, for what purpose did they gather here—the representatives of 62 newspapers, 13 journals, 16 information agencies, special correspondents of various level and orientation, up to and including the radio station “Svoboda”, plus five individual delegates? Altogether there were 98 people (13 women and the rest men) from all corners of the Ukraine. Why did they come? On what advice did they come here not by order, but of their own free will, remaining true to their much-suffering convictions? What word called them together to sit at a common table, these people who at first glance appear so different, even outwardly: Ceremoniously slicked-down hair, casual denim jackets, cossack-style handlebar moustaches, deputy flags of various size, yellow and blue [Ukrainian national colors] insignia pins, luxurious clip earrings—the latest word in fashion... According to the letter of the protocol, these people were: the independent press—22 delegates; departmental publications—18; Soviet publications—12; youth publications—four; party-Soviet publications—two, and so on all the way to cable TV and a single representative from a liberal-democratic party newspaper.

Forgive me for the meticulous detail, but the moment demands it, so that the respected reader may once and for all have an understanding of whom we are talking about.

And so—about the word uniting them all. And although it is today rather worn out by its popularity, nevertheless this word is—democracy.

It is true, when the participants in the democratic meeting began discussing the draft of the ADPU Charter, a dispute spontaneously broke out on this topic—how to best call themselves: The “democratic press” or “independent”, or “free”. The clear majority of votes agreed on democratic, because according to common sense there cannot be an absolutely independent and free press (and not from a certain political force), since any form of mass information is always dependent on the main thing—the reader, listener, or viewer.

The “democratic press” is also, of course, nonsense and a paradox, because the press must be such by its very essence and nature. Otherwise it is not a press at all, but some kind of parody. But this is if we resort to the services of the theory of the press and examples of other, non-Soviet states. Yet we live today in the Ukraine in 1991, so we will not be naive. The situation with freedom of speech in the republic is unenviable, if we do not say directly—critical. Then again, difference of opinion in the Ukraine has always been subject to ostracism on the part of those who hold power.

Vitaliy Karpenko, editor-in-chief of VECHERNIY KIEV, presented an informative speech at the meeting on the topic, “Freedom of speech in the Ukraine is in danger”. Specifically, he made an interesting attempt to sort out today's press in the republic. In his opinion, it consists today of the following component parts: a) communist party newspapers acting counter to the Law on the Press, which prohibits party monopoly of publications; b) democratic publications, which have been able to free themselves to a certain degree from the persistent dogmas of their founders; c) the soviet press, which reflects the life of soviets of various levels, but which is still rather ineffective due to its inexperience; d) the latest generations of newspapers arising thanks to the Law on the Press...

Any attempt at a thoughtful analysis of the situation always deserves respect, but in my opinion such a classification is somewhat superficial, because where would we classify the communist party-Soviet (meaning almost all the rayon newspapers and a significant portion of the oblast newspapers), children's, trade union, sports, or simply advertising, etc. publications? Is it not simpler to leave this endeavor to the theoreticians of journalism and ourselves, having placed our stake on democratic transformations of Ukrainian society, continue to work in this noble direction with our minds and hearts, as Skovoroda once said? Any division is always conditional, even one which, it would seem, is simplified, like the division of newspapers into those of a democratic ilk and an anti-democratic. (This is specifically the terminology at which the meeting delegates arrived, deleting from their usage the imprecise word “conservatives”). And what is there to argue about here, facts are facts. In

many party newspapers there are many democratically-minded journalists, just as in papers of opposite directionality there are newspapermen who are stuck on some outdated point, and therefore are weakly progressive. So who is who?

But this again is a topic for a separate publication. At the present stage the Association's task does not consist of working with individual personalities. Its goal today is to consolidate the democratic pens so as not to allow clearly and brightly expressed anti-democratic forces to gain control of the printed word. And here everything is synonymous: Although the ADPU is not a public or non-party organization, it is nevertheless a political organization. Why be coy about this fact?

But before “joining hands so as not to perish alone”, each democratically oriented publication must remember like the “Lord's Prayer” all the most common accusations which the political enemy levels against it. Here they are, the basic sins of the “so-called democrats”:

“Defamation of our history, distortion of reality, incitement of national passions, support of destructive elements, disorganization of the economy”.

And since this is so, since these principles have been defined, there is no reason to provide extra reason to gloat. The argumentation of our own positions must be built on proven facts and sources. This, after all, is the first gospel of the first-year journalist.

Moreover, there are also many methods for dealing with democratic publications, where one may: a) drag the editorial staff to court over every trifle; b) threaten a progressive editor with dismissal, or actually remove him; c) deprive the publication of polygraphic capacities and paper by raising the prices in such a way as to equate one kilogram of paper with one kilogram of meat, etc.

And this is no longer theory—this is reality. This leads to the following conclusion: No one will defend us if we do not defend ourselves. And it is specifically because of this that the exceptionally large number of journalists of democratic temper (half that number were expected) gathered in the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences conference hall. Some of them justly deserved rebuke. You are, so to speak, comrades. In the past you were “apparatchiki” [party apparatus workers], but now—just look—you are democrats. But what can you do if before there was an “iron” scheme? Until you worked in the Central Committee or obkom [oblast committee], you would not receive the editor's chair. But we should not confuse those who were apparatus workers to the bone with those journalists who simply accepted the rules of the game. Well, and then again—suppose we removed the former non-democrats from the democratic processes because of their occupation? Then what? Who will take their place if the new generation has not grown up yet? That is one thing. Another is that it is undemocratic not to accept a person who has broken with past dogmas. Thirdly, the experience of the former apparatus worker

is not always negative. So that today we must deal with those whom there are, so that in the future we may have those who must be. Otherwise we will have no one at all.

The meeting participants (we might add that at a certain moment some of them were overcome with deputy fervor, and therefore proposals began pouring in about renaming the meeting to a "congress" or at least a "conference", but they came to their senses in time and understood that this does not change the essence of the matter, and then they calmed down) came to an opinion on the ADPU's political position—the position left of center. It was a calm and well thought-out decision. In short—without outbursts. And since this was so, that means work must begin on the creation of their own fund, because without it in this day and age all good intentions remain a declaration and nothing more. Simply put, in order to implement some kind of line—they need money. The journalists took an active part in the exchange of opinions regarding the creation of a service for periodicals distribution which would be an alternative to the Ministry of Communications. Editor-in-chief of the newspaper KONTRAKT, Aleksandr Tertychnyy, noted that such a service cannot be created out of thin air, and proposed a contract with already formed structures of the former Minbyt [Ministry of Consumer Services].

In his speech, the editor of the journal LYUDINA I SVIT, Nikolay Rubanets, argued to create a republic "roundtable" on "The Democratic Ukraine" with the participation of the ADPU, not as "elucidators", but on an equal footing with all democratic forces of the republic. He also spoke out in favor of instituting a Ukrainian Press Day (or a Ukraine Press Day) on a day other than 5 May, which has lost its significance.

We might add that the name of the PRAVDA founder came up repeatedly at the meeting in the same context. This is where we must take a lesson in organization of the press. After all, tomorrow ADPU will be faced with the question of its own press organ, and the day after tomorrow—a publication base. Therefore, today it is already clear to everyone that the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet is in no great hurry to nationalize the so-called party publishing house. And in this context the speech by the director of the Donets independent literary agency "Valya Yarovaya", Valentina Yarova, was the shortest. She gave her telephone numbers (92-13-65 at work and 94-44-25 at home) and offered any publication services which might benefit the Association.

...Thus, the foundation for consolidation of the democratic press in the Ukraine has been laid. There is an association! And since this is so, honorable comrades, gentlemen and pan democrats, you may enter the ranks of the ADPU. In order to understand that this is now an organized force, I will give only one example. A report similar to mine regarding the ADPU Constituent Meeting will be published and broadcast by 98 other means of mass information (this is no mistake, by the end of the meeting there were even more democrat-journalists).

Evening had not yet fallen that day on Vladimirskaia Street in Kiev (famous for its opera, university and KGB), but the organizational moment, in the absence of which there would have been no apparatus, was completed. The delegates hurried to the station to catch their trains, and the chestnut trees were blooming on Vladimirskaia Street. Very powerful! And this is very good, when people in the heat of their political passions do not fail to notice the beauty which surrounds them. And since this is so—we will survive.

USSR Law on Social Protection for Chernobyl Victims

Text of Law

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[Text of Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: "On Social Protection for Citizens Who Suffered as a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe"]

[Text] The accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station] on 26 April 1986 caused a great ecological catastrophe in terms of contamination of the biosphere and became a nationwide misfortune which affected the fates of millions of people living in vast territories.

New social and economic conditions arose in regions where zones of heightened radioactive contamination occurred because of the accident, and an extraordinary situation developed for citizens who had to be evacuated or moved from the territories contaminated with radio-nuclides or those who continued to live, work, or serve in the military on them, as well as for citizens who took part in cleaning up the consequences of the Chernobyl accident.

Section 1. General Provisions

Article 1. Goals and Tasks of the Law

This Law is focused on protecting the rights and interests of citizens of the USSR who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe, participated in cleaning up the accident at the Chernobyl AES and its consequences, found themselves in a zone adversely affected by factors which arose as a result of this accident, or were evacuated or moved to a new place of residence from the radioactively contaminated territories, and other categories of citizens defined by this Law.

The Law regulates the status of the territory subjected to radioactive contamination as a result of this catastrophe, the living conditions and medical care of the population, and the economic, scientific-research, and other activity on this territory.

Article 2. USSR Legislation on Social Protection of Citizens Who Suffered as a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe

Relations involving social protection of citizens who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe are regulated by this Law and other enactments of legislation of the USSR issued in accordance with it, as well as by the legislative enactments of the republics.

Article 3. Citizens' Right to Compensation for Damages and To Receive Allowances and Benefits

USSR citizens have the right to compensation for damages to their health and property as a result of the

Chernobyl catastrophe, preferential medical care, and allowances and benefits for living and working on the territory contaminated by radioactive substances and in conditions where the adverse factors caused by this catastrophe operate.

Foreign citizens and stateless persons who took part in cleaning up the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES have the right to compensation for damages done to their health and property while in the USSR, as well as to other allowances and benefits in accordance with USSR legislation.

Realization of the rights of citizens established by this Article is guaranteed by the state.

Article 4. Establishment of Allowances and Benefits

This Law establishes the basic types and amounts of monetary allowances and benefits granted to citizens who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe.

The amount of monetary and other allowances and benefits not established in this Law is determined by the USSR Government unless otherwise specified.

The Union republics whose territories were subjected to radioactive contamination as a result of this accident may establish additional allowances and benefits out of the republic budget and other capital.

Article 5. Basic Points of the Concept of People Living in Regions Which Suffered as a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe

The part of this Law which defines the conditions of people living in territory subjected to radioactive contamination as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl AES is based on the points of the concept of people living in regions which suffered from the accident at the Chernobyl AES formulated by the USSR Academy of Sciences jointly with the republic academies of sciences:

1) the level of the irradiation dose of the population as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl AES is the basic indicator for adopting decisions on the need to implement safety measures as well as to provide compensation for damages;

2) an additional increase (over the level of natural and technogenic background radiation for the given area) in irradiation of the population from radioactive fallout resulting from the accident at the Chernobyl AES which in 1991 and subsequent years produces an average annual effective equivalent dose which does not exceed 1 millisievert (0.1 rem) is acceptable and does not require any intervention;

3) safety measures (or countermeasures) are implemented when there is an additional increase (over the level of natural and technogenic background radiation of the given area) in irradiation of the population from radioactive fallout as a result of the accident at the

Chernobyl AES in 1991 and subsequent years of more than 1 millisievert (0.1 rem) a year.

The set of safety measures should be focused on steadily reducing the dose (and this includes by reducing contamination of food products) while at the same time relaxing restrictions which disrupt the customary way of life. These goals should be optimally achieved under conditions where the average effective equivalent dose of irradiation of the population does not exceed the level of 5 millisieverts (0.5 rem) in 1991 and where, to the greatest possible extent justified by economic and social factors, this threshold level is reduced all the way down to 1 millisievert (0.1 rem) a year;

4) mandatory relocation from populated points indicated in the State Union Republic Program of Emergency Measures for 1990-1992 To Eliminate the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES must be carried out;

5) a person who lives on the territory contaminated by radionuclides has the right to decide independently whether to continue living on this territory or move to a different place of residence based on objective information offered to him on the radiation conditions and the radiation doses, and the possible health consequences of them.

Section 2. Legal Regulation of the Territory Subjected to Radioactive Contamination as a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe

Article 6. Radioactive Contamination Zones

The force of this Law extends to the territories of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR whose environment was contaminated by radioactive substances as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe and are divided into the following zones:

the alienation zone;

the relocation zone;

the habitation zone with implementation of safety measures focused on reducing exposure of the population and with citizens' right to receive allowances when they voluntarily relocate from this zone (henceforth this zone is called the habitation zone with the right to relocation);

the habitation zone with privileged socioeconomic status.

The boundaries of these zones are established and, depending on the radiation conditions and with consideration of other factors, reviewed at least once every three years by the governments of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR with the consent of the organs empowered by the USSR Government.

The legal regulation of territories subjected to radioactive contamination as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe is established by this Law and the legislation of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR.

Article 7. The Alienation Zone

The alienation zone (which in 1986-1987 was called the 30-kilometer zone, and from 1988 to the adoption of this Law—the relocation zone) comprises the territories of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR from which the population was evacuated in 1986 in accordance with the Norms of Radiation Safety.

People are prohibited from living permanently in the alienation zone and economic activity and use of natural resources are restricted. The types of economic activity and resource use and the conditions for them are established by the governments of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR jointly with the USSR Government.

Operation of the Chernobyl AES and economic activity associated with it plus work to take the energy units of this station out of operation are carried on by an organ empowered by the USSR Government at times agreed upon by the USSR Government and the Government of the Ukrainian SSR.

Article 8. The Relocation Zone

The relocation zone is the territories of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR beyond the boundaries of the alienation zone where the level of soil contamination with cesium-137 is more than 15 Curie per square kilometer, or with strontium-90—more than 3 Curie per square kilometer, or with plutonium-239 or -240—more than 0.1 Curie per square kilometer. On territories of this zone where the level of soil contamination with cesium is more than 40 Curie per square kilometer, or with strontium-90—more than 3 Curie per square kilometer, or with plutonium-239 or -240—more than 0.1 Curie per square kilometer, as well as on territories of the zone with levels of soil contamination with cesium of 15-20 Curie per square kilometer, where the average annual effective equivalent dose of irradiation of the population from radioactive fallout as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe may exceed 5 millisieverts (0.5 rem), mandatory relocation of the population is necessary. In the other territories of the zone citizens who have made the decision to go to a different place of residence or live on these territories have the right to receive the allowances and privileges established by this Law.

Taking into account the landscape and geochemical features of the territories subjected to radioactive contamination as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe, and this includes the existence of territories with soils which facilitate high migration of radionuclides to plants, by legislation of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR individual territories with lower levels

of radioactive contamination where the average annual effective equivalent dose of irradiation of the population from radioactive fallout as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe may exceed 5 millisieverts (0.5 rem) may be included in this zone.

Regular, mandatory medical monitoring of the population's health is provided and safety measures focused on reducing irradiation of the population are carried out, and the inhabitants are informed of this through the mass information media.

The rules for living in the relocation zone and the conditions for economic use of its territory are established by the governments of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR jointly with the USSR Government.

Article 9. The Zone of Habitation With the Right to Relocation

The zone of habitation with the right to relocation comprises territories of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR beyond the boundaries of the alienation and relocation zones with a level of soil contamination with cesium-137 of from 5 to 15 Curie per square kilometer. Citizens who live in populated points where the average annual effective equivalent dose of irradiation of the population exceeds 1 millisievert (0.1 rem) and have decided to leave this zone for a different place of residence have the right to receive compensation for property lost in connection with the move and to other allowances and benefits established by this Law.

Taking into account the landscape and geochemical features of the territories subjected to radioactive contamination as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe, and that includes the existence of territories with soils which facilitate high migration of radionuclides to plants, by legislation of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR individual territories with lower levels of radioactive contamination where the average annual effective equivalent dose of irradiation of the population from radioactive fallout as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe exceeds 1 millisievert (0.1 rem) may be included in this zone.

Additional criteria to determine the boundaries of this zone depending on the contamination of its territory by other (besides cesium-137) long-lived radionuclides may be established by the governments of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR jointly with the USSR Government.

Regular, mandatory medical monitoring of the health of the population is provided in the zone and safety measures focused on reducing irradiation of the population are carried out, and the inhabitants are informed of this through the mass information media.

The rules for the population to live in this zone and the conditions for inhabitants' voluntary relocation from it,

implementation of economic and other activity on this territory, and implementation of measures to preserve the health and reduce the risk of illness are established by the governments of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR jointly with the USSR Government.

Article 10. The Zone of Habitation With Privileged Socioeconomic Status

The zone of habitation with privileged socioeconomic status comprises the territories of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR beyond the boundaries of the zones of alienation and relocation and the zone of habitation with the right to relocation where the level of radioactive contamination of the soils with cesium-137 is from 1 to 5 Curie per square kilometer. The average annual effective equivalent dose of irradiation of the population should not exceed 1 millisievert (0.1 rem) in this zone.

Additional criteria to determine the boundaries of this zone depending on the contamination of its territory with other (besides cesium-137) long-lived radionuclides may be established by the governments of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR jointly with the USSR Government.

Periodic radiation monitoring and medical monitoring of the population's health are carried out in this zone.

Article 11. Ecological Normalization of Territories Subjected to Radioactive Contamination

A program of economic, legal, and other measures focused on normalizing the natural environment is carried out on territories subjected to radioactive contamination as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe. They include: scientific research; monitoring of the condition of the natural environment and objects which are potentially dangerous in the ecological sense; state ecological expert review of economic and other activity; reduction of and compensation for damages inflicted upon nature, including termination of the action of ecologically dangerous factors; and implementation of measures to return radioactively contaminated territories to economic circulation.

Organization and implementation of monitoring of the ecological situation in these territories and planning and implementation of measures to normalize them ecologically are carried out by the governments of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the Belorussian SSR in agreement with the USSR Government.

Section 3. The Status of Citizens Who Suffered as a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe

Article 12. Categories of Citizens

The force of this Law extends to the following citizens who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe:

1) persons who became ill and had radiation sickness caused by the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES as well as disabled persons for whom a causal relationship is established between the onset of the disability and the Chernobyl catastrophe, from among the following persons:

a) persons (including those sent temporarily or for work purposes) who took part in cleaning up the consequences of the accident within the boundaries of the alienation zone or were involved in operations or other jobs at the Chernobyl AES;

b) management or rank and file personnel of the internal affairs organs who served (or are serving) in the alienation zone;

c) military personnel* and reservists summoned to special assemblies and enlisted to perform jobs in the alienation zone involving cleaning up the consequences of this accident;

* Here and in what follows this refers to officers, warrant officers, extended-term servicemen, servicewomen, and regular-term sergeants and enlisted personnel on active duty in the USSR Armed Forces, the troops and organs of the USSR State Committee for State Security [KGB], internal and railway troops, and other military formations.

m +) persons evacuated (or those who left voluntarily) in 1986 from the alienation zone as well as those who live (or used to live) from 26 April 1986 in the relocation zone and in the zone of habitation with the right to relocation;

2) persons (including those sent temporarily or for work purposes) who in 1986-1987 took part in work to clean up the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES within the boundaries of the alienation zone or during this period were involved in operations or other jobs at the Chernobyl AES, as well as military personnel and reservists summoned to special assemblies and enlisted during this period to work on cleaning up the consequences of this accident, regardless of their site of deployment or the work performed, as well as management or rank and file personnel of internal affairs organs who served in the alienation zone in 1986-1987;

3) persons (including those sent temporarily or for work purposes) who in 1988-1989 took part in work to clean up the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES within the boundaries of the alienation zone or during this period were involved in operations or other jobs at the Chernobyl AES, as well as military personnel and reservists summoned to special assemblies and enlisted during this period to work on cleaning up the consequences of this accident, regardless of the site of deployment and the jobs performed, as well as management or rank and file personnel of the internal affairs organs who served in the alienation zone in 1988-1989;

4) persons involved in operating the Chernobyl AES or in jobs in the alienation zone;

5) persons evacuated (or persons who left voluntarily) in 1986 from the alienation zone or were (or are being) resettled, as well as those who voluntarily left the relocation zone in 1986 and in subsequent years, including children who were in the womb on the day of evacuation;

6) persons who live (or work) in populated points on the territory of the zone of habitation with the right to relocation;

7) persons who live (or work) in populated points on the territory of the zone of habitation with privileged socioeconomic status;

8) persons who live (or work) in the relocation zone;

9) persons who voluntarily left for a new place of residence from the zone of habitation with the right to relocation after the accident at the Chernobyl AES;

10) military personnel and management and rank and file personnel of the internal affairs organs who are (or were) on military (or regular) duty in the relocation zone, the zone of habitation with the right to relocation, or the zone of habitation with privileged socioeconomic status.

Article 13. Allowances and Benefits for Persons Who Became Ill and Had Radiation Sickness and for Disabled Persons

Persons indicated in Point 1 of Article 12 of this Law have the following rights:

1) to free medicine (with a doctor's prescription), free annual sanatorium-resort treatment or monetary compensation in an amount equal to the average value of the voucher, and free travel on transport (with the exception of taxis) from the place of residence to the place of treatment or dispensary, out-patient, or clinical examination center and back;

2) free manufacture and repair of dentures (with the exception of dentures from precious metals);

3) payment of temporary disability benefits in an amount equal to 100 percent of the wage regardless of the continuous length of service;

4) payment to working disabled persons of temporary disability benefits for up to four consecutive months or up to five months in the calendar year;

5) provision of living space within a year from the day the request is made on condition of recognition of their need for improved housing conditions or for additional living space in the form of a separate room;

6) payment for the living space occupied (within the limits of norms envisioned by current legislation),

including space occupied jointly with members of families living there, amounting to 50 percent of the apartment payment figured using the schedules established for workers and white-collar workers.

These persons, as well as the families of persons who perished as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl AES, those who died as a result of radiation sickness, and disabled persons who have died are offered a discount in the amount of 50 percent off the designated payment for use of the heat, water, gas, and electrical systems, while those who live in homes without central heating receive a 50-percent discount on the cost of fuel obtained within the limits of norms established for sale to the population;

7) transfer of the state housing fund living space which they occupy free of charge to personal ownership;

8) payment of the difference between their former wage and the wage for the new job when they change to a lower-paying job for medical reasons. This difference is paid by enterprises, institutions, or organizations until work capacity is restored or disability is established;

9) a disability pension for disabilities which came as a result of injury or illness caused by the accident at the Chernobyl AES, and to members of their families—a pension for loss of the breadwinner for these same reasons in the manner envisioned by the USSR Law: "On Pension Support for Citizens in the USSR" in an amount equal to the actual compensation of damages determined in accordance with the Regulations authorized by the USSR Government. If the citizens so desire, the pension is computed from the wage received for work in the alienation zone;

10) granting of a disability pension to military personnel or management and rank and file personnel of internal affairs organs and a pension for loss of the breadwinner to their families in the manner and by the norms established by legislation in case of a wound, contusion, or injury received while performing military (or regular) service. In this case, if they so desire, officers, warrant officers, extended-term servicemen, service-women, and management and rank and file personnel of internal affairs organs may have the disability pension resulting from these causes computed on the basis of their higher pay for work in the alienation zone; while regular-term military personnel on active duty may, if they so desire, have the pension computed from five times the minimum wage;

11) a free passenger car with manual transmission if there are the appropriate medical indications;

12) compensation by social security organs of expenditures related to care in the home, if there are no close relatives living with them;

13) provision of foodstuffs in accordance with rational norms of food consumption;

14) free travel on all types of city passenger transport (with the exception of taxis) and on public use motor

transport (with the exception of taxis) in rural areas within the boundaries of the administrative rayon for the place of residence, as well as on suburban railway and water transport and on suburban route buses, and free travel by train or on ships of transit and local lines of the river fleet once a year (round-trip), and in rayons without railroad traffic—by air, water, or intercity motor transport with the right to obtain tickets on a priority basis;

15) availability of an annual vacation at a time that is convenient for them, as well as an annual supplemental vacation of 14 calendar days with pay.

16) exemption from paying income tax or the tax for bachelors, single people, and citizens with two or fewer children on all the income they receive. The spouse of the victim is also exempt from paying the tax for bachelors, single persons, or citizens with two or fewer children;

17) installation of a telephone on a priority basis;

18) preferential job security when the number of employees or staff is reduced and preferential job placement when the activity of the enterprise, institution, or organization is terminated;

19) priority access to housing and construction cooperatives, cooperatives to build and operate collective garages and parking places for means of transportation and their technical service, horticultural societies (or cooperatives), acquisition of garden sheds and materials to build them, and industrial goods in great demand, including passenger cars, motorcycles, and motor boats and priority service at enterprises offering domestic services, technical service and repair of means of transportation, and public catering, at housing and municipal services institutions, and at communications and intercity transport organizations;

20) receipt of no-interest loans for individual or cooperative housing construction with 50 percent paid out of Union budget capital;

21) receipt of no-interest loans to obtain or build garden sheds and to fix up garden plots. Compensation to banks of losses incurred from offering this loan is made using Union budget capital;

22) priority service in treatment and prevention institutions and pharmacies;

23) when they go on pension or change their place of work, use of the polyclinics to which they were assigned before they went on pension or before they changed their place of work;

24) preferential (when other conditions are equal) enrollment in higher and secondary special and vocational-technical educational institutions as well as in courses for occupational training with dormitory space for the time of study offered in the established manner.

Acceptance into preparatory departments of the appropriate higher educational institution occurs regardless of the existence of places, with a mandatory offer of dormitory space.

The stipend for these persons is set 50 percent higher than the usual amount;

25) provision of children with places in children's preschool institutions, specialized children's treatment and sanatorium institutions, pioneer camps, and other health institutions, regardless of departmental affiliation, without waiting;

26) priority receipt of plots of land for individual housing construction;

27) payment of the unpaid part, up to 5,000 rubles [R] per family, of a no-interest loan for setting up a household obtained by evacuees from the alienation zone using the capital of the Union budget;

28) preferential provision of places in nursing homes for the elderly and disabled;

29) receipt of a no-interest loan of up to R50,000 to organize a subsidiary operation or farm. Compensation to banks of losses incurred from granting this loan is made using capital of the Union budget.

The allowances and benefits envisioned by Points 5-7, 17, 19-21, and 25-28 of this Article extend to the families of those who perished as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl AES, of those who died as a result of radiation sickness, and of deceased disabled persons to whom the benefits indicated in this Article extended.

Article 14. Allowances and Benefits to Participants in Cleaning Up the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES in the Alienation Zone

Persons indicated in Point 2 of Article 12 of this Law have the right to the allowances and benefits envisioned by Points 2, 3, 6-8, 13, 15-19, and 21-28 of Article 13 of this Law as well as to the following:

1) old-age pension in preferential conditions envisioned for workers engaged in jobs with especially dangerous or especially difficult conditions of labor by Point "a" of Article 14 of the USSR Law: "On Pension Support of Citizens in the USSR":

men—upon reaching the age of 50 and with a length of service of at least 20 years, regardless of the length of service in the alienation zone;

women—upon reaching the age of 45 and with a length of service of at least 15 years, regardless of the length of service in the alienation zone;

2) payment of the old-age pension in full without consideration of wages (income) being received;

3) a supplement to the pension in the amount of 30 percent of the minimum old-age pension;

4) compensation for damages incurred as a result of illness or injury which occurred in connection with performing work to clean up the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES and which led to permanent loss of work capacity (without disability being established), determined in the manner envisioned by legislation for cases where such damages incurred by workers and white-collar workers while performing their work duties are compensated;

5) free medicine (with a doctor's prescription);

6) priority annual provision through the work place of a voucher for a sanatorium-resort (given the medical indications) or other health institution free of charge, or if it is impossible to offer a voucher—monetary compensation equal to its average value;

7) priority provision of living space where a need to improve housing conditions is recognized;

8) free travel on all types of urban passenger transport (with the exception of taxis) and on public use motor transport (with the exception of taxis) in rural areas within the boundaries of the administrative rayon for the place of residence, as well as on suburban railway and water transport and on suburban route buses;

9) the right to a 50-percent discount on the cost of travel (round-trip) once a year by air, railway, and water transport;

10) receipt of a no-interest loan for individual or cooperative housing construction with 25 percent paid off using Union budget capital;

The allowances and benefits envisioned by points 6, 7, and 17 of Article 13 and Point 7 of this Article extend to the families of deceased participants in cleaning up the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES.

Persons indicated in Point 3 of Article 12 of this Law have the right to the allowances and benefits envisioned by points 3, 8, 18, 21-26, and 28 of Article 13 and points 2, 4, and 8 of Part 1 of this Article as well as to the following:

1) an old-age pension under preferential conditions, with the exception of persons who took part in cleaning up the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES in 1989, as envisioned for workers engaged in work under dangerous and difficult working conditions by Point "b" of Article 14 of the USSR Law: "On Pension Support of Citizens in the USSR":

men—upon reaching the age of 55 and with a length of service of at least 25 years, regardless of the length of service in the alienation zone;

women—upon reaching the age of 50 and with a length of service of at least 20 years, regardless of the length of service in the alienation zone;

- 2) a supplement to the pension equal to 25 percent of the minimum old-age pension;
- 3) the availability of an annual vacation at a time which is convenient for them;
- 4) priority annual provision through the work place of vouchers for sanatorium-resort treatment and rest;
- 5) preferential enrollment in garage-construction cooperatives and horticultural societies (or cooperatives);
- 6) receipt of a no-interest loan for individual or cooperative housing construction;
- 7) acceptance on the apartment rolls for citizens living in communal apartments, regardless of the size of the living space occupied;
- 8) provision of foodstuffs in accordance with rational norms of food consumption, as well as preferential provision of durable industrial goods.

Identification papers and chest insignia are issued by the USSR ministries and departments, the republic councils of ministers, the ispolkoms of the kray and oblast soviets of people's deputies, military commissariats, and social support organs. Officials are responsible for the correct registration and issuance of identification papers in accordance with legislation in force.

Article 15. Allowances and Benefits for Persons Engaged in Operating the Chernobyl AES and Jobs in the Alienation Zone

Persons (including those sent temporarily or for work purposes) indicated in Point 4 of Article 12 of this Law have the right to the following:

- 1) higher labor payment, a reduced work week, and additional vacation time established by the USSR Government;
- 2) preferential pension support under List No 1 of Production Facilities, Jobs, Occupations, Posts, and Indicators, which is being ratified by the USSR Government;
- 3) inclusion of time worked in the alienation zone, multiplied by 1.5, in the labor service record and in the service record which gives the right to a preferential pension under List No 1 of Facilities, Jobs, Occupations, Posts, and Indicators.

Pensions for workers and white-collar workers who got occupational diseases related to the effects of radiation while working in the alienation zone envisioned by this Article are assigned under List No 1 of Production Facilities, Jobs, Occupations, Posts, and Indicators regardless of the length of service in dangerous working conditions;

- 4) a disability pension for a disability which occurred as a result of an injury or illness caused by the accident

at the Chernobyl AES, as well as for members of their families—a pension for loss of breadwinner as a result of these reasons in the manner envisioned by the USSR Law: "On Pension Support of Citizens in the USSR" in an amount equal to actual compensation for damages determined in accordance with the Regulations being ratified by the USSR Government. If the citizens so desire, the pension may be computed from the wage received for work in the alienation zone;

5) assignment of a disability pension for military personnel and management and rank and file personnel of internal affairs organs and of a pension for loss of breadwinner to their families in the manner and according to the norms established by legislation in case of a wound, contusion, or injury received when performing military (or regular) service. If they so desire, officers, warrant officers, extended-term servicemen, servicewomen, and management and rank and file personnel of internal affairs organs may have the disability pension computed from their higher pay for work in the alienation zone, and regular-term military personnel on active duty—from twice the amount of the minimum wage, if they so desire;

6) payment of the full old-age pension to working pensioners regardless of the wages they are receiving;

7) continued wages for a year after termination of work for medical reasons related to radiation effects and consequent removal from the alienation zone and transfer to a lower-paying job or training for a different occupation.

Additional work and social-everyday benefits to workers in the alienation zone are established by the USSR Government and the governments of the Ukrainian SSR and the Belorussian SSR.

Article 16. Allowances and Benefits for Persons Evacuated From the Alienation Zone or Resettled (or Being Resettled) From the Relocation Zone

Persons indicated in Point 5 of Article 12 of this Law have the right to the allowances and benefits envisioned by Points 21, 22, and 28 of Article 13 of this Law, as well as to the following:

- 1) cancellation of the labor contract when resettled without observing the term envisioned by current legislation for giving notice to the administration of the enterprise, organization, or institution;
- 2) priority job placement by ispolkoms of local soviets of people's deputies in the new place of residence in accordance with their occupations and qualifications. When such job placement is impossible, the ispolkoms provide them with other work taking into account their wishes or offer them the opportunity for training in a new occupation (or specialization) with wages continued during the training period in the established manner;

- 3) continuation of average wages and uninterrupted work credit during the job placement period, but for no more than 4 months;
- 4) monetary compensation for property lost because of resettlement or if these persons so desire, receipt of different property of equal value;
- 5) receipt of a one-time subsidy in connection with moving to a new place of residence;
- 6) compensation for expenditures related to moving;
- 7) provision of housing spaces, as a rule in settlements, houses, or apartments specially constructed for this purpose, or provision of living space in buildings of the state and public housing fund without waiting, or purchase of apartments in buildings of the state or public housing fund without waiting, or enrollment in housing or housing-construction cooperatives at the new place of residence without waiting, when current legislation recognizes that they need improved housing conditions (regardless of the time they lived in this populated point and of the living space occupied);
- 8) priority offering of housing space for citizens who are among those who are unable to work and have been resettled to the living space of close relatives (parents, children, grandchildren, brothers, or sisters) to live together as a member of the family, if as a result of moving the need arises to improve housing conditions in accordance with current law;
- 9) receipt of plots of land for construction of individual houses and acquisition of construction materials without waiting;
- 10) receipt of a no-interest loan to set up a household or to obtain construction materials to build individual houses with 50 percent paid from Union budget capital;
- 11) priority right to enrollment in cooperatives for construction and operation of collective garages and parking spaces for means of transportation;
- 12) preferential provision to children of places in children's preschool institutions, specialized children's treatment and sanatorium institutions, pioneer camps, and other health institutions, regardless of departmental affiliation;
- 13) compensation for the cost of dachas, garden sheds, and other structures, fruit and berry plots, and property inherited or received on other legal bases located in these zones in accordance with Point 4 of this Article, regardless of the place of permanent residence;
- 14) preferential provision of durable goods;
- 15) exemption from the agricultural tax for 3 years when resettled to a rural area.

A one-time subsidy in connection with moving non-working pensioners is paid in the manner established for workers moved to a new place of residence.

The conditions and procedure for moving, offering housing, and finding jobs for citizens being resettled are established by the governments of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR (on the condition that they move within the corresponding republic).

Preferential pension support of persons indicated in this Article is established by legislation of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR.

When citizens of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, or the Belorussian SSR move to a permanent place of residence in other republics, they retain the right to the allowances and benefits established by this Article and by legislation of these republics in the manner determined by interrepublic agreements. The governments of these republics compensate for expenditures to move citizens to other republics using capital allocated to overcome the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe.

Article 17. Allowances and Benefits for Persons Who Live (or Work) in Populated Points on the Territory of the Zone of Habitation With the Right to Relocation

Persons indicated in Point 6 of Article 12 of this Law have the right to the allowances and privileges envisioned by Point 24 of Article 13, Point 5 of Part 1 and points 6 and 8 of Part 2 of Article 14, and Point 13 of Article 16 of this Law, as well as to the following:

- 1) monetary compensation in the amount of 40R a month;
- 2) annual vacation of 37 calendar days with pay, not counting additional vacation for working in dangerous working conditions, if other enactments do not envision a longer vacation, and payment of a one-time material subsidy for health purposes in an amount equal to the state monthly wage rate (or official salary);
- 3) a 100-percent increase in the allowance for children of poor families;
- 4) a subsidy for caring for a child until they reach the age of three. This amount is established at double the amount envisioned by current legislation;
- 5) labor payment at higher rates but no more than 50 percent above the state wage rates (or official salaries);
- 6) payment in higher amounts, but no more than 50 percent, of pensions and benefits to nonworking pensioners and disabled persons;
- 7) payment of full old-age pensions to working pensioners regardless of the wages (or income) they are receiving;
- 8) maternity leave to women lasting 90 calendar days;
- 9) care of children in children's preschool institutions free of charge; provision of foodstuffs in accordance with norms established for these institutions or payment of the cost of food in children's preschool institutions if the

child does not go to such an institution, in the amount established by local soviets of people's deputies;

10) feeding of schoolchildren and pupils in vocational-technical schools and teknikums free of charge;

11) exemption from paying the agricultural tax;

12) with voluntary relocation, receipt of monetary compensation for property lost because of the resettlement, a no-interest loan to set up a household, and payment of expenditures related to moving to the new place of residence.

Allowances and the costs of moving are paid by the ispolkoms of the local soviets of people's deputies at the former place of residence.

Workers sent temporarily or for work purposes to this zone are granted the privileges envisioned by points 1, 2, 5, and 7 of this Article for the actual time worked in this zone.

Differentiation of the monetary allowances and labor payment at higher state wage rates (or official salary rates) relative to the degree of radioactive contamination of the territory or by other criteria is established by legislation of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR.

Preferential pension support of inhabitants of this zone is established by legislation of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR.

Article 18. Allowances and Benefits for Persons Who Live (Or Work) on the Territories of the Zone of Habitation With Privileged Socioeconomic Status

Persons indicated in Point 7 of Article 12 of this Law have the right to the privileges envisioned by Point 24 of Article 13 and Points 8 and 10 of Article 17 of this Law, as well as to the following:

1) monetary compensation in the amount of R30 a month;

2) labor payment at higher rates but no more than 15 percent above the state wage rates (or official salary rates);

3) annual paid vacation of 30 calendar days, without counting additional vacation time for working in dangerous working conditions, if other enactments do not envision a longer vacation;

4) regular, comprehensive medical care.

The list of populated points to whose inhabitants the force of this Article extends is determined by the governments of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR by agreement with the USSR Government.

Article 19. Allowances and Benefits for Persons Who Live (Or Work) in the Relocation Zone

Persons indicated in Point 8 of Article 12 of this Law have the right to the allowances and privileges envisioned by Point 24 of Article 13, Point 5 of Part 1 and points 6 and 8 of Part 2 of Article 14, and points 3, 4, and 7-12 of Article 17 of this Law, as well as to the following:

1) monetary compensation in the amount of 60R a month;

2) annual paid vacation of 44 calendar days, without counting additional vacation time for working in dangerous working conditions, if other enactments do not envision a longer vacation, and a one-time material subsidy for health purposes in an amount equal to the state monthly wage rate (or official salary rate);

3) labor payment at higher rates but no more than 100 percent above the state wage rates (or official salary rates);

4) payment of higher, but no more than 100 percent higher, pensions and benefits to nonworking pensioners and disabled persons.

Differentiation of monetary allowances and labor payment at higher state wage rates (or official salary rates) relative to the degree of radioactive contamination of the territory or by other criteria is established by legislation of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR.

Workers who are sent temporarily or for work purposes to this zone are granted the privileges envisioned by points 1-3 of this Article and by Point 7 of Article 17 of this Law.

Preferential pension support of inhabitants of this zone is established by legislation of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR.

Article 20. Allowances and Benefits for Persons Who Voluntarily Left the Zone of Habitation With the Right to Relocation for a New Place of Residence

Persons indicated in Point 9 of Article 12 of this Law have the right to the allowances and benefits envisioned by Point 21 of Article 13 and points 1-6, 8, and 10-13 of Article 16 of this Law, as well as to the following:

1) priority provision of living space or priority purchase of apartments in buildings of the state and public housing fund, or priority enrollment in housing or housing-construction cooperatives at the new place of residence;

2) priority receipt of plots of land for construction of individual houses and acquisition of construction materials.

Allowances and moving costs are paid by the ispolkoms of the local soviets of people's deputies at the former place of residence.

The conditions and procedure for offering housing and job placement for citizens being resettled are established by legislation of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR (on the condition that they move within the corresponding republic).

When citizens of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, or the Belorussian SSR move to a permanent place of residence in other republics, they retain the right to the allowances and benefits established by this Article and the legislation of these republics in the manner determined by interrepublic agreements. The governments of these republics reimburse expenditures when citizens move to other republics using capital allocated to overcome the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe.

Article 21. Privileges for Military Personnel and Management and Rank and File Personnel of the Internal Affairs Organs Who Are Serving (or Served) Military (or Regular) Duty in the Zones of Relocation, Habitation With the Right to Relocation, or Habitation With Privileged Socioeconomic Status

Persons indicated in Point 10 of Article 12 of this Law have the right to the appropriate allowances and benefits envisioned by articles 15-20 of this Law in the manner determined by the USSR Government.

Article 22. The Conditions for Serving Military (or Regular) Duty in Territories Subjected to Radioactive Contamination as a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe

Serving military (or regular) duty in the alienation zone is forbidden. If the need arises to perform service duties in this zone, military personnel are sent on a voluntary basis, other than in cases envisioned by Article 11 of the USSR Law: "On the Legal Conditions of the State of Emergency."

The conditions for serving military (or regular) duty in the relocation zone are determined by the USSR Government.

Military (or regular) duty in the zone of habitation with the right to relocation or the zone of habitation with privileged socioeconomic status is carried out in accordance with current legislation. Citizens drafted for military service from the zone of relocation or the zone of habitation with the right to relocation are sent for regular-term active duty in military units and institutions in posts which preclude any exposure to radiation during service.

Sergeants and enlisted personnel on regular-term active duty in the zone of habitation with the right to relocation have the right after 12 months to a vacation lasting 14 calendar days, without counting time needed to reach the vacation site and return from it. The specific lengths of time of vacations contingent upon the level of contamination of the territories or other criteria are established by the USSR Government.

Military servicemen (with the exception of regular-term sergeants and enlisted personnel) who are serving in the zone of habitation with the right to relocation have the right to change the place of military service in the manner established by the USSR Government and to reserve living space in the former place of service.

Decisions on additional benefits and allowances for citizens living and working on territories subjected to radioactive contamination as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe made by the higher organs of power and management of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR extend to persons performing military (or regular) duty and management and rank and file personnel of internal affairs organs who are serving on these territories, as well as to members of their families.

Article 23. Organization of Medical Aid and Radiation Protection for Persons Who Suffered as a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe

Persons indicated in Article 12 of this Law, as well as their children who were born in the post-accident period under conditions where radioactive emissions could indirectly affect them, are subject to specialized medical observation (dispensary service). A State Register is being set up for their personal records.

Medical aid to persons who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe and dispensary observation of them are carried out by the health care institutions at their place of residence or work. Specialized medical care for these persons is provided by health care institutions. The list of these institutions and the procedure for giving medical aid and dispensary observation are determined by the organs empowered by the USSR Government and the governments of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR and other republics.

Interdepartmental expert review councils and military-medical commissions authorized by the organs and empowered by the USSR Government and the governments of the Union republics establish the causal connection between the illness or disability and the accident at the Chernobyl AES for persons indicated in Point 1 of Article 12 of this Law. The causal connection between partial or complete loss of work capacity of victims of the Chernobyl catastrophe who are citizens is considered established if these councils or commissions do not affirm the absence of such a connection.

Persons who are dissatisfied with the decisions of these expert councils or military-medical commissions have the right to request a second review of the case in the Central Interdepartmental Expert Council To Establish a Causal Connection Between the Disease or Disability and the Performance of Work To Clean up the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES formed by organs empowered by the USSR Government.

When a medical commission for determination of disability (VTEK) establishes that the disability is a result of illness for persons indicated in Point 2 of Article 12 of

this Law, as well as for persons evacuated from the alienation zone, the disability is considered related to the accident at the Chernobyl AES without examination of these persons by interdepartmental expert councils or military-medical commissions.

The necessary level of ecological protection of the population is provided in regions subjected to radioactive contamination as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe. For this purpose, special service offices of the organs empowered by the USSR Government and the governments of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR provide state supervision which includes monitoring the condition of the environment, including radiation conditions on the entire contaminated territory, and the amount of harmful substances (including radionuclides) in drinking water, foodstuffs, and locally produced agricultural output, as well as levels of internal and external irradiation of the population.

Article 24. Social Protection, Medical Care, and Improvement of the Health of Children and Adolescents

In order to provide social protection and medical care and improve the health of children and adolescents under 18 years of age who live in the relocation zone or the zone of habitation with the right to relocation, as well as those evacuated and moved from the alienation or relocation zones or the zone of habitation with the right to relocation, including those who were in the womb on the day of evacuation, the following additional benefits are granted:

for these children and adolescents:

1) sanatorium-resort treatment, with the appropriate medical indications, in sanatoriums of the appropriate specialization, including in "Mother and Child" sanatoriums, free of charge;

2) acquisition of medicines (with a doctor's prescription) free of charge;

3) free travel (round-trip) together with one of the parents or substitute person on the railroad or on ships of transit and local lines of the river fleet, and in rayons without railway traffic—by air, water, or intercity motor transport, to the place of treatment or sanatorium-resort treatment, at the direction of medical institutions, with a priority right to tickets;

4) annual free health treatment in (public or sanatorium-type) pioneer camps and other health improvement institutions, and if that is not possible, receipt of monetary compensation in an amount equal to its average value;

5) if illness affects the blood-producing organs (acute leukemia) or the thyroid gland (adenoma or cancer), or malignant tumors appear, children and adolescents have the right to the benefits envisioned by Article 13 of this Law;

for parents of children under 14 years of age:

1) 100-percent payment based on a temporary disability certificate (to one of the parents) in order to take care of the sick child, regardless of the length of service;

2) one of the parents may stay with the sick child in the medical institution (at doctors' recommendations) for the entire period of treatment with the issuance of the certificate and payment for temporary disability.

If it is impossible for the parents to be with the child during treatment, the force of points 1 and 2 of Part 2 of this Article extends to the other person who is taking care of the child.

The procedure for medical care and health improvement of children and adolescents indicated in this Article is determined by the organs empowered by the USSR Government and the governments of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR with the participation of public associations.

The benefits envisioned by points 1, 2, and 5 of Part 1 of this Article as well as the right to preferential health improvement in general-type pioneer camps and with the appropriate medical indications in health improvement institutions extend to children and adolescents living in the zone of habitation with privileged socioeconomic status.

Article 25. On Additional Benefits Not Envisioned by This Law

The governments of the republics, ispolkoms of soviets of people's deputies, enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and trade union associations may within the limits of their authority take additional measures to provide foodstuffs and improve material-domestic conditions or medical, trade, and transport service for persons to whom the force of this Law extends.

Article 26. On Resumption of Vital Activity of the Population in the Alienation and Relocation Zones

Resumption of permanent habitation of the population in populated points and rayons of the alienation zone and the relocation zone, including returning of evacuees, is possible only on a voluntary basis after the radioactive impact in these points and rayons has been reduced to levels which require no restrictions and after the necessary conditions have been created for habitation and labor activity of the population.

The decision to resume permanent habitation of the population in these zones, including returning evacuees, is made by the governments of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR.

Section 4. Allowances for Persons for Damages to Health Caused by the Chernobyl Catastrophe

Article 27. Allowances for Damages to Health for Disabled Persons and Families Who Lost Their Breadwinner

Disabled persons indicated in Point 1 of Article 12 of this Law are paid a one-time allowance for damages to health in the following amounts: Group 1—R10,000; Group 2—R7,000; Group 3—R5,000. Every year they are also paid a one-time material subsidy for health improvement in the following amounts: Group 1 and Group 2 disabled persons—three times the amount of the minimum wage; for Group 3 disabled persons—two times the amount of the minimum wage.

Families who lost their breadwinner as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe are paid a one-time allowance in the amount of R10,000, while the parents of a deceased person receive R5,000.

Article 28. Allowances for Damages to Health for Participants in Cleaning up the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES

Persons indicated in Point 2 of Article 12 of this Law are paid an annual one-time material subsidy for health improvement in an amount three times the minimum wage.

Persons indicated in Point 3 of Article 12 of this Law who took part in eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES in 1988 are paid an annual material subsidy for health improvement in an amount twice the minimum wage.

Persons indicated in Point 3 of Article 12 of this Law who took part in cleaning up the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES in 1989 are paid an annual one-time material subsidy for health improvement in the amount of the minimum wage.

Article 29. Allowances for Families for Loss of a Breadwinner Who Participated in Cleaning Up the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES

Disabled dependent family members have the right to a monthly allowance for the loss of a breadwinner who participated in eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe. In this case the monthly allowance is assigned for children, regardless of whether they are the breadwinner's dependents.

An allowance is granted for each disabled family member in an amount equal to 50 percent of the minimum old-age pension regardless of the pension which has been established for these persons by this Law.

Children who have lost their breadwinner are paid a one-time material subsidy in an amount equal to the minimum wage.

Article 30. Payment of Allowances for Damages to Health to Persons Who Suffered as a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe and to Families for Loss of the Breadwinner

The allowances for damages to health to persons who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe and to families for loss of the breadwinner because of this catastrophe are paid regardless of other types of income.

Section 5. Conditions for Activity by Enterprises, Institutions, Organizations, and Public Associations

Article 31. The Conditions for Activity of Enterprises, Institutions, and Organizations Located in Territories Subjected to Radioactive Contamination

The conditions for work of enterprises, institutions, and organizations in the jurisdiction of republics located on territories subjected to radioactive contamination to which the force of this Law extends are determined by the governments of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR, and for enterprises, institutions, and organizations of Union subordination—with the agreement of the USSR Government.

Enterprises, institutions, and organizations located in these territories have the following rights:

1) exemption from taxation of the part of profits directed for health improvement of workers and members of their families;

2) conclusion of a labor agreement with specialists on a contract basis.

Taxable income of enterprises, organizations, and institutions received from activities involving cultural-domestic, trade, and other types of service to the population and construction in the relocation zone and the zone of habitation with right to relocation is reduced by 30 percent. The lists of enterprises, organizations, and institutions are established by the governments of the republics.

Article 32. Public Associations

Public associations whose charter activity is rendering aid to persons who suffered from the Chernobyl catastrophe are exempt from taxation for amounts directed for these purposes. The tax on profits for enterprises and organizations of these public associations is reduced by the amount which is directed to these associations to carry out their charter activity of rendering aid to victims of the Chernobyl catastrophe. Public associations and their departments and enterprises are granted privileges in the manner determined by the USSR Government when paying customs duties on goods they export or import.

Article 33. Requirements for Foodstuffs and Consumer Goods Produced on a Territory Subjected to Radioactive Contamination as a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe

Production for the direct use of the population of foodstuffs and consumer goods contaminated with radioactive substances as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe above the levels set by the organs empowered by the USSR Government is forbidden. If such products and goods go on sale, they are to be confiscated by the local organs of power.

Persons guilty of violating the requirements of this Article bear responsibility in accordance with legislation of the USSR and the republics.

Article 34. The Right of Citizens and Public Associations to Information

Citizens and public associations have the right to receive timely, complete, and reliable information on questions involving the Chernobyl catastrophe. Information is provided by institutions and organizations empowered for this by the USSR Government and the governments of the republics.

Officials of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, public associations, and the mass information media bear responsibility for deliberate distortion or suppression of objective data on questions involving the Chernobyl catastrophe in accordance with legislation of the USSR and the republics.

M. Gorbachev, president,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Moscow, the Kremlin, 12 May 1991.

Implementation Resolution

91WN0496B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 May
91 Union Edition p 5

[“Resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet: ‘On Putting Into Force the USSR Law ‘On Social Protection of Citizens Who Suffered as a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe’’”]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To put into force the USSR Law: “On Social Protection of Citizens Who Suffered as a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe” from the moment it is adopted, and in the part involving pension support—from 1 September 1991.

2. To specify for the USSR Government and the governments of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR, before 1 July 1991, the lists of populated points which are part of the territories of radioactive contamination defined by this Law.

3. Within three months the USSR Cabinet of Ministers shall:

adopt the necessary normative enactments to apply the USSR Law “On Social Protection of Citizens Who Suffered as a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe”;

present to the USSR Supreme Soviet proposals to introduce into current legislation changes and additions stemming from this Law;

bring the enactments of the USSR Government regarding the Chernobyl catastrophe into line with this Law.

4. Until legislation of the USSR and the republics is brought into line with the USSR Law: “On Social Protection of Citizens Who Suffered as a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe,” that legislation is to be applied to the extent it does not contradict this Law.

5. It is recommended to the supreme soviets of the republics that they adopt the necessary enactments to apply the Law adopted on questions involving their jurisdiction.

6. It is recommended to the supreme soviets of the republics and the local soviets of people’s deputies that they take measures to ensure additional guarantees of social protection and improvement of living conditions for citizens who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe, and especially to increase attention given to less well-off categories of such citizens.

7. The USSR Cabinet of Ministers shall, depending on changes in conditions in rayons subjected to the impact of radiation as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe, introduce to the USSR Supreme Soviet proposals to change or amend this Law.

8. Financing of expenditures related to adopting the USSR Law: “On Social Protection of Citizens Who Suffered as a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe” is to be carried out in 1991 in accordance with the USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution of 25 April 1990 “On a Uniform Program To Eliminate the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES and the Situation Related to This Accident” and with the State Union Republic Program of Emergency Measures for 1990-1992 To Eliminate the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES, and starting in 1992—from the Union budget.

9. Beginning in 1992 extend the allowances and benefits envisioned by the USSR Law: “On Social Protection of Citizens Who Suffered as a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe” for persons who became ill with radiation sickness or became disabled as a result of radiation accidents and their consequences to other (in addition to the Chernobyl AES) civilian and military nuclear facilities.

The USSR Cabinet of Ministers together with the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Public Health should introduce proposals by 1 November 1991 for measures on social protection of USSR citizens who suffered as a result of radiation accidents and their consequences in

other (in addition to the Chernobyl AES) civilian and military nuclear facilities, as well as those who suffered as a result of experiments, exercises, and other jobs involving all types of nuclear installations, including nuclear weapons.

A. Lukyanov, chairman,
USSR Supreme Soviet.
Moscow, the Kremlin, 12 May 1991.

Biophysics Institute Director on Chernobyl Health Statistics

*91WN0509A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 21, Jun 91 p 6*

[Interview of L. Ilin, academician of the AMN SSSR [USSR Academy of Medical Sciences] and director of the Biophysics Institute of the AMN SSSR, by V. Romanenko and O. Izvekova: "My Conscience as a Scientist Is Clear...."]

[Text] Chernobyl: The total damage from the catastrophe is 170-215 billion rubles.

L. Ilin, director of the Biophysics Institute of the AMN SSSR, a man about whom, for the past five years perhaps, most of the criticism for covering up the truth about Chernobyl has been heard, answers our correspondents' questions.

[Correspondent] In the opinion of Ukrainian SSR Minister of Public Health Yu. Spizhenko, "...a lie and a half-truth, the informational dictation of the Center, and supersecretiveness about the true radiation situation outside the 30-kilometer zone have done their job—about 150,000 residents of the Ukraine have received radiation doses of the thyroid gland that exceed the permissible doses. And the thyroid glands of 5,000 children and the families of thousands of adults have received 200 rads, which, under present norms, exceeds the permissible limits 30-fold to 40-fold!"

Today the capital's Biophysics Institute of the AMN USSR has been forced to recognize the connection of the accident with the spread of the illness of thyroid-gland cancer, but still "does not see" the connection of that large-scale pathology of the blood that is being observed today with the radiation.

You do not feel a personal responsibility for the fact that people were not told the truth five years ago?

[Ilin] Five years ago no one knew the whole truth. And this is completely natural. The information was not complete. My conscience as a scientist is absolutely clear. All this was classified. That which we knew, that which could be accepted, we accepted, and when I am asked, "What would you do then?", I would like to have seen these people at our place.

[Correspondent] How many people were victims of the accident at the ChAES [Chernobyl Nuclear Electric-Power Station]?

[Ilin] According to data of the Institute of Medical Radiology of the AMN SSSR, 244,000 liquidators and 536,000 evacuees and people who live in the areas of rigid monitoring are included in the state registry. During the past month the institute received information about 10,000 people under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense (officer personnel), 8,000 MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] officers, and about 34,000 soldiers on their first term of service. I do not believe the last figure very much. I think it is larger.

Only 141,000 people have individual dosimetry, that is, practically 100,000 people do not have papers about dosages.

In 1986, 121,000 people passed through the Chernobyl site, 75,000 in 1987, 22,600 in 1988, and 8,000 in 1989.

The characteristics of the death rate among liquidators throughout the Ukraine, Russia, and Belorussia for the group 20 to 50 years of age practically differs in no way from the average mortality rate for these republics.

In all, 1,134 people (ages 20-49 years) died during these years. This is for the liquidators. The overall death rate for the USSR among people 20-30 years of age is in the range of 2.2-2.6 per 100,000 persons. But for the registry (people of this age were taken) it is 1.5 persons (that is, 30 percent lower than for the country as a whole).

[Correspondent] After the accident you proposed a 35-ber [rem units] concentration for evaluating the degree of radiation effect. Today many scientists consider it mistaken. You are confident of it, as before?

[Ilin] Absolutely! I have here on the table the report of the International Project on Chernobyl, in which more than 20 countries of the world took part. A group of deputies appealed at one time to N. Ryzhkov with the request to conduct an independent international study by experts, since they did not believe Soviet specialists.

The independent international experts' study termed our concept, more precisely the 35-ber level of intervention proposed by the national commission on radiation protection, too conservative. They would name the permissible dose as two-fold to three-fold higher. Yet today we are accused of genocide of the Belorussian people.

The main conclusions of the experts: they did not find in the rayons which had been harmed any kind of changes in comparison with the control rayons, which would indicate the possible effect of the radiation on people. All the decisions of Soviet specialists at the early phase of the accident were correct and were taken in accordance with standards that have been developed by us and abroad.

I suggest that right here in our country everything will be done by certain people to repudiate the decisions of the commission of independent experts.

[Correspondent] Do you consider that your critics are guided by purely political and not professional considerations?

[Ilin] Many have made a career of this criticism....At a time when practical questions were not being solved for years. For example, it was the efforts of scientists of our institute which created a special filter for purifying milk of radioactive cesium. The filter is a nontextile material in the structure of which, by means of special chemical techniques, a substance was introduced that selectively binds the cesium. It reduced the radioactivity of milk 20-to 40-fold, that is, it became practically pure, without losing its taste and other qualities. If these filters had been introduced in time, a portion of the people would not have been resettled.

One filter costs about four kopecks. As a minimum, fewer than 10 million of them are needed per year. But our existing system does not allow this development to be introduced quickly. We are ready to send the technology and the documentation.

Estimates of May 1986 Chernobyl Fallout in Kiev Disputed

91WN0506B Moscow *TRUD* in Russian 4 Jun 91 p 3

[Article by V. Tokarevskiy, doctor of physical-mathematical sciences, section head at the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences Nuclear Studies Institute: "Chernobyl: Echo of a Tragedy. Glasnost With Partiality"]

[Text] May 1986—once again about the demonstration in Kiev.

There is a most definite circle of Soviet scientists who purposefully propagandize the conception of the insignificance of the medical-biological consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe. There are also those who defend their ideas, as for example the Canadian physicist from the University of Manitoba, Iovan V. Iovanovich, who published his article: "Glasnost and Partiality" in the Ukraine. Iovanovich says that the speech on Chernobyl by USSR People's Deputy Yu. Shcherbak, chairman of the Ukrainian ecology association "Greenpeace", and his accusations addressed to the Ukrainian government regarding the May 1 demonstration on the streets of radioisotope-bombarded Kiev, were a gross error. The Canadian believes that the figure presented by writer Yu. Shcherbak, who stated that the radiation level in Kiev in those days of May 1986 was 100 times higher than the maximally allowable level, is a monstrous distortion of the truth.

Moreover, the Canadian physicist maintains that incompetence and political intrigue have given rise to a new "Lysenkovism" in the Soviet Union. And while in the 30's the antiscientific theories of Academician Trofim Lysenko destroyed many true scientists and set back Soviet genetics by decades, today's Chernobyl "Lysenkovism" is capable of inflicting almost as much harm.

The accusations are serious and demand commentary.

The radioactive cloud from Chernobyl reached Kiev on the morning of 30 April 1986. The next day, the Mayday demonstration was held in the city...

According to Soviet as well as American data, which I. Iovanovich presents in his article, the radiation levels in the city fluctuated during those days from 3 to 0.32 milliroentgen per hour. The primary component of the aerosol cloud was radioactive iodine-131. If we average these figures, then according to the computations of the Canadian physicist, the children, of whom there were many at the demonstration, received 5 milliroentgen of external and from 2 to 5 milliroentgen of internal radiation.

One may receive this dose by flying on a jet airplane from Kiev to Vladivostok and back. To speak of the harm of such radiation, he says, is simply laughable.

All these figures evoke for me at least a feeling of distressing confusion.

...The cloud which covered Kiev at 11:00 a.m. on 30 April turned the air which we breathe, 22,000 liters of which we pass through our lungs every day, into a radioactive environment. During those days it saturated the blood not only with oxygen, but also with radionuclides. And the main blow was dealt to the Kiev residents not through external radiation, which is really computed with the aid of arithmetic rules, but through internal radiation.

Aleksandr Linev, a professor at the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences Nuclear Studies Institute, conducted regular measurements of the gamma- background at a single location in Kiev, beginning with 30 April. The level of radiation changed within an interval of several hours: It dropped from 5 to 0.6 milliroentgens, and then it again rose to 2.2. Such surges continued over a period of two weeks. I am focusing attention on them because they reflect the fluctuations of the so-called volume activity of the atmospheric air—a most important constant in computing received doses. A specialist will easily tell you that in one hour an adult located in such a cloud received two yearly norms to his thyroid gland—around 3 rem [roentgen equivalent, man]!

In case you have forgotten, I. Iovanovich cited somewhat different doses: No more than 10 millirem in the five hours of the demonstration.

Yet there was not only the iodine impact. An analysis of the air filters at hydrometeorological stations conducted at our institute during those days showed that the level of volume activity exceeded the maximal levels by hundreds and thousands of times, not only for iodine-131, but also for tellurium-132, cesium-137, and certain other isotopes.

Thus, in my opinion, the discussion of the Canadian physicist about the Chernobyl "Lysenkovism" seems hardly appropriate.

**Conclusions of Vienna Chernobyl Conference
Reviewed**

*91WN0509B Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 May 91
Second Edition p 5*

[Article by I. Melnikov (Vienna): "Chernobyl Stress"]

[Text] The independent study of the consequences of the catastrophe which was made by experts was welcomed unambiguously.

The number of conferences, symposia, and consultative meetings dedicated to the Chernobyl accident is counted in the tens if not the hundreds. Many of them were international. However, it is unlikely that even one of them could, in terms of diversity and volume of the materials collected and analyzed, scarcely stand alongside the one that was held at the end of May within the walls of the Vienna Division of the United Nations.

The conference on evaluation of the study that independent experts conducted in areas suffering from the Chernobyl catastrophe brought together scientists from 34 countries, as well as representatives of tens of international organizations. This "Areopagus of authorities" was to analyze the conclusions to which experts had arrived after a year and a half of study and to draw an authentic and understandable picture of today's Chernobyl realities.

But first, the preceding history of the Vienna forum. In the spring of 1989 our government appealed to the International Agency for Atomic Energy [IAEA], asking for "a study by experts of the concept which was developed in the USSR of safe residence by the populace in areas that had been subjected to radioactive contamination as a result of the accident at the Chernobylskaya AES [nuclear electric power station]." One did not have to wait for a response. Soon MAGATE [IAEA—the International Atomic Energy Agency], together with VOZ [World Health Organization], the Commission of European Associations, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and the Scientific Committee of the United Nations on the Effects of Nuclear Radiation established a project within the framework of which a group of independent international experts began to operate.

At the finish line the independent experts had come up with almost a thousand pages of summary studies.

Just what were the conclusions of the expert evaluation, in the conduct of which 200 scientists from some 20 countries participated and the responsive direction of which was accomplished by the International Consultative Committee? The main conclusion is cited in the chapter, "The Effect on Health." The experts noted substantial violations, not caused by radiation, of the health of the residents both of the polluted communities investigated and of the control populations that were studied within the framework of the project. But there

were no violations of health of any kind directly connected with the effect of radiation exposure. At the same time, the report noted, the accident involved substantial negative psychological consequences that were expressed in an increased feeling of worry and the emergence of stress because of a constant feeling of uncertainty. This tendency was traced even beyond the limits of the contaminated regions.

What kind of a grade did the foreign colleagues give to Soviet scientists, particularly their "concept of safe residence in areas affected by the catastrophe"? This grade was completely satisfactory: the methodology of our specialists was adopted, and high professionalism was noted in compilation of the maps of radioactive poisoning of the locality. The Soviet experts also were ready for criticism, but its arrows flew from an unexpected direction: we were reproached for a certain conservatism in determining the probability evaluations of radiation dosages and contamination levels. As the Western professors indicate, these evaluations were overstated by almost double for a large number of parameters.

I was reminded of the phrase, spoken by Chairman of the International Consultative Committee Isuzo Shigematsu, on the forum's opening day: only time will enable the actual meaning of the contribution made by the experts to be evaluated. Behind these words, it seems, there stood not only the modesty of the Japanese professor and his associates. More likely it was a signal that the international study by experts did not assume the role of an inerrant oracle. The rigid calendar and the shortage of experimental data actually narrowed the field of the experts' activity. No kind of scientific scrupulosity could erase such "white blemishes" as, for example, the condition of the 100,000 local residents who were evacuated, which was cited within the framework of the project, and the 600,000 "liquidators"—people who had struggled with the consequences of the accident. It is not surprising that the discussion at the conference, day by day, became increasingly lively.

The attitude toward the recommendations of the independent experts' study proved to be ambiguous. On the last day of the conference, the representatives of Belorussia and the Ukraine came out with a joint announcement. After having recognized the competence and integrity of the international experts, they nevertheless expressed concern for their "excessive optimism" in regard to both the present and the long-term consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe. The Belorussian and Ukrainian representatives announced that the summary of the project cannot be regarded as conclusive. But is it not clear that the pronouncements made on the last day of the forum by Chairman of the International Consultative Committee Isuzo Shigematsu and IAEA General Director Hans Bliks were not in unison with this thought? Both emphasized the vital necessity of tirelessly continuing global collaboration in studying the consequences of Chernobyl. And that, obviously, in the near

future a search must be made for a compromise model of that collaboration which would organize all the interested parties.

In conclusion there is still one aspect of the Chernobyl problem which was not brought out at the proscenium during the discussions but was invariably held up for the conference's participants to see. This was international help—technical and financial. It is completely understandable that the conclusions of the experts' study "about overstated evaluations" of the danger for people's health and for the state of the environment can in a definite situation cool the enthusiasm of the "donor" states. Two of the people I talked with gave me to understand how undesirable the consequences are.

"We cannot get along without help," Deputy Chief of the Government of Belorussia Ivan Kenik admitted. In the last war a fourth of the republic's resident perished, and right now a fifth of them have been injured. We severely need medical equipment which will enable us to treat people on the spot and not bring them to the ends of the earth for healing."

"We now stand on the threshold of a very interesting era," says Chairman of the Committee on Elimination of the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobylskaya AES Victor Gubanov—execution of the resolution of the United General Assembly on the extension of international aid. Jointly with the republics, we have developed tens of concrete programs, beginning with the urgent needs of regional hospitals and ending with treatment of the most complicated types of illnesses. What is concealed here is that the quantity and quality of foreign assistance depend upon the recommendations of the experts' study and the frame of mind of the Vienna conference."

Status of Estonian Radioactive Waste Burial Site *91WN0525B Tallinn VECHERNIY TALLINN* *in Russian 7 May 91 p 2*

[Article by Tamara Makarova, head of the republic sanitation and epidemiological station radiation safety department: "Radioactive Waste Burial Site: Hazard Assessment"]

[Text] The republic press has written many times about the radioactive waste burial site. But as a rule, the information has been either incomplete or presented by people who are not competent. For example, in the weekly EESTI EKSPRESS No. 14 of April 12, 1991, in an article entitled: "Caution: Radioactivity," several questions were raised (to whom does the burial site belong, what danger does it pose to those around it). However, the information itself was very approximate. I would like to attempt to introduce some clarity.

The radioactive waste burial site has been functioning in Estonia since 1963. Administratively, the enterprise is subordinate to the Tallinn Specialized Automotive

Transport Depot and is located in a coniferous forest 11 kilometers from the city and four kilometers from the settlement of Saku.

The area of the burial site is about one square kilometer and is surrounded by barbed wire. The radius of the protective sanitary zone is .3 kilometer. The sector in which radioactive wastes are stored directly has two storage chambers—for solid and liquid wastes. The reinforced-concrete burial chamber for solid wastes has a volume of 500 cubic meters and is divided into seven sections. At present, it is 40 percent full. The burial chamber for liquid wastes has a volume of 200 cubic meters and is lined with stainless steel. It is only 1.5 percent full—with low-radioactivity biological wastes, since the republic has virtually no liquid wastes. The area where wastes are buried has an area of 200 square meters and is surrounded by a second barbed wire fence. It also has wells that are used to monitor subsurface water radioactivity.

On driving onto the grounds of the burial site, one encounters a guardpost and sanitation checkpoint. The burial site is guarded around the clock.

Radioactive wastes in Estonia consist primarily of spent radioactive sources from gamma-ray defectoscopes, radioisotope technical monitoring instruments, and low-radioactivity wastes from research and medical institutions. Spent sources from large gamma-ray irradiation units used in both medicine and industry have up until now been taken out of the republic by specialized enterprises in Moscow and Leningrad.

It should be pointed out that whereas in the 1960s and 1970s, gamma-ray defectoscopes primarily used radioactive sources of cesium-137, with a half-life of 30 years, in recent decades there has been a shift to sources of iridium-192, with a half-life of 74 days. This is significantly safer, since after 10 half-life periods, a radioactive substance essentially ceases to be radioactive.

The radiation situation at the radioactive waste burial site is monitored. This monitoring consists in measurements of external background gamma-ray radiation, of radioactive contamination of equipment and special transport vehicles, and of the specific radioactivity of subsurface water. The results of this monitoring are as follows: The external gamma-ray background radiation outside the burial section is essentially equal to the natural level; specialized transport vehicles and equipment have not been found to be contaminated with radioactivity; and the specific radioactivity of subsurface water has been at the natural level throughout the period of the burial site's operation. Accordingly, in assessing the radioactive situation at the burial site, one can at present consider it to be favorable and to pose no danger to the public. However, I would nonetheless like to call attention to certain problems.

Burial volumes could increase in the next few years if the specialized enterprises in Moscow and Leningrad were to stop taking spent sources from gamma- and beta-ray

irradiation units out of the republic. At that time, the question would arise of the need to provide the site with its own laboratory for monitoring environmental radioactivity of the surrounding area. Until now, the specific radioactivity of subsurface water has been assessed periodically by the radiological laboratory of the republic sanitation and epidemiological station.

Secondly, we safety technicians are disturbed not so much by the burial site itself as by the problem of making sure that all radioactive sources utilized in the republic end up here following their use. The existing monitoring system cannot provide a 100 percent guarantee of this. In addition, burying radioactive wastes has cost 650 rubles in recent years, which increases the risk that radioactive sources might not be buried (VECHERNIY TALLINN, January 22, 1991).

To prevent this, burial must be fully subsidized by the state, or its cost should be included in the cost of the radioactive sources themselves. In order to step up burial monitoring, we consider it necessary to introduce in the republic an automated system to trace sources from the moment of their acquisition by an enterprise or institution to their burial at the radioactive waste burial site.

This is a task for the future, of course. But we intend to submit this proposal to the Estonian Republic government. We would also like to enlist the support of the public.

Dzhambul Morbidity, Mortality Rates Linked to Chemical Pollution

91WN0507A Alma-Ata LENINSKAYA SMENA
in Russian 13 Apr 91 p 1

[Article by G. Vybornova, personal correspondent: "Public Disclosure of Effects of Chemical Plant Waste; The Rate of Infant Mortality in Dzhambul Is 39.5 Percent as Compared to a Republic Average of 29 Percent. The Rate in Dzhambulskiy Rayon Is 46.7 Percent"]

[Text] These figures were included in just the same way in the subtitle of an article in the first issue of the new publication OAZIS. It was not even an article, but a public health report from the republic center. Residents of Dzhambul finally learned the truth about their city, where three chemical plants are located.

Many readers were probably shocked to learn that spontaneous abortions in the polluted zone (these were the neighborhoods surrounding the plants, which are the first to be affected by chemical plant waste) occur 12.5 times as frequently as the average, the rate of premature births is 5.4 times as high as the average, and the rate of infertility is 3.8 times as high. People in the zone are 9.5 times as likely to seek medical treatment for acute respiratory diseases and 13.5 times as likely to seek treatment for chronic pharyngitis and laryngitis. The inhabitants of these neighborhoods are seven times as likely to suffer from bronchial pneumonia.

The cardiovascular system also undergoes changes: The frequency of severe infarction is 12 times as high as the average and the rate of stenocardia is 4.3 times as high. The rate of oncological disease is also higher in the polluted zone: 42 times as high for gynecological cancers and 16 times as high for cancers of the respiratory organs.

The entire report consists of numerical data of this kind on various diseases. The report ends with the statement that Zavodskiy Rayon Chief Public Health Physician Kh. Mamedakhunov remarked at a recent Dzhambul Medical Institute applied science conference that the genetic effects of pollution have not been investigated thoroughly.

We shall see if this distressing news provides the momentum for immediate measures for the ecological recovery of the city.

Austrian Firm's Deal for Disposal of Toxic Waste in USSR Criticized

91WN0537A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 18 Jun 91 p 1

[Yu. Kulibaba report: "All the Waste Is Welcome Here"]

[Text] The Krivoy Rog Cement and Mining Combine has signed a fantastic contract with an Austrian company. Under the terms of the contract the foreign company is to deliver 10,000 tons of gypsum sludge. And for each ton it will pay the Krivoy Rog Cement and Mining Combine 1,330 Austrian chillings. Transportation costs will also be borne by the supplier, and it would appear that it gains no profit, only scientific interest.

The subject of the research is ordinary waste, which is obviously called "sludge" for the sake of conspiracy, and it is to be used to conduct experiments to develop new technology for the manufacture of cement. In any event, that is the official version. But this is nothing but legend. It is obvious that the proposed cooperation will yield no scientific results. The waste being exported into the country cannot be used in any kind of production because it contains substances that are dangerous to the environment and to people's health, and they are there in concentrations tens and hundreds of times greater than the maximum permissible levels. According to the Administration of the Committee for State Security, it is proposed to bury the imported waste in a quarry and use the money received for the needs of the enterprise.

Managers at the Kamysh-Burunskiy Iron Ore Combine decided to rush through a similar deal. A protocol of intent has already been signed. It is proposed to bury a million tons of toxic waste on the territory of the Crimea; the foreign company is prepared to pay 30 West German marks for each ton.

The list of similar deals could be continued. The privilege of destroying nature on a particularly large scale is evidently being transferred from the Union departments

to the enterprises whose managers are ready to make any kind of deal with their consciences for the sake of immediate profit.

Ministries Findings in Sverdlovsk Pesticide Poisoning Case

91WN0468A Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian 15 May 91
First Edition p 1

[Article by B. Pipiya: "What Happened in the Vicinity of Sverdlovsk: The Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Defense Warn: To Work in Fields Treated With Pesticides Is Not Safe"]

[Text] A "toxic ghost"—that is how the report was called that was printed in *PRAVDA* of 19 August 1990 under the heading "Explain What Is Happening?" We will briefly recall what the question was.

In the summer of 1989, students of Sverdlovsk University, during the bringing in of the harvest in the Krasnoufimskiy Sovkhoz of Krasnoufimskiy Rayon felt indisposed. Their feet began to grow numb, headaches appeared. Fifty people were hospitalized with the diagnosis of "disease of the peripheral nervous system."

Last year the outbreak of illnesses repeated itself in the Khramtsovskiy Sovkhoz. Senior pupils of the secondary schools of Sverdlovsk came to weed carrots and turnips. Four to six hours after work, three pupils became ill. After several days, six more turned to the doctor with complaints about pain in their legs, the loss of feeling. All of them were taken away by an ambulance.

Here they raised the alarm. Specialists from the USSR Ministry of Health, the Taifun Scientific Production Association of the USSR State Hydrometeorological Administration, the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Chemical Plant Protection, the Scientific Research Institute for Labor Hygiene and Professional Diseases, and the USSR Ministry of Defense flew to Sverdlovsk.

Virological, bacteriological, radiological, and toxicological tests of the food products, the water, soil and air of the work zone, the wash water from the leather covers and clothes of the people who became ill were undertaken. It proved impossible at that time to establish at once the precise reasons for the disease of the peripheral nervous system of people on a group scale.

And here not long ago, *PRAVDA* received documents with the results of the investigation from the USSR and RSFSR ministries of health.

According to the conclusion of the specialists, the illnesses of the young people were the result of the influence of a complex of chemical compounds discovered in the soil and plants. In a number of the samples taken from the fields where the victims had worked, pesticides were discovered in quantities exceeding the maximum permissible concentrations.

The manifestation of the toxicological action of the chemical substances was promoted by the following: Damp fumes from the fields after rains in hot weather and morning fogs; unaccustomed physical loads for the duration of a working day of up to 10-12 hours in the necessary posture—on the knees; the contamination of leather covers and clothes with dust and soil from the fields.

The basic reason for the contamination of the soil, it is noted in the documents, is the violation of the rules and technologies of the application of chemical means for the protection of plants and mineral fertilizer.

The USSR Chief State Sanitary Inspector signed a decree: "On the Limitation of the Work of Students and Pupils in Agricultural Fields Treated With Pesticides."

Taking into consideration the proposals of specialists of the USSR Ministry of Defense and on the basis of the analysis of the situation, recommendations were developed in regard to the determination of the real chemical situation in agricultural fields, the procedure for the use of pesticides, conditions for the involvement of the population in agricultural work, and measures to prevent the disease of people.

The adoption of a law on the protection of the environment and the health of the population against unfavorable influences of the chemicalization of agriculture seems to extremely important.

Better Regional Cooperation Urged To Improve Amu Darya

91WN0507B Tashkent *PRAVDA VOSTOKA* in Russian
24 Apr 91 p 3

[Article by I. Kalandarov, candidate of technical sciences and deputy chief of Amu Darya Basin Association (Khorezm Oblast): "The Troubled Waters of the Amu Darya; Time To Take Action in the Cis-Aral Zone"]

[Text] Specialists already knew around 30 years ago that all of the runoff of the Amu Darya would soon be used for irrigation. This is when the decision was made to recycle the ground water. All irrigation and reclamation projects were planned and carried out with the stipulation that the water in drains and collecting mains would be dumped back in the river to replenish it. This idea was portrayed as an achievement of scientific thinking.

Now we are reaping its bitter harvest: Every part of the Amu Darya is polluted. Industrial and household sewage was added to the effluent in drains and collecting mains. The lower reaches of the river—taking in all of Kara-Kalpakistan and Khorezm and Tashauz oblasts—began receiving not only less water, but also water of poorer quality.

The mineral content even in the upper reaches of the Amu Darya exceeds the permissible limits for drinking water. Organic pollutants, metal, pesticides, petroleum

products, and phenols have already been discovered near Termez, according to the data of the Uzbek Hydrometeorology Administration, and frequently in quantities considerably in excess of the permissible maximum content. Sometimes the water in the *cis*-Aral zone is unsuitable not only for drinking, but even for irrigation.

The water in collecting mains and household sewage from Kashka-Darya and Chardzhou oblasts are dumped into the river in quantities totaling around 9 cubic kilometers a year, which increases the overall mineral content of the river water by 1.6-fold or 1.7-fold and increases the content of certain salts several times over. Another half a billion cubic meters enters the river below the Tuyamuyun hydrosystem and seriously diminishes the quality of river water in the northern rayons and cities of Kara-Kalpakistan and Tashauz Oblast.

Water management organizations in Khorezm Oblast and Kara-Kalpakistan now have draft resolutions in their possession to stop the dumping of water in collecting mains into the river, but this has been delayed by the limited funds for capital investment. Priority should be assigned to the stepped-up construction of the trans-Amu Darya right-bank collecting main stipulated in the plans, because it will stop the dumping of more than four billion cubic meters of polluted sewage in the middle reaches of the river.

Many quicker and cheaper ways of carrying out this project have been proposed in recent years. In particular, the Ministry of Water Management and State Committee for Environmental Protection of Uzbekistan submitted a plan to the republic Cabinet of Ministers for consideration which would envisage the diversion of the water from the trans-Amu Darya collecting main, even before the completion of construction, to the Ayak-agitma, Medami, Dengizkul, and Kattashor basins and the use of part of this water to cultivate sandy desert soils for grain farming, and also for fishing and other purposes, with the aid of domestic and foreign experience.

Specific solutions have also been proposed in Turkmenia, but no action has been taken on them yet: After all, they require careful preparations. The reduction of river flow by more than four cubic kilometers will change the operating conditions of river and internal reservoirs, disrupt the years-old hydrological balance in the river, and affect the water supply of adjacent areas. For this reason, the appropriate investigations must be conducted in advance, mainly with a view to defining new procedures for the distribution of water of higher quality but in smaller quantities. It will be important to reduce the amount of water diverted from the river, use the water efficiently, improve watering techniques, arrange for the comprehensive remodeling of sprinkler systems, institute progressive forms of agricultural irrigation, and take other measures to conserve water. They will require sizable expenditures.

Unfortunately, the decentralization of the union land reclamation program, the disruption of cooperative ties

and relations in the branch, and the reduction of capital investments have effectively countermanded water conservation measures in our republic. The resolution of this problem will require coordinated efforts by all of the republics through which the Amu Darya flows.

The life of the entire region of Central Asia and Kazakhstan depends on the ecological state of the Amu Darya and Syr-Darya basins. In the past, and even now, each republic and oblast has used the protected zones and the water of these rivers in its own interest. We believe that the protected zones of the Amu Darya and Syr-Darya, from the main tributaries to the Aral Sea, should be declared interrepublic zones and placed under the jurisdiction of special organizations. Their protection should be organized in the common interest. This will require decisions on legal and organizational aspects of management and the institution of economic and administrative penalties for organizations and officials violating environmental protection and conservation laws.

When the Amu Darya and Syr-Darya basin associations were established, they were clearly assigned an inadequate role in the interrepublic and intersectorial distribution of water and management of water resources. This is why the section pertaining to the Aral Sea in the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 4 March 1991: "On Immediate Measures for the Ecological Recovery of the Country" says that these associations should have a higher status. We still have a long way to go, however, before the situation can be called normal. We still cannot, for example, establish reasonable water diversion regulations for the Kara-Kum Canal and Tuyamuyun reservoir in the interest of different republics. The successful completion of this task will require closer cooperation by the basin associations and republic agencies.

Azerbaijan Environment Chief on Caspian Conference

91WN0525A Moscow RABOCHAYA GAZETA
in Russian 14 Jun 91 p 2

[Interview with A. Mansurov, chairman of the Azerbaijan state committee for the protection of nature, by Correspondent Ali Naibov: "Caspian Alarm"]

[Text] Baku—The first international conference on the problems facing the Caspian Sea opened in Baku yesterday.

Last summer, agencies of Azerbaijan's state sanitation service were forced to take an extreme and unprecedented step—to close almost all of Apsheron's beaches, which are renowned for their golden sand, velvety waves, and sun that leaves a deep bronze tan. The famous beaches of Mardakyany, Buzovny, Zagulba, Bilgya, and Nardaran are half empty. Half empty, because despite the ban, there are skeptics who didn't believe the "doctors" and boldly embraced the gentle sea. Its "caresses," however, sometimes had a regrettable outcome: Bathers developed skin and allergy infections. The poisoned Caspian is taking

revenge for the many years' of ecological violence done to it, and for our civic conscience, which has been in a deep lethargic sleep.

In a conversation with me, A. Mansurov, chairman of the Azerbaijan Republic state committee for the protection of nature, often repeated the word "alarm." As he put it, the first international conference on the Caspian Sea's problems will sound that alarm, calling the world community's attention to the sea's plight. Ecologists and officials of the country's environmental protection agencies, including those of all the republics adjacent the Caspian, are taking part in the conference, as are representatives of Iran, Turkey, the United States, UNESCO, and UNEP [United Nations Environment Program].

[Naibov] Arif Enverovich, Bismarck once said: "Only fools learn from their mistakes; intelligent people learn from the mistakes of others." If even the terrible tragedy of the Aral Sea can diplomatically be termed a mistake, the question arises: Maybe we aren't that intelligent after all, to put it mildly, if we saw the disaster confronting our neighbors and nonetheless failed to take any steps to prevent the same thing from happening in our own region?

[Mansurov] I totally agree with you: Until recently, we failed to grasp the lesson of the Aral Sea, even though it was not particularly difficult to figure out and predict the development of events in the Caspian region in accordance with the "Aral model." Although the details vary, we see the same thing in both areas: a manmade disaster resulting from the violence we have done to nature.

The Caspian is unique. It does not belong solely to the peoples inhabiting its shores. It belongs to all mankind. It would seem that such a unique body of water should be a preserve, a giant ecological laboratory. But instead, the Caspian has been turned into a production component. The precatastrophe situation in which the sea now finds itself was preprogrammed by the fundamental principles of the command-administrative system.

Almost everywhere throughout the world, we can observe a synchronization of technical and ecological progress. There is no contradiction here: The more rationally natural resources are used, the greater the return in terms of finished output, and the lower the level of waste. And that, in turn, means less stress on the environment. In our country, unfortunately, this orderly and proven arrangement has been destroyed.

Each branch has chosen from the natural resources to be processed only "its own" components, and thrown away the rest. Most often—into the sea, as is done in Azerbaijan to this day in extracting iodine and bromine from drill water: Boron, strontium, and other rare-earth elements, whose value exceeds iodine and bromine products by many times, goes off into the sea. The same is true of common salt, which Azerbaijan imports from other republics.

Unfortunately, the area's natural resources are free of charge. So try and refrain from the temptation to exploit nature's free gifts with reckless abandon!

[Naibov] But that same temptation could confront any economic manager or businessman "over there." And that's why the state exists in the first place—to restrain the appetites of those who would grow rich at nature's expense.

[Mansurov] You will agree that it is difficult to appease those who like to avail themselves of nature's bounty when you sign a decree on environmental-protection measures with one hand, and a decree ordering faster rates of development with the other. More than 15 government resolutions and decisions have been taken with regard to protecting the Caspian Sea in the past 20 to 25 years. And what good have they done?

And now another wave of disaster has swept over us—in the most direct sense of the word. The Caspian, whose level is subject to cyclical fluctuations, is now advancing once again. It's sign to sound the alarm. But instead, a fresh assault on nature is being planned: the large-scale exploitation of western Kazakhstan's high-sulfur petroleum deposits—essentially a poison for all living things.

We are still completely unable to part with our ecological self-centeredness, from an ecological short-sightedness syndrome. Yet ecosystems know no state borders. Experts maintain that dust and salt from the bottom of a dried-out Aral could even cause the mountain glaciers of the Himalayas to melt! The alarm bells of the Caspian are ringing for all of us.

[Naibov] As is apparent, discussion of the Caspian's fate has long been urgent and promises to be serious, if difficult, at the conference. What tasks associated with saving the sea do you see as the most important and most pressing?

[Mansurov] First and foremost, we must conclude treaties that will regulate, at the international level, the rights and responsibilities of the republics and states of the Caspian region with respect to preserving the sea's ecological purity. As a first step, the participants in the conference could reach agreement on joint efforts to restore the health of the Caspian ecosystem. In my view, it is necessary to establish an independent Caspian Sea fund that could serve as a source of special-purpose financing of ecological research and applied programs. It is also necessary to set up corresponding intergovernmental structures. Clearly, all fines levied for polluting the sea should be deposited in this fund.

**Ecological Monthly 'PRIRODA I CHELOVEK'
Acquires Republic Sponsors**
91WN0537B Bishkek KOMSOMOLETS KIRGIZII
in Russian 24 Apr 91 p 3

[Report by D. Koduranova, AALAM press center editor-
"PRIRODA I CHELOVEK"]

ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS

JPRS-UPA-91-033
17 July 1991

[Text] The title is the name of a monthly journal whose parent organization was until recently the USSR State Committee for Protection of the Environment. Until recently, because now the state committees for protection of the environment in nine of the Union republics, including ours, now set on an equal footing with the Union committee, have become the co-founders of this journal. The first conference of the co-founders took place recently in Moscow, which, unfortunately, was not attended by representatives of all the republics but which nevertheless did discuss and adopt the basic constituent documents for the journal *PRIRODA I CHELOVEK*. The USSR minister for the use of national resources, N. Vorontsov, took part in the work of the conference.

Those present signed an agreement on founding the journal that sets forth the schedules for the payment of startup sums and procedure for acceptance and withdrawal of co-founders and designates the rights of the council of co-founders, which will convene at least once each year and is competent to decide on the programs and directions of activity by the journal's editor and appoint the chief editor.

One very important question in the work of the conference was the choice of chief editor for the journal. Viktor Yaroshenko was elected on a competitive basis. He is an engineer by profession and has spent many years in journalism and dealing with ecological issues, and has published several books on this subject. Before this appointment he was chief of the information department on the journal *NOVYY MIR*. He won sympathy for his principled approach with respect to the independence of the journal and his uncompromising attitude toward those who pollute the natural environment, no matter who they may be. His energy and his desire to make a new, interesting journal, and his clear-cut program of action helped the co-founders to vote for him unanimously. And along with the new chief editor, those attending the conference discussed the charter for the journal *PRIRODA I CHELOVEK*, which secures for its associates quite broad rights and offers the opportunity freely to realize their capabilities.

With respect to the correspondents in the republics and the state committees for protection of the environment that are co-founders, in this matter V. Yaroshenko decided to abandon the practice of setting up a network of stringers, placing his hopes instead mainly in the public organizations in these republics engaged in ecological problems.

Of course, the journal will not limit itself to information only from the republics that are co-founders. But they will be given priority rights in publication, and space has also been allotted on the pages of the journal for republic ecological information. This right will be specified in a special agreement between the journal editor and the co-founders, and this will be discussed and adopted by the council of co-founders. Representatives of the co-founders—the USSR and Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic state committees for protection of the

environment—which at the conference were delegated this right by the council, and the chief editor of the journalist *PRIRODA I CHELOVEK* are now working on this.

I think that readers in our republic will soon be getting a good chance to look at Kyrgyzstan's problems both from the inside and the outside. Well, ecological experts will be able to obtain interesting and complete information and share their own work and discoveries, and even their simple proposals, through the pieces published in it.

Outbreak of Angina at 'Secret' Moscow Enterprises Probed

91WN0531A Moscow *TRUD* in Russian 18 Jun 91 p 3

[Article by I. Nevinnaya: "Sickness From a Test Tube"]

[Text] Our newspaper has twice reported on a mass outbreak of illness suffered by workers at two closed enterprises situated in Krasnogvardeyskiy Rayon, Moscow. Today we inform readers about the investigation of this extraordinary occurrence. This investigation is being conducted by an officially appointed commission of the Third Main Administration (MA) of the USSR Ministry of Health, which is responsible for the health of these enterprises.

On 23 May 1991, doctors of the 11th Medical Unit turned their attention to a situation that was unusual for the beginning of summer—an outbreak of angina. This unit serves several enterprises closed to general access, which were formerly under the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, and which are now under the Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry. They were struck by the fact that the only ones who fell ill were workers behind the thick walls of two enterprises, the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Chemical Technology and the All-Union Scientific Research Laboratory of Industrial Technology.

These institutes belong to a number of research groups that are off limits and secret. There is not so much as a sign or even a nameplate at the entrance. The security system for admittance is tightly controlled. Not only is the entrance guarded but access to each of the buildings. Many work places can be entered only with a key, and often a person at work behind one locked door can only guess what goes on behind the next locked door....Suddenly, there was this extraordinary occurrence.

The Medical Unit became genuinely alarmed. They contacted without delay the Third MA of the Ministry of Health, which soon made available a section of the local clinic in which to quarantine those who were ill. By the evening of the first day there were 12 beds occupied in this isolation ward, and the doctors continued to make house calls on those who, having been listed as ill with angina, were being treated at home. New sufferers of the illness came to the clinic by the dozens with each passing day. In a week the storm reached its peak. As of 2 July,

there were 169 persons confined to the clinic, and 387 others who were under treatment on an outpatient basis.

The investigation of this occurrence was in the hands of a specially created commission, consisting of more than twenty prominent members, senior officials, expert researchers from the Ministry, and a wide array of others from various scientific research institutes. Their work was conducted along two principal lines of inquiry. It was first necessary to reveal the cause of this massive outbreak of illness by more than five hundred persons at one time, then to answer the question, How could this phenomenon occur?

There were many possible versions of what happened to be worked on. A by no means complete list of organizations who sent their specialists includes the following: the Institute of Hygiene and Occupational Illnesses; the Institute of Immunology; the All-Union Center for the Treatment of Acute Cases of Poisoning of the Moscow Scientific Research Institute of Emergency Treatment imeni N. Silifosovskiy; the Institute of Biophysics; the All-Union Research Center of Molecular Diagnostics and Treatment; and the Institute of Virology imeni D. Ivanovskiy.

An immense amount of investigative work was done. To start with, they ruled out the suggestion of possible radioactive contamination. Investigators with dosimeters checked the areas surrounding the institutes for radioactivity, the courtyards, and the work places—on each of the floors and in the basements. A detailed chart of these measurements was drawn up. Bacteriologists, virologists, and experts on contagious diseases worked together to untangle the threads of a skein of circumstances.

They checked the operation of the dining hall. Once again their findings were negative.

Meanwhile, those who had been stricken ill could be given no convincing explanation. The "angina," as it was called, was treated with antibiotics, gargling, and inhalation. When treatment was discontinued, the temperatures of many of them rose once again, and they experienced sore throats and stiff joints with a fever. Some of the patients became chronically ill with high fevers reminiscent of long-forgotten childhood diseases. In others the symptoms of angina were not observable, but there were detectable alterations in their blood, kidneys, liver, and nervous systems.

O. Laptev, chief of the 11th Medical Unit, explained the situation by saying: "We have not quarantined the sick because of the seriousness of their condition. When a massive outbreak like this occurs, it is necessary to isolate those who are ill to preclude the possibility of contagious infection—to place them under round-the-clock observation and try to find out the cause of the outbreak."

As the findings of the commission reveal, "modern clinical, biochemical, immunological, bacteriological,

virological, serological, and toxicological, as well as functional methods" were used. Blood and urine analysis revealed an unusually high content of fluorine.

The people who were sick continued to be highly upset. They appealed to the Moscow Soviet, the Russian Federation of Independent Unions; they appeared in the newspapers and on television; and they formed an committee to protect their interests.

The situation in the institutes was no less tense than at the clinic. Closing their eyes to what they chose to regard as feigned illnesses, the administration directed its good works to its coworkers, giving them permission to use the leave-time they had accumulated (which was usually tightly regulated) and—all at once—go on vacation. The institutes emptied.

Those researchers who remained on the job, however, assisted in the investigation. In the initial period following the outbreak, a special questionnaire was prepared and distributed. Each of the 1,300 people who responded to the survey questions accounted for their time and described in detail their movements in the institutes. At the same time a check was begun on the operation of the laboratories—the chemicals each person was working with, how and where they might have been drained off or discarded, and whether the ventilation was in operation. In the process everything was thoroughly checked, even the most absurd rumors. Someone claimed to have experienced a strong odor of rotten herring—a possible sign of a group of amino acids. Someone else allegedly saw a "dense white mirage." All of this information was sifted and analyzed. Even reports emanating from the other rayons of the city were analyzed. An outbreak of "angina" was rumored in the Orekhovo-Borisov area, and then a similar illness was noted in Butovo. The epidemiological station in Krasnogvardeyskiy Rayon assisted the commission in checking out these rumors. Incidents of illness elsewhere in the area, where they were found, proved to be idiosyncratic and in no way related to the extraordinary occurrence at the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Chemical Technology.

And what were the findings of the commission? The most probable cause, it was found, was human inhalation of fine particles of synthetic resins containing toxic substances, including fluorine, which resulted in a massive outbreak of toxic poisoning, complicated in cases by infection (angina).

As you can see, great care was used in the investigation, but the particular substance that caused the poisoning remains unidentified. Much depends, of course, on whether or not an answer will be found to this question. Right now this question torments most of the victims (those still in the hospital and those that have returned to their homes). With regard to the aftereffects of the poisoning, fluorine is conducted out of the human organism rather rapidly—in a matter of days. (Recall the amount of fluoride toothpaste and tablets for preventing

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caries, and the thought of being afraid will not enter anyone's mind.) But three weeks have passed since the start of this incident, and there are some fifty people still on the sick list. Does this mean that fluorine is not the only causal agent? Up to now there is still no answer to this question. The people are not fooled. All the applied methods of scientific investigation have proved to be insufficient to reveal the unseen poison. As a result of the commission's efforts, however, a good deal else has been revealed that provokes serious thought.

It turns out that the institute for laboratory research and experimental testing has been using more than fifteen hundred (1,500) chemical substances of various kinds. Many of these are among the most poisonous—in the first and second class of dangerous chemicals.

The ventilation is poor. At the most inopportune moment the ventilating system may unexpectedly fail.

"Unfortunately, too little thought is given to the harm caused to the human organism by various chemicals," says O. Shamov, deputy chief of the USSR Ministry of Health's medical unit and one of the leaders of the investigation. "We know that radiation is dangerous and what its consequences are. The effects of thousands of these toxic substances on every living thing, the cumulative or synergistic effects of one with another in varying combinations, and how to determine safe levels

for them in the air, in water, and in products—these are all questions of the most critical kind requiring an immense amount of research. Yet we do not even have a reliable way of monitoring the presence of these chemical agents in the environment. In this respect the case of poisoning that has occurred at the Institute of Chemical Technology is not unique. Unfortunately, poisoning at industrial plants occurs much more frequently than might be supposed by the uninitiated."

Of course it is frightening to realize that we are sitting—if you will pardon the expression—on a chemical powder keg. There are, of course, a large number of enterprises in the city with a far more potent amount of chemical production than is found in a scientific research institute. Does not the secrecy surrounding so many of these enterprises act to encourage the lack of supervisory control over their activities?

The incident at the All Union Scientific Research Institute of Chemical Technology is not closed. A check on the work of the laboratory continues. Interest has arisen in what goes on at six small enterprises that have recently been shown to belong to the institute. Incidentally, four of the six, it turns out, are not even registered with the epidemiological station. Meanwhile, the case of the "industrial accident," as it is officially referred to in the findings of the commission, has been turned over to the Procurator's Office.

Health Minister Emphasizes Primary Health Care

91JUN1710A Leningrad CHAS PIK in Russian No 20,
20 May 91 p 6

[Interview with Igor Nikolayevich Denisov, USSR minister of health, conducted by Marina Goncharenko: "New Minister Prepared To Begin Reform of Soviet Health Care: District Doctors May Disappear, But Family Doctors Will Appear"]

[Text] One year ago, when a film crew from the television show "Good Evening, Moscow" did a report from the red brick mansion of the Ministry of Health on the Neglingka, following the interview with senior officials the journalists turned to the guard at the door and asked: "What do you think about the work of this agency?" The answer was categorical: "The Ministry of Health should be done away with." However, the new minister of health in the Pavlov government—surgeon and professor Igor Nikolayevich Denisov—has his own opinion regarding the future of the agency entrusted to him.

[Denisov] I must say that pressure is being put on us with regard to the situation in health care today. There is constant discussion; people say that the system is outdated, that the principles are wrong, that people are being crippled instead of cured. People are saying give us alternative medicine, we need privatization, let us develop private, paid medicine—you have heard and read all that yourself.

Let us attempt to get to the bottom of the issue: what is our health care system, our medicine, today? For we must consider the system which exists in our country as a unified whole. There is in fact nothing similar anywhere else in the world, not in terms of the size of our country, the number of physicians and hospital beds, etc.

But I want to talk about something else. We have regions which are up to world standards with regard to health care. Let us consider just one indicator: infant mortality. Just yesterday I met with representatives from Turkmenistan. One year ago the infant mortality rate there was 50 per 1,000 births. Yet by pooling our efforts this figure has been reduced by 17 percent in just one year. That means that the lives of 1,200 children were saved.

I cited an extreme example. For the country as a whole the infant mortality rate last year was 21.8 per 1,000 births. But—and now I am getting to my main point—in Belorussia, the Baltic republics and in the Western Ukraine this indicator is at the European level.

Or take Georgia as an example. There the number of doctors per capita is what the country as a whole will not have until the year 2000. Yet the infant mortality rate is worse than, for example, in Penza Oblast, where there is not a single medical VUZ and the number of doctors per capita is less by a factor of two.

[Goncharenko] From what you have said it is clear that the Soviet health care system is not functioning as a unified whole even in its present condition.

[Denisov] Yes, I acknowledge that. And I can tell you something else. As you are aware, the World Health Organization is working to develop the most rational models for health care organization. At a conference of this world community held in Alma-Ata in 1978 the Soviet system of primary medical care was held up as one of the main avenues for development. The correctness of moving in that direction was reaffirmed by the World Health Organization three years ago in Riga.

[Goncharenko] Excuse me, but praise for our health care system is unconvincing, despite all our current respect for world authorities.

[Denisov] Well, they say that in someone else's hand even a crust of bread seems thicker. There is so much skepticism in our country with regard to things Soviet... But can you recall any other system or sector which instead of its required minimum—five percent of GNP—never received over 3.3 percent? Which was supplied with only 60 or 70 percent of its raw material and supply needs, i.e. medicines and medical equipment? Yet despite all that, notice that it continued to function and actually improved its indices!

[Goncharenko] Fine. Let us turn from discussion of the model to the way it functions in practice. Let us just look at a polyclinic or open the door of any hospital...

[Denisov] In addition to the objective circumstances which have hampered development of health care there have also been subjective factors. I am referring to mistakes and mistaken ideas which gobbled up our already meager funding. For a long time our medicine was known for its extensive development principle. Until the 1960's this was virtually all we paid attention to, graduating more and more new doctors and building more and more new hospitals. Yet we did not stop to think that quantity does not always translate into quality: the doctors' level of skills was low, and hospital beds were bare, fit only for patients to sleep in.

In the 1970's the idea of specialization became predominant. It seemed necessary to build large centers, we thought that that would produce significant progress in our medicine. Now those centers exist: centers for general surgery, heart surgery, oncology, neurosurgery and organ transplantation. Of course their equipment still lags behind other centers around the world, but much has been done there for the sake of science and for tomorrow. However, the people's health indices have not improved.

Or take the idea of universal clinical examinations. Tell me how it was realistically possible to examine each of 285 million people once a year and diagnose the sick and have readily available results of blood and urine sample analyses and arterial pressure tests? This was a parody of

preventive medicine, especially when the examinations were conducted right there on the shop floor, on farms or in "red corners."

[Goncharenko] You reject the outdated ideas of your predecessors and are probably prepared to talk about your own concept for solving this crisis.

[Denisov] In my opinion we need to change the ideology of health care. We need to be concerned with people's health. Only 20 percent of our population require specialized treatment. The other 80 percent never go anywhere except to their local polyclinic. That means that the primary sector for today's health care is the first encounter between a physician and the person who comes to the physician for help.

Where is this principal link in our country today?

[Goncharenko] In the office of the receiving physician, I assume.

[Denisov] Right, the doctor who either sees an incipient illness or sends you home, who tells you: "You have a sore knee (or ear, or eye). Go to the second floor, starting at 5:00 pm a specialist (surgeon, ear, nose and throat specialist, ophthalmologist) has office hours there." The receiving physician is often nothing more than a dispatcher who shuffles patients from one office to another. According to our figures the skills level of receiving therapists and pediatricians is in 17th place after surgeons, gynecologists, stomatologists, etc. We need new doctors and a new concept for training them: general practice. Incidentally, we once had departments like that in this country.

[Goncharenko] But who has not spent time waiting in line at a polyclinic? Who does not know how overworked receiving physicians are?

[Denisov] The Ministry of Health once reduced the caseload per doctor at each station from 2,400 to 1,800. This was done precisely in order to give the therapists more free time for well care. Do you not remember a doctor calling you or coming to your home and anxiously inquiring: you have not been in to see us lately, how are you feeling?

[Goncharenko] But I can just imagine what a workload general practitioners will have! Are you not afraid, Igor Nikolayevich, of being reproached for returning virtually to the era of country doctors just to preserve the system?

[Denisov] A general practitioner is a medical doctor. He alone cannot bear full responsibility for the health of the people, nor should he. Furthermore, I feel that there should be an additional figure between the individual and the general practitioner. Not so much a medical figure as a social one. This is the family doctor.

This would also be a general practice therapist who would live in the same building as his patients and see approximately 180 people. He would be paid out of the municipal budget, i.e. with funds from local soviets.

As for allegations that I want to preserve the ministry at all costs, I can say that it is precisely the USSR Ministry of Health which was the agency that three years ago granted full independence to the republics. At the present time of the ministry's 68 former functions it now only fulfills six. These are: developing a strategy for public health care; setting up unified union-republic programs (AIDS, Chernobyl, etc.); monitoring sanitary and ecological standards; developing strategies for providing medicines (i.e. a unified state register of medicines and equipment); carrying out disaster medical relief; and performing obligations under international treaties.

Incidentally, virtually all of the republic ministries work closely together with us, and their directors are members of the USSR Ministry of Health Coordinating Council.

[Goncharenko] How does this claim you make jibe with the actions of certain republic governments with regard to pay increases?

[Denisov] What can I say, the problem is a pressing one, and I understand the Ukraine when it raises salaries by 60 percent, or the RSFSR when it raises them by 40 percent. Therefore we have reconsidered our previous principle and lifted the wage ceiling for medical personnel. It was keeping us from taking the quantity and quality of people's labor into account, i.e. how much time a doctor spent on duty, how many operations he performed; a doctor's additional effort was not being rewarded with material incentives.

Now the pay structure will look like a "layer cake." The Ministry of Health has established a guaranteed minimum which is the least a medical worker may receive. After a very thorough and, if you like, even severe certification program which determines the skills level of doctors and other medical personnel guaranteed payments for certain skills are added to the base pay. The remainder of the wages paid is variable, depending upon the amount of labor actually performed. The more operations one does or the more patients one sees, the more one is paid. As a surgeon I personally can tell you that the present guaranteed minimum for a surgeon is R460 [rubles] per month. When supplementary pay and pay based on workload are taken into account the total is over R1,000 per month. I believe that with that level of protection we can now move into a market economy.

Igor Nikolayevich Denisov is well-informed, simple and democratic. He seems like a professional, but also on the other hand like an experienced ministerial administrator. However, there is one "but"... I think that on a human level the reader will understand me. As a was returning from my trip to Moscow I thought about what I would say, how I would encourage at least my loved ones and my colleagues. I will say: are you waiting for reforms? But if something happens tomorrow, then depend on your own resources. Pray to God that you don't get sick...

Children's Health Care Inadequacies Highlighted
91US0600A Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian 21 Jun 91
Union Edition p 7

[Article by L. Ivchenko: "The Return on a Government Guest House: A Former Sanatorium for High-Ranking Officials Is Now Being Used Inefficiently"]

[Text] The vogue for turning over government convalescent homes appears to have passed. Perhaps times have changed, and such guest houses are things of the past. Here and there, they are still to be seen—but a gift cannot be taken back. A. Titkov, director of the "Krylatskoye" Guest house of the RSFSR Ministry of Health, should no doubt be pleased that this is the case. For two years this former rest house of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, which was turned over to the Ministry of Health to lodge sick children and their parents from out of town, has been without any real proprietary agency.

The main ward is in need of major renovation; the inn's costly Arabian furniture is in disrepair; flowering shrubs and trees are sagging, and the flower beds trampled down—a brief glimpse of the entrance courtyard. But the main thing is that the guest house is almost empty. There are days when only two or three rooms are occupied. And, of course, the upkeep is extremely costly.

The fact that there are few guests is not surprising. This refuge in paradise, this oasis of greenery and fresh air in the smoky and dirty city, does not even have an address: 192 Pervaya Krylatskaya Ulitsa is nowhere in existence—it is not even to be found in the directory. The buses do not come here; the area is closed to access. Those who for many years came here to rest in places reserved for them arrived by car. It is not easy for mothers with sick children, who have recently arrived in Moscow in order to consult with doctors, to find this temporary refuge. Those who come to the city usually cannot count on help in finding lodgings and must fend for themselves as best they can for two or three days. In a formal sense, the guest house might seem to be available for use by appointment. In fact, from the standpoint of serving genuine needs, the immense potential of this nine-acre estate scarcely benefits anyone. Is such a thing permissible in our present state of adversity? The republic Council of Ministers, the Union Ministry of Health, and the rayon executive committee, one after the other, come to look over the depopulated grounds, each measuring the place in terms of its own needs, before making an appeal to the RSFSR Minister of Health.

One such applicant for its use is Professor A. Rumyantsev, director of the recently established Russian Children's Institute of Hematology. Together with the director of the sanatorium, A. Titkov, I accompanied him on a tour of the verdant grounds and aromatic trees in bloom. Avidly directing his gaze at the balconies and colonnades of the guest house, he mused aloud at what a marvelous sanatorium this might be for children who were ill with leukemia.

"A better place for rehabilitation after the severities of treatment is not to be found," he said. "Here, there is a kitchen and dining room available, which means that medically supervised diets could be provided. The gardens and greenhouses provide berries, greens, and vegetables. The sports area is superb. There is a river a few feet away. During the recovery period, physical therapy procedures for children are not so important as fresh air, greenery, a picturesque setting, games, and recreational opportunities. If we were given the use of this facility, we would increase the number of beds for occupants many times over; for this stage of intensive therapy must be accompanied by opportunities to recuperate. Do you know what chemotherapy is like? The little ones who go through it lose their hair. Their skin becomes like parchment. They can barely stand on their legs. If we were concerned only with those who live in Moscow, many could themselves manage to find opportunities for their children to recuperate, but 90 percent of those we must treat come from out of town.

"Every year approximately three thousand children in the country come down with leukemia. Since we lack facilities for intensive chemotherapy, the majority of them are doomed. Moreover, bone marrow transplants, which could save them, are virtually not done in this country, although they have become routine operations abroad. More than 2,000 such operations are performed each year in France—about 600 transplants of bone marrow provided by donors and 1,500 transplants of processed bone marrow derived from the patients themselves. Thanks to immense investments in the West, such technologies for treating leukemia have been developed to the point where they now make it possible for 70 percent of the children to recover. The success rate in treating a number of other oncological and hematological disorders, including lymphogranulomatosis and lymphosarcoma, is even higher. Our own doctors are able to help only 10 percent of these children. And this is not because they do not have the knowledge. We have among us a fair number of outstanding doctors. The republic children's hospital, which formed the basis upon which our institute was founded, has available now the latest methods for treating leukemia. But there are insufficient funds. According to calculations of the USSR Ministry of Health, a bone marrow transplant with all the treatment that must accompany it costs 81,000 rubles per child, in addition to which another five percent of the costs incurred for certain elements of it must be paid for in hard currency. Not only here but everywhere treatment of these kinds of illnesses is extremely expensive. Abroad, however, the money can be found, whether from hospital budgets, insurance, charitable contributions, or municipal funding. Here, however, it is not to be found. Any parents therefore that can manage to collect the \$100,000 or \$200,000 from philanthropic organizations or private contributors to treat their child abroad may consider themselves lucky indeed.

"Each month the USSR Ministry of Health sends a few children abroad for whose treatment a half million

dollars or so has been collected in this fashion," says A. Rumyantsev. "But we, too, possess the technology for treatment. If only the proper conditions could be given to us, we could help a greater number of children and without the loss of hard currency. We have received offers from enterprises and organizations that are prepared to give us the currency for this good deed. For example, the German philanthropic organization [Keer Deutschland] has agreed to contribute 170-180 million marks to our work. We need only a base of operations. And here one is—almost ready-made for us—but it is being used for overnight lodgings. No matter how many times I have requested the Ministry of Health, it has avoided giving me a direct reply. Apparently, the minister does not dare to make up his mind—there are too many other applicants for it in the area. It is clear that there will no longer be a lodging house here—it makes no sense. But, if not, then what? Once again a rest home for high-ranking personages? Or will it be up for sale or rented perhaps to party members or foreign institutions?

Yes, we do not have much right now. In abundance there are only problems—we have those of every kind. Though for the present the hapless state of medicine cannot be assisted with money or drugs, could it not, at least, have some organizational support?

Current Situation, Comparative Success in Keeping AIDS Rate Down

91US0577A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 14 Jun 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by V. Pokrovskiy, director of the All-Union Center for Preventing and Combating AIDS: "Medicine for All: Do Something Before We Are Hit With a Severe AIDS Epidemic"]

[Text] Moscow—Nearly 100,000 Americans have already died of AIDS, and 100,000 more will inevitably die in the next two years. Another one million Americans, at the very least, who are infected with the immunodeficiency virus (HIV) are under death sentences, and death will come within 10 years unless a pardon comes in the form of a new medicine. But the prospects for its development are rather uncertain.

Moreover, 250,000 to 550,000 infected Americans still cannot expect a full range of specialized medical care, since they do not have insurance. The insurance of those who have it covers only 80 percent of the cost of the medicines, which are expensive and in short supply. As a result, many hospitals that treat AIDS are incurring losses and could eventually face the threat of closing unless the federal government assumes part of the expenses.

Despite the grave situation in the United States, many people are convinced that the AIDS situation in the USSR is even worse. "Disclosures" in articles that have

appeared in the magazine OGONYOK about a monstrous AIDS epidemic in the USSR and about a lack of effective efforts to combat the disease have done much to promote this perception.

I would like to bring some clarity to the situation, to dot the "i"s, so to speak.

The impetus for such pointed articles was the announcement that as a result of safety procedure violations, 250 children were infected in Russian hospitals in 1988 and 1989. However, it must be borne in mind that in the United States by that time, through the use of blood clotting medicines that had not undergone thermal processing, at least 50,000 people had been infected. People in developed countries have also been infected in the course of organ transplants, artificial insemination of women, and even—despite disposable instruments—when undergoing dental treatment. Yet no one investigated these instances, identified the causes of infection, or took measures.

Against this "international" backdrop, the outbreak of HIV-infection in Elista, Rostov, and Volgograd are only episodes—although I won't dispute their tragic character. Of no less importance is the fact that in the USSR, these outbreaks were quickly discovered and localized, thanks to which no new cases of infection in Soviet hospitals were recorded in 1990 and 1991.

It is also necessary to point out that the organization per se of efforts to combat AIDS in the USSR entails many elements that favorably set us apart from other countries. They include, first and foremost, mandatory mass testing of the population for AIDS (more than 100 million tests have already been done!), the registration of all identified cases of infection, even if the onset of AIDS has not occurred, and the invariable investigation of causes of infection. In the United States, only government employees, donors, and certain other population groups undergo mandatory testing. Only cases of the actual incidence of the disease itself are recorded. Investigations of the causes of infection are conducted only sporadically. If the American monitoring system existed in the USSR, the outbreak in Elista would not have been detected for some time.

There is no doubt that our "sexual revolution" (accompanied by a lack of adequate knowledge about sexual matters), the opening of our borders, and the sizable increase in contacts with foreigners are creating favorable conditions for an "influx" of AIDS into our country from abroad. Yet the legally mandated AIDS testing of foreigners who are coming to the USSR for a period of more than three months applies mainly to students from the developing countries. Tourists, businessmen, and foreigners working for hire are not tested, as a rule. Is it awkward to be so mistrustful toward our foreign guests?! On the other hand, there's nothing wrong with looking out for the health of our own nation!

The world community long ago came to the conclusion that the only way to impede the spread of AIDS is to

educate the public about preventive measures. It is essential to provide as many people as possible with knowledge as to how, in one or another situation, to make a choice that will enable them to avoid AIDS infection. But in the USSR, this is the area that remains the weakest link in efforts to combat the disease.

Tuberculosis on Rise in Uzbek SSR

91US0583B IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jun 91 Union Edition p 1

[Unattributed article: "Tuberculosis in Children"]

[Text] There has been a 34-percent increase in the rate of tuberculosis among children in Samara Oblast in recent years. The fatality rate from that disease has increased by 17 percent.

The basic cause of the spread of tuberculosis is the reduction in immunity as a result of poor nutrition, which is the result of the drop in the overall standard of living, according to Rudolf Galkin, doctor of medical sciences, head of the oblast health department. One of the centers from which the disease is spreading among the upcoming generation is the Skazka children's cafe in Samara, where patients, frequently still wearing their hospital dressing gowns, go straight from the city's tuberculosis dispensary that is situated right across the street, the RIA [Russian Information Agency] reports.

Supplementary Paid Health Insurance Introduced in Armenian SSR

91US0583C Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jun 91 p 1

[Article by V. Aloyan: "Ten Rubles For an Enema? However..."]

[Text] The most expensive thing that we have in our life is our health. The first people in our country to be convinced of that were the inhabitants of Armenia: starting 1 July medicine in the republic becomes paid. For the time being, however, frightening rumors about the future prices have been spreading throughout Yerevan: an injection, three rubles; an enema, 10 rubles; obtaining of a medical statement for persons enrolling in institutions of higher learning (Form 286), 22 rubles; and childbirth, 1200 rubles.

"There are no grounds for panic," I was assured by V. Demirchyan, deputy minister of public health. "This is only alternative medicine. The patient has the right to choose whether or not he wants to pay for treatment. Moreover, he will pay not for the quality of treatment, since everyone must be in an equal position. Instead, he will pay for the service—for a separate room with all conveniences, for an individual menu, for a nurse who, in anticipation of your desire, will remain on duty at the foot of your bed around the clock... There is no other way

to raise the level of our public health. The state deducts to meet our needs only three percent of the national income.

"And as for the 10-rubles enema, every hospital, for the time being, will establish its own prices, orienting itself on the market. In six months, when we summarize the results of the experiment, we will decide everything finally. There must be a general policy here, that takes into consideration the public's financial capabilities. Incidentally, simultaneously with 1 July, children's nutrition for infants up to the age of one and a half years becomes free, in accordance with a decision of the republic's Council of Ministers."

Falling Birth Rate in USSR Noted

91UN1644A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 May 91 Union Edition p 7

[Report by S. Tutorskaya: "Are We Becoming a Nation of Sick People?"]

[Text] According to official data, infant mortality fell in 1990. Not too much, but still: per 1,000 live births, 22.4 infants died before they reached the age of one.

This is, of course, an achievement. But let us compare this figure, behind which is the hard work of doctors and nurses, with some others, published in the USSR State Committee on Statistics annual reference book and in some other sources. In 1990, specialists report, there were 12,000 fewer babies born in Moscow alone than in 1989. The Muscovites came up 12,000 new citizens short. This is approximately 11 percent of the total average number of babies born in Moscow annually.

The data for other cities is not available yet. There is a report, however, that an even greater decline in the birth rate is taking place in some cities in Siberia.

"When the birth rate goes down," said V. Tabolin, a noted pediatrician and a member of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, "infant mortality also declines: Those who are not born cannot die. Therefore, without diminishing the achievements of many of my colleagues, I would say that it is still early to talk about a qualitative jump in our work. We have not yet learned in some places to, I beg your pardon, deliver babies. American obstetricians recently paid us a visit, and for two weeks delivered babies in one of the Moscow maternity wards. During these two weeks the newborns did not have any complications or traumas. With us, it happens all too often."

The words of the noted pediatrician are confirmed by the statistics. At the same time that infant and mother mortality generally is in decline—slow as it is—the number of sick women who suffer from the consequences of pregnancy and childbirth is growing. The healthy motherhood service that is so talked about (there were also years when a lot was being done about it) seems to be fading away. Young mothers, having made the sad

rounds of the polyclinics with their problems and with a sick child on top of that (the number of children with birth defects and those unhealthy because of poor care immediately after birth is growing), will not easily decide to have another child.

And what about the rest? Sadly, the facts show evidence that the decline in the living standards, social cataclysms, uncertainty in regard to the future, and the worsening of the quality of health care accessible to general population—all of this has affected first of all those who are least protected: mothers and children. Thus, nice figures for survival rate against the background of a growing number of sick children is a weak and illusory consolation.

New 'Women's Alliance' Organization Outlined

91US0598A Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian 22 Jun 91
Union Edition p 7

[Article by T. Khudyakova: "The Debut of the 'Women's Alliance'"]

[Text] A new women's organization was introduced yesterday at the International Center of Applied Political Science Studies. The board of the all-Union public organization: "Through Mass Creativity for People's Social Ecology" (Blue Movement) became a founder of the new organization. Political scientist Tatyana Ivanova was named president of the "Women's Alliance."

Moscow alone has over 70 public women's associations, unions, organizations, and groups but it seems that the "Women's Alliance" managed to find its own place in the sun with its very first steps. The banner of the new organization carries the legend: "Women's Spirituality Will Save Civilization!" This is how the organizers explain it: They will do everything to encourage every woman to exercise her free choice as she realizes her creative potential; they will provide the moral and material conditions to enable her to apply her talents, including the right and ability to be a mother.

The program does not seem to have anything basically new in it. However, its novelty lies in the fact that these intentions are being put into practice. The creative center, "A Woman's Institute," was set up under the aegis of the "Women's Alliance." It has already united the efforts of scientists, public and government figures, and business circles both in our country and in the world community meant to implement their theoretical designs.

The Women's Affairs and Family and Demographic Policy Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet, some other government and public organizations and associations expressed their readiness to cooperate with the new organization.

The meeting heard a greeting from President M.S. Gorbachev to the "Women's Alliance."

Committee To Improve Conditions for Young People Outlined

91US0598B Moscow *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA*
in Russian 22 Jun 91 p 3

[Unattributed report on interview with V. Mironenko: "An Evening Telephone Call to V. Mironenko"]

[Text] [Question] Viktor Ivanovich, people talk about you as one of the candidates for the post of the chairman of the Young People's Affairs Committee that is now being established under the USSR Cabinet of Ministers...

[Mironenko] Yes, I read something in your newspaper about a new organ which will take care of our young people. I am very grateful to the person, whom I do not know, who mentioned my name in the list of candidates for the ministerial "portfolio." Honestly speaking, I was very surprised at that as I had no part in preparing this decision and I do not have any part in it now. I wish I did, however.

[Question] But you have enormous personal experience in heading a similar agency, have you not?

[Mironenko] Yes, I have and I would like to use this occasion to share some of my experiences.

First of all, an old agency or an agency in general will not be able to spawn but a copy of itself—"a small agency." Second, to me it seems strange, to say the least, that a tool is being created for unknown purposes even if we have the Law On the Basics of the USSR Government Policy on Young People. Third, such a purpose may be the development, to put it in one word, or, in more detail, the program: "Participation, Development, Peace" adopted by the 21st Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Congress and undeservedly forgotten.

[Question] In your opinion, what was the most important thing in that program?

[Mironenko] Speaking in concrete terms, we primarily have to take care of three things: Teach a large number of young people in other countries things that we cannot teach them here. We can find the money for this in our country and also in various foreign foundations as, for instance, Great Britain's "Know-how" foundation, etc. But very few people know how to get and use this money, even those from the Supreme Soviet, and our young people know even less. We need to encourage the involvement of our young people in small and medium enterprises, especially in those industries which can already be qualified as "disaster areas." We need to cultivate the shoots of a civil society among our young people because they are the only ones capable of becoming the foundation of the truly democratic political systems of tomorrow. They can also present an alternative to pseudo-democratic tendencies and "games in democracy."

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, by the way, could become a "collective organizer" of their brain storm. Incidentally, I sent all these suggestions to the USSR president as early as spring of last year. I did not get any response.

Cinematographers Union Changes Name, Status

91UN1670A Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian 1 Jun 91
Union Edition p 7

[Article by M. Murzina: "Cinematographers Union Changes Status and Name"]

[Text] At a just-concluded plenum, cinematographers proclaimed that henceforth their creative union will bear the name "Confederation of Cinematographers Unions." The agreement establishing the confederation was signed by all the "subjects" (the official name for the former republic and regional divisions of the USSR Cinematographers Union), with the exception of Moscow, Tatarstan, and Russia (since they do not yet have the appropriate authority). The Georgian Cinematographers Union is acceding to the agreement as an associate foreign "subject." So then, are cinematographers once again out in front of everyone else when it comes to all manner of renewal and reorganization? But it was with somewhat sad irony that Armen Medvedev greeted the plenum: "Hello, esteemed subjects of the federation!" And more than one speech was permeated with recollections of the good old union of the recent past and with calls and exhortations to preserve that integrity and unity, while other speeches (S. Solovyev) were filled with criticism of the atmosphere prevailing in the present union and, naturally, among its new leadership.

And now as concerns the confederation. It is a voluntary association of independent, equal, and fully autonomous cinematographers' unions throughout the country. This entails the same unity, but on a new foundation; the same cooperation, but on a basis of freedom and sovereignty. Of course, the overall absence of serious strife in this creative milieu is heartening: All republics and regions are represented in the confederation. Also heartening is the plenum's adoption of a new charter (to replace the old one adopted in 1965). As a result, the "charter" and "constitutional" crises have been overcome.

Is this another step forward, then? Yes, optimistic notes were again sounded at the plenum. The Supreme Soviet is now discussing (finally!) the copyright issue, and the union's numerous petitions regarding various problems will finally be taken by the Culture Committee. Both the report by critic Yu. Bogomolov and the speech by Ye. Shinarbayev, a young director from Kazakhstan, about the "new wave" in Kazakh film confirmed there is no artistic crisis in our filmmaking, that there are talented and unique pictures, and quite a few of them (33 titles were cited).

But a warning was promptly issued: The union must not become a union of chatterboxes, opposition members and politicians; otherwise, it will be increasingly clear that freedom is too great a burden for the artists (director I. Tumanyan). The union's new structure dehumanizes and depersonalizes it; it is being destroyed as a union of creative individuals (playwright P. Finn).

Foreign guests addressed the plenum, which means that it had access to a detached view—and one from a far more civilized and organized perspective! Christian Felin, deputy general director of France's National Committee on Cinematography, spoke about experience in protecting national and European film by means of the state (which is obstructing monopolization of the market), private donations, special foundations, and television (three percent of revenues from television, which is largely "fed," as we know, by film productions, is earmarked for filmmaking). "We know perfectly well that the market, as a condition for the freedom of film, could become its antithesis."

We might add that this is especially true of the uncivilized and uncontrolled market that we have today. And the steps that the plenum took dealt with this problem: the creation under such a market of a mechanism by which to protect Soviet film productions, film rentals, and national film; the establishment of a foundation to assist cinematographers; and preservation of mixed public-state principles of management.

Just before the plenum's conclusion, it was addressed (for the first time from that rostrum) by I. Tagi-zade, president of the All-Union Association of Film and Video Distribution Organization Employees (ASKIN), who had been invited to the plenum and whose intensive commercial activity in the film rental field is now being written about by virtually every publication, including *IZVESTIYA*. He protested charges that the rental market is being monopolized and flooded with cheap American films: Take a better look at what the Sovkinoportfilm [Soviet Film Export Association] is spending state money on! He sought to justify his "Cannes voyage," saying that it was on-site "training" and an effort to acquaint his coworkers with the international film festival. He spoke with happiness of the film distribution employees who are now making five times more money, thanks to the ASKIN. He publicly announced that he was dropping plans to hold a widely publicized all-union film festival in August (aboard a ship that, once again, would be making a voyage to foreign countries), which would have cost him 54 million. He generously offered to use his unlimited cash resources to finance pictures by Panfilov and "The Master and Margarita" by Klimov. E. Klimov's response was very brief: It would be good to hear an answer to a different question—the source of such enormous income.

Central Asian, Armenian PEN-Club Centers Formed
91UN1670B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 20, 22 May 91 p 9

[Article by A. Rozanov: "PEN-Club: Assembly In Paris"]

[Text] The PEN-Club, the international association of writers, has unanimously accepted into its ranks two more centers representing multinational Soviet literature: a Central Asian Center (president Timur Pulatov), and an Armenian Center (president Gevork Emin). The decision was taken by an assembly of delegates held in Paris recently. In doing so, they noted with satisfaction the goodwill of Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tajik, Turkmen, and Uzbek writers, their aspiration to promote not separatism but unity, and their willingness, while preserving their literary "autonomies" and independence, to act as a single whole—a worthy example! Especially considering that such a thing is unprecedented in PEN's history; a tendency toward fragmentation along language lines even within a single small country is far stronger. But the writers of Soviet Central Asia, on the contrary, have joined forces, and they plan to elect representatives of all the literatures included in the Center as vice-presidents.

Through the report delivered by A. Blok (France), general secretary of the international PEN organization, the assembly took special note of the productive efforts of the Russian Center to establish unofficial contacts among writers from various countries, to participate in creative discussions that bring peoples closer together, and most importantly, to meet the extremely important requirements of the international PEN-Club's charter—i.e., to combat any and all forms of suppression of freedom of speech, violations of the rights of the individual, and infringements on national dignity. High regard was expressed for the active creative involvement of center representatives A. Kurchatkin and S. Chuprinin in the regional literary conference of East European centers devoted to the topic "Literature in the Jungles of Freedom" (Budapest). At the suggestion of international PEN president D. Konrad, the assembly expressed its gratitude to the Russian Center for the fact that "its two-year affiliation with PEN has been marked by very important actions that have enhanced its authority in the international arena still further, and above all by its appeal regarding the bloody events in Lithuania and its protest against the threat of curtailing glasnost in the Soviet press and on television."

A significant event for the forum was the first-time participation of the Belorussian PEN organization, represented by a delegation led by its president, R. Borodulin. The assembly marked the fifth anniversary of the Chernobyl tragedy with a minute of silence and a declaration calling on all the world's writers to work together to help the catastrophe's victims in any way they can and to prevent such crimes in the future.

Just over a year ago, the Russian Center joined in the work of the international PEN organization's "imprisoned writers committee," whose function is far broader than its name might suggest: The committee seeks to defend any writer or journalist subjected to any form of discrimination for his professional activities. The Russian Center's first "wards" were Cuban writer Hubert Jerez and Turkish writer Mehmet Ozgen, who are no longer jailed. At the center's direction, appeals on their behalf were presented by center members Al. Tkachenko in Havana and A. Vaksberg, R. Gamzatov, and Ye. Sidorov in Ankara. The assembly of delegates applauded the announcement that both these writers had been released from jail.

Language Acquisition in Republic Capitals Analyzed

91UN1708A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 12, Mar 91 p 17

[Article by Mikhail Guboglo: "Such Many-Faced Capitals..."]

[Text] In previous issues of "Entsiklopediya 'Soyuza'" ["Soyuz" Encyclopedia] (SOYUZ No 6 and 10, 1991), we published tables reflecting the linguistic situation in the capitals of the USSR union republics. Of course, even dry statistics can be very telling. Nevertheless, in order to better understand certain regularities in the current linguistic processes, we believe it would not be excessive to listen to what science has to say about this. Therefore, we present for your attention a short commentary by a scientist-ethnographer.

The present national make-up of the population of union republic capitals was formed under the effect of a complex combination of factors. The uneven rate of natural growth of population numbers of various nationalities, the non-uniform scope of migration of the rural and urban population, the different currents within the inter-republic migrations, etc. have all had their impact here. This is not the time or the place to deal in detail with the description of this process. It deserves special discussion. However, it is important to emphasize the main thing in it—that is the reduction in the relative share of the Russian population in the union republic capitals and the increased relative share of persons of native nationality.

At the boundary of the 60's and 70's, the national make-up of the capitals was significantly Russified. This was evidenced by the fact that in 14 out of 15 capital cities, the Russian population ranked first second. The boundary of the 80's-90's presented an entirely different picture. Thus, in Tashkent Russians "yielded" first place in their numbers to Uzbeks, in Dushanbe—to Tajiks, and in Ashkhabad—to Turkmen. As a result, Russians remained in second place in their population numbers in 10 cities—Kiev, Minsk, Tashkent, Baku, Vilnius, Kishinev, Dushanbe, Yerevan, Ashkhabad, and Tallinn.

There were two tendencies which facilitated this shift: The growth of national self-awareness and the accelerated growth in the capital population numbers. The serious ethno-demographic shifts which took place in the course of this process laid the groundwork for the Russian population's re-evaluation of its place and status on the ethnic map of each capital. The reduction of their quantitative share in the make-up of the capital population was at the same time the objective basis for their recognition of themselves as a national minority. The language laws of 1989, the Declaration of Republic Sovereignty, and other legislative statutes of the new authority, especially in places where it was assumed by the representatives of popular fronts, laid not only a legal, but also an ideological foundation for this newest process. Inter-ethnic conflicts which swept through the capitals of the union republics from Alma-Ata to Kishinev and from Tbilisi to Riga showed that during the designated transitional period, the path of the Russian population in 14 union republics (except the RSFSR) toward the status of a national minority proved to be fraught with many difficulties, a process which was painful and difficult to resolve. It caught many theoreticians and practitioners unaware. Moreover, many specialists were unable to see that the increase in social activity of the peripheral peoples, specifically in the non-Russian union republics, which was accompanied by the growth of social apathy of the Russian and moreover the Russian-speaking minority, will reach a certain boundary, after which fierce opposition will begin. The "conquest" complex gained by the Russian minority in the course of the developed national movements has seemingly already begun to gradually dissipate. Yet today, for example, in the circles of the technical intelligentsia, there are the beginnings of fermentation and a new wave of "self defense". And unusual effort will be required of all in order to create a new atmosphere of mutual tolerance.

By the scope of stability of the native language spoken at "home", i.e., within the boundaries of their own capitals, among the non-Russian nationalities the Armenians and Georgians are undoubtedly in first place. In Yerevan and Tbilisi almost everyone (99.6 and 99.5 percent) considers their native languages to be Armenian and Georgian, respectively. (For detailed data on all peoples, see SOYUZ No 6, 1991). Obviously, in creating a broad base of self-reproduction of ethnicity, expressed in such a broad coincidence of the two ethnic determinants—national affiliation and native language, there is an entire set of factors which "come into play". These include the depth of historical memory of the people, the richness of its cultural tradition, the functional expansion of the professional strata of the national culture, and the widely branched system of generation-to-generation transfer of ethnic information. It is understandable that for other peoples these same factors are also "not sleeping", although the activity of each of them, if we believe L. N. Gumilev, may vary within a rather broad range, and may be rather different at different times. How do we determine the dominant factor in the formation of

native languages of the "masters" of the two capitals—the Yerevan and Tbilisi residents? A significant role in the firm stability of their native languages, evidently, is played by such an additional factor as population distribution, i.e., the relative share of Armenians and Georgians in the overall make-up of the population of the indicated cities. In each of them, both [the Armenians and the Georgians] comprise the overwhelming majority in their numbers. At the boundary of the 80's-90's, during the 1989 census, the portion of Armenians in Yerevan comprised 96.5 percent.

On the opposite pole—with the least relative share of persons with native language of their nationality in their capitals—were the Slavic-language Belorussians and Ukrainians who are linguistically closely related to the Russians. Among Minsk residents, the relative share of Belorussians whose native language was Belorussian comprised 61.6 percent. Among Kiev residents the portion of Ukrainians with Ukrainian as their native language was 78.7 percent. In other words, the loss of the language of their nationality was significant. Almost one in three Belorussians and almost one in four Ukrainians, even at home in his own capital city, considered his native language to be one other than that of his nationality.

The scope of retention of the Moldavian language as a native language—87.9 percent—among the Kishinev Moldavians was relatively narrow as compared with other peoples having their own union republics. This in turn is explained by the fact that the Moldavians in Kishinev comprised just under half of the city's entire population.

The relative share of persons with native language of their own nationality among the other nations—including among the Lithuanians, Azerbaijanis, Estonians, Uzbeks, Kirghiz, Tajiks, Turkmens, Latvians, and Kazakhs—was high, and fluctuated within a narrow interval of from 98.7 to 95.6 percent.

In most of the union republic capitals, the loss of the native language of one's nationality was most often accompanied by the transition to Russian.

The final transition to a second language, up to acknowledging it as one's native language, is an entirely voluntary matter. Without making an entry into his passport, a person himself determines which language is his native one. An entirely different matter is the evaluation of this phenomenon. Without resorting to any extremes, of which there are many in today's publicistics, we should emphasize that it regularly evokes the alarm of the national intelligentsia, although sometimes its representatives themselves assume the lead in this matter.

In absolutely all nations having a union republic, the stability of the native language "at home" is higher than "in company". However, the difference between the portions of the population who retain the native language of their nationality in their own and in other capital cities is significantly differentiated. Unlike the

Turkish-speaking peoples, whose linguistic habits appear relatively similar both "at home" and "in company", the linguistic life of the Slavs and Baltic peoples within the boundaries of their capitals differs sharply from the linguistic life in other capitals. This leads to the shakiness of national self-awareness in a different national environment.

Each capital represents both the face of the nation forming the union republic, and the mirror of our entire multi-national state. Accordingly, the linguistic situation in the capital cities is also formed under the influence of two vectors—the functional development of the native nation's language and the interaction of languages of the remaining population, which today in popular publications is most often called the Russian-speaking population.

In fact, it is specifically here, in the capital city, that newspapers and journals are published, that radio and television stations operate. It is here that the local publishing houses publish a significant portion of the national book production, here that plays are set on the stages of theatres, that movies are filmed in movie studios, etc. And the social tone of the nation depends largely on how the linguistic life of the capital's population is formulated, what speech is heard on the streets and squares, what language is spoken in the ads, and in what language the singers sing their songs and the parliament deputies give their speeches.

The 1989 census testifies to the fact that linguistic self-awareness of the capital population represents part of the broader linguistic picture of the urban population. At least the indicators for the entire urban and capital city population in terms of native language are closer to each other than the indicators of linguistic self-awareness of urban and rural residents. In 10 out of 15 capital cities, the residents from among the native nations ranked below the entire urban population of the given nationality in retention of the language of their nationality as their native language.

However, one capital is not like another. In Minsk, for example, the processes of loss of the Belorussian language have taken on a mass, and not exclusively—irreversible character. Over one-third of the Minsk residents who are Belorussians (38.4 percent) considered some non-Belorussian language to be their native language, most often Russian. Among the entire urban population of Belorussia, the relative share of persons who had been assimilated in a psycholinguistic sense comprised 30.2 percent, and was somewhat less than among the capital city Belorussian population. Rural Belorussians firmly retained the native language of their nationality. Only 3.2 percent of their numbers indicated some other nationality's language as their native tongue. Most often this was Russian, more rarely Polish. An analogous picture was reflected by the census also in the capital of the Ukrainian SSR. In four capital cities—Moscow, Yerevan, Tbilisi and Tallinn, the scope of

retention of one's native language (the portion of Russian, Armenian, Georgian and Estonian population with the language of their nationality cited as the native language) was equal to analogous indicators for the entire urban population.

Among all the capitals of the union republics, only Tashkent stood out in this respect. Unlike the residents of the other capital cities, Tashkent Uzbeks, more than those in the republic's urban population as a whole, retained Uzbek as their native language. Among Tashkent only 2.5 percent of the Uzbeks, and among all urban residents—only 2.0 percent had changed over to the language of some other nationality. It is understandable that two factors played their role here: Demography and urbanization.

We may say that 1989 will go down in history as the year of nationalization of many languages. Many times we have presented the list of adopted laws on state languages. And in connection with this in the capital cities more than anywhere else, the euphoria of one portion of the population and the depression of the other made themselves known. The course of this psycholinguopolitical opposition must still be seriously considered.

The shortcomings of the laws on language were largely predetermined by the legacy of the command-administrative method of management, ideologized thinking, and the absence of political and sociolinguistic experience in the development and practical introduction of a legal basis for the linguistic policy. What are we speaking about here? Primarily about the fact that our language laws, unlike similar laws in the West, were adopted first of all secretly, and secondly—with the speed of cavalry charge, without consideration for certain vital sets of problems, in my opinion.

The situation in the republics was such that along with the representatives of the non-native nationality, which were on the whole relegated to the ranks of the Russian-speaking population, the make-up of the native nations included significant contingents of persons who were fluent in Russian. Thus, for example, in 14 of their capital cities (except for Moscow), 60.5 percent of the entire non-Russian population which had their own union republics was fluent in Russian as a second language. The exceptions to this were only the Belorussians of Belorussia and the Georgians of Georgia, among which capital city national-Russian bilingualism had a slightly more limited scope than among the entire urban population. Thus, within the boundaries of the capital city of each union republic (except for Minsk and Tbilisi), the capital city framework of bilingualism was broader than the all-city indicators, while bilingualism in the cities, in turn, was more widespread than in rural areas.

The relation between the polarities—capital city and rural bilingualism—was far from synonymous. The

boundaries of national- Russian bilingualism among the urban and rural Ukrainians were relatively close to each other.

In the European portion of the USSR, the rural and urban population exhibited tendencies toward levelling in terms of the portion of the bilingual population.

The case was somewhat different in the republics of Central Asia. Among the Central Asian peoples making up union republics (Tajiks, Kirghiz, Turkmen), as well as among Azerbaijanis, the difference between the [bilingualism] of the urban and rural population reached 3 or more times. Even more noticeable was the difference between Uzbeks living in the capital city and those living in rural areas.

One notable fact is that among a number of peoples the fluency in Russian as a second language in their own capitals was more widespread than in capitals beyond the boundaries of their republic. At first glance this phenomenon contradicts common sense. However, the logic of inter-national and inter-linguistic contacts is such that, having become removed from one's own ethnos, in close other-national or mosaic-like multinational surroundings, people not only attained fluency in the second language, but also changed over to this language, and began considering it as their native language. Therefore, an adequate evaluation of real bilingualism and post-bilingualism associated with the transition to a second language through an intermediate stage of functional bilingualism requires also a comparison of at least two indicators: Both the native language and the second language. With such an approach we find that in their own capital cities, the general consensus of the population of a given nationality which is fluent in a second (Russian) language, or which considers it to be its native language, yields significantly to the similar total of the population of a given nationality dispersed in capitals of other nationalities. Fluency in two languages and their application in certain spheres of everyday life is natural for a significant number of people. For each bilingual person the knowledge and use of two languages is not a policy and not even a conviction, but a simple fact of life. And excessive politicization of bilingualism, especially forced methods of its introduction, have led to a directly opposite result: From non- acceptance of this very phenomenon to the accusation of the second language, which is not guilty of anything, of destroying the psychological balance of the individual, threatening the national culture, denationalizing and destabilizing the ethnos, and draining the life blood from the living organism of national culture, etc. Understandably, such ideas are far removed from science.

And so, in the capital cities, where the fates of ethnicity are decided, where the mechanisms of inter- and intra-generation transfer of traditional and professional culture are forged, the habits of life with two languages are formed at the same time. Today for many capital city residents Russian serves as a second language. We cannot exclude the possibility that tomorrow the second

(and sometimes third) language for significant groups of people will be English. Our new openness to the world fully predisposes us toward this. However, perhaps we should understand deeper than we do today that without knowledge of the language of international or inter-ethnic communication, the window to the world of all-human values will remain either very narrow, or closed altogether. And if we intend to open the windows wider, then it is best to start with the capital cities.

Patriarch Aleksiy on Political Issues

91UN2019A Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian
No 22, May 91 p 13

[Interview with Patriarch of Moscow and All-Russia Aleksiy II by correspondent Yuriy Lebedev: "Preachers of Concord"]

[Text] [Lebedev] Your Holiness, clergymen are being elected people's deputies. The parish council of the Church of St. Dmitriy of Vladimir Oblast's village of Sima nominated you for president of the RSFSR. What is the attitude of the Orthodox Church toward participation in political life?

[Aleksiy II] I am frequently asked: What are the feelings of the clergy in a country in which the church has been separated from the state when it is elected to organs of state power? How to behave? I answer thus. We are separated from the state and believe this to be right. But we have never been separated from society and we represent the interests of its believers in the elective bodies to which, trust having been shown in us, we have been elected. I would like to emphasize that we have been elected not from the church but from public organizations. I, for example, was elected a people's deputy of the USSR by the Soviet Charity and Health Foundation, although I was nominated in a national-territorial district also. But I preferred the Foundation because tasks of the moral health of society and the cause of charity have always been close to the church. Unfortunately, the word "charity" had been removed from our daily vocabulary, and it is only now, praise be to God, that charity is returning to life and being revived in our hearts. My participation in the work of the Committee for Elaboration of the Freedom of Worship Act and in the discussion of the draft law at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet was useful. I represented the interests of the church and religious associations of our country, and many proposals of our Synod and Assembly of Elders were taken into consideration. As far as participation in the political life of the country is concerned, we are categorically opposed to clergy of any rank being members of any party whatever. Because in this case the clergyman would not be objective toward his parishioners, giving his affections to political sympathizers. We are for the wholeness of society, mutual understanding, tolerance and the surmounting of the confrontation which, unfortunately, is perceived so acutely in our country today.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES

[Lebedev] What needs to be done to prevent social and national disagreements being intensified by clashes on religious grounds?

[Aleksiy II] Fundamental for us in interethnic relations are the words of the Apostle Paul: in Christ there is neither Jew nor Greek nor bondman nor free—you are all one in Christ. So we must always oppose interethnic enmity and religious dissension. The Orthodox Church, although called Russian, is multinational because there are Orthodox in the Ukraine, in Belorussia, in Moldova, in the Baltic. The mufti of Uzbekistan and the chief rabbi proposed to me a meeting of heads of churches and religious associations of the USSR. We have agreed in principle to organize a meeting of representatives of Islam, Judaism, Protestantism, Old Believers, and Orthodox. Only by common efforts can we overcome interethnic discord, settle religious conflicts and make our contribution to the establishment of social peace and tranquillity in our fatherland. All citizens of our country without exception must enjoy equal rights. We cannot fail to be disturbed by the fate of Russian people who live outside of Russia, where interethnic relations are now becoming aggravated. When our compatriots are called "immigrants" or "occupation forces," I consider this a direct violation of human rights and an insult against the personality. We need to overcome intolerance and treat one another as brothers and sisters, as compatriots.

[Lebedev] Your Holiness, how are relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and our compatriots overseas taking shape?

[Aleksiy II] As of the 1960's, I have tried when visiting France, the United States and other countries to always meet with compatriots who live overseas. It is planned to hold a Compatriots Congress in the country in August, and we will readily participate most actively in this noble undertaking.

[Lebedev] Centrifugal trends are intensifying in the Soviet Union. How do you view this process?

[Aleksiy II] It was the case historically that Russia gathered scattered appanage principalities in a single whole, and its strength was always only in unity. If we separate, we will lose the strength which we had and still have in the international arena. Today we are prepared to separate not only by republic but by oblast, rayon and city also and create "free economic zones," where people hope in isolation to save themselves from the economic crisis. But experience of life shows that strength lies only in unity. After all, how can, for example, individual republics, oblasts even more, solve their problems without the aid of other regions of our country? After all, long-standing relations and the exchange of raw material and various components have already evolved. The plants could simply come to a halt. And the human contacts, family ties, mixed marriages? All this cannot be dissolved and severed overnight. We are for each republic, should its people so want, being able to decide for itself. But some transitional period is needed, after

all, so that human and economic relations not be severed all at once. We are on the verge of catastrophe. If we continue to pull apart and see each person as an enemy, not a sympathizer and compatriot, we simply may not live to see the good life.

Patriarch Aleksiy Meets With Chernobyl Victims

91UN1894A Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian 21 Jun 91
Union Edition p 2

[Article by M. Shimanskiy: "The Church and Chernobyl"]

[Text] Minsk—During his stay in Belorussia, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Aleksiy II visited the Children's Hematology Center in the Minsk City Clinical Hospital No. 1. He also visited the Mogilev and Gomel areas, which have suffered from the Chernobyl accident.

The patriarch brought medicines to the Children's Center as a gift, and gave each child here for treatment a small icon blessed during the pilgrimage of His Holiness to Jerusalem.

At a press conference for journalists in Minsk, Patriarch Aleksiy II stated that the Russian Orthodox Church has been providing and will continue to provide material assistance to people who have suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe. A special synodal commission has been established in Belorussia, he added, for eliminating the aftereffects of the accident. It is chaired by Metropolitan of Minsk and Grodno Filaret, Exarch of the Patriarch of All Belorussia. Humanitarian aid from international Christian organizations is also arriving.

The more we come into contact with the aftereffects of the Chernobyl disaster, the patriarch stressed, the more we become convinced that energetic, practical actions—and not general, theoretical, lofty phrases—are necessary to fight them on the part of all, including the clergy.

Patriarch Says Church To Shun Political Alliances

91UN1646A Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
29 May 91 Union Edition p 3

[Unattributed interview with Patriarch Aleksiy II: "Patriarch Aleksiy II: The Church Does Not Intend To Enter 'Political Marriages'"]

[Text] The appeal of the deputies' group "For the Cooperation of Constructive Forces" published in *IZVESTIYA* a week ago (No. 121) did not go unnoticed. It has caused a variety of interpretations, opinions, and commentaries. According to what is already becoming a tradition, *IZVESTIYA* asked His Holiness Patriarch of Moscow and All-Russia Aleksiy II to express his pastoral, totally unbiased opinion on the main points of this document.

According to the Patriarch's opinion, any step is important today if it is made with the sincere purpose of easing the public confrontation. After that he said: "As of late,

I have been thinking more and more often of the words from the Gospel: 'Are we trying to arouse the Lord's jealousy? Are we stronger than he? "Everything is permissible"—but not everything is beneficial. "Everything is permissible"—but not everything is constructive. Nobody should seek his own good, but the good of others.' (I Corinthians 10:22-24) That is the way for a person to treat others, and we should remember it all the more so when we dare to come out into the world of public life. I have expressed my hope several times already this spring, in IZVESTIYA as well as others, that it will be the people alien to the party's enthusiastic spirit, people whose vision is least distorted by selfishness and by limited party and ethnic interests, who will call for a creative dialog and for an act of conciliation.

[IZVESTIYA] But Your Holiness, why is your signature missing under this appeal?

[Aleksiy] A political struggle has one sad quality: Even sensible ideas often get rejected having been pronounced by a person who belongs to one or another party. His opponents do not see the issue as "Is this idea correct or not?" but they see it as "Whose party is going to profit from it—'ours' or 'not ours'?" Were this text adopted at, say, a meeting of the country's religious leaders or at a "roundtable" of representatives of culture, i.e. people outside the political arena, and not by politicians, I would agree with many of its concepts, I think. But given our current situation, it is quite probable that this appeal first, is really hiding somebody's party or private interests and second, it is quite inevitable that they will be viewed as such by his opponents. Many people at present would like to see the patriarch take some unequivocal, one-party position. But my flock cannot be fitted within any one party or even a bloc. All the more so because the church in general is facing that depth of human life which does not abut on politics. Therefore, my direct pastoral duty is to prevent any politicization in the life of the church and of course, not to push anyone away from Christ by my actions.

[IZVESTIYA] Suppose we take this text out of the context of a political struggle and look at it not from the point of view of political parties' needs but those of the entire country. What do you agree with? What concepts and appeals do you consider important?

[Aleksiy] The attempt to alienate themselves from the history, psychology, and tactics of Bolshevism is most important for me in this appeal. In essence, it admits the guilt of social radicals and Bolsheviks, in particular, in the failure of both the Stolypin reforms and the provisional government effort to prevent a civil war. Next to the Law on Freedom of Conscience it is the most important step, I think, that our parliamentarians made along the road towards liberating life in our country from the rule of materialist ideology.

It is true that the many ailments experienced by the leftist intelligentsia during the prerevolutionary decades and in our days are dangerously similar. Their essence

was illustrated in the famous almanacs "Vekhi" and "Iz glubiny." It happens too often that a radical thinking person gets fascinated by the beauty and logic of his developing concept; if the real events or the real needs of the country start to contradict this concept, he would prefer to act in accordance with the principle of "so much the worse for facts." Incidentally, I was in Siberia recently and I could see especially clearly there how little foundation there is under the traditional insistence of the Moscow intelligentsia that its views and interests are those of the entire country.

Finally, I agree that an opportunity should be provided for the proposals of most diverse political groups to meet, be discussed and considered. It is a different story that many of the people who signed the appeal failed to use the very Supreme Soviet of our country as the place for a dialog of "constructive forces." I am not quite convinced, therefore, that they can really help bring different positions closer to each other outside the parliament walls. However, the fact that the deputies' groups association "Soglasie" was created makes one hope for real cooperation. It is a much needed initiative and I hope to God that it did not come too late.

The April "statement of the ten" also brings forth hopes for conciliation in our life. But, incidentally, this statement, in essence, postulates an impending reelection of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It seems to me that the "appeal" in question is the first document of the new preelection struggle. But as you can understand, it would not be proper for the church and its patriarch to take part in a preelection campaign. For the single reason, at least, that was wittily described by the Philippines' Cardinal Sin: As soon as the church enters a "political marriage" with one of the political forces, it might become a "widow" in the next generation. We have a different purpose anyway, which is to show the people the road to eternity. If people come to us now, it is not because they expect political guidance from us in their trust in the church, but because they find there a concern for their souls which get hurt so often at present times.

I have to admit my sincere hope that one day journalists will understand the above-politics nature of the church and then they will start ask me spiritual and not political questions. Every time I have to give an interview I secretly expect to hear the only truly important human question which a young man asks Our Saviour in the Bible: "Lord, what must I do to inherit eternal life?"

Russian Greek Catholic Church Described 91UN1646B Riga BALTIYSKOYE VREMYA in Russian 6 May 91 p 3

[Interview with Bishop Vikentiy by K. Rotmanova, BALTIYSKOYE VREMYA correspondent; place and date not given: "The Road to an Independent Church"]

[Text] Last week Bishop Vikentiy of the Russian Greek Catholic Church visited Daugavpils and met with the

members of the Balto-Slavic society. After the meeting he granted an interview to the BALTIYSKOYE VREMYA correspondent.

[Rotmanova] Could you please tell us how the church was formed, the head of which you were appointed by the pope?

[Vikentiy] Our church has united both the Greek Catholics who are dispersed in different locations in Russia and the parishes of the Orthodox Church known as the catacombic one.

[Rotmanova] Does that mean that Greek Catholicism is not new in Russia?

[Vikentiy] It is not. It has been around for a sufficiently long period of time. It experienced its first mass persecution in 1832—1865. After the February revolution the Greek Catholic church was registered by the Kerenskiy government and after the October one it was recognized by Lenin. Incidentally, Greek Catholicism has its ancient roots in Latgalia also. It had its temples in Rezekne, Daugavpils, Kraslava, and Piedruja. Monasteries of Basilian fathers also existed in Ilukste and Krustpils. All of them were later taken away from us and most of them were simply closed.

[Rotmanova] The name of your church combines two conflicting branches of Christianity. What makes this church close to the Eastern church and what makes it close to the Western one?

[Vikentiy] We conduct our services in accordance with the Eastern ritual. In that respect we are in full compliance with the decisions of the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council which recognized Western and Eastern ritual as equal. As for our dogma, we recognize the doctrine of papal infallibility in issues of faith. Infallibility, I want to emphasize and not impeccability, as opponents insist. The pope is human, like any human being he can make mistakes when he is talking about some particular subjects. But when he is speaking about the issues of faith from his pulpit, he is infallible because the Holy Ghost is assisting him then. This is the main point of our contradictions with the Russian Orthodox Church. Because we recognize the pope and not the Moscow patriarch as our primate. The great trouble of Russian Orthodoxy is in its too-close links with the government, secular power. This power has always interfered with the life of the church.

[Rotmanova] How are things today?

[Vikentiy] The authorities are flirting with the Russian Orthodox Church but they do not want any church that would be independent of them, which cannot be ruled from Moscow. We also ran into a lot of difficulties from the very beginning. For instance, Patriarch of Moscow and All-Russia Aleksey II has claims for all the vacant temples. But we consider ourselves legal successors also, as our church has incorporated the parishes of the Holy Orthodox Church of Russia—the catacombic church.

But then at the very beginning Aleksey II wrote a letter to Pope John Paul II with his severe objections against the restoration of our church.

[Rotmanova] On what side do you find support?

[Vikentiy] We are supported by the Ukrainian Greek Catholic church. Besides, there already are communities and people who support us. That includes some people in Latvia also. These communities now need to be registered and I hope that things will go better, with God's help.

Position, Problems of Belorussian Uniates Described

91UN1787A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 13,
Mar 91 p 17

[Interview with Polish Roman Catholic Priest Jan Matusevich conducted by Aleksandr Shagun: "Ksendz Matusevich Visits the Pope in Rome; Problems of the Uniate Church Cannot Be Seen Due to the Paling of Old Dogmas"]

[Text] Ksendz [Polish Roman Catholic Priest] Jan Matusevich, one of the reconstructors of the Belorussian Catholic Church of the Eastern rite, has returned to Minsk from the Vatican after his meeting with the Pope. Evidently because of the crisis phenomena in economics and politics which the republic is currently experiencing, this event went largely unnoticed. Nevertheless, it deserves attention, since the Belorussian Ksendz's visit to Rome marked the completion of recognition at the international level of the religious confession recreated in the republic.

The Pope blessed the activity of the Catholic (Uniate) Church of the Eastern rite.

Soon after the visit to Rome, our SOYUZ correspondent met with the priest.

[Correspondent] Father Jan, why has it become necessary to bring back confession in the republic, a rite which had ceased its existence 150 years ago? And why did you, a Catholic priest with strong authority, have to go through the misunderstanding of laymen, the coldness of the official Roman Catholic Church, and the mistrusting attitude of the authorities toward the resurrection of the Uniate? In short, why do you think this road to the new church, which combines traits of Orthodoxy as well as Catholicism, was necessary?

[Matusevich] You understand, we Belorussians, from our very birth as a people, have been "Uniates"—i.e., "people in the middle", living on the boundary of Eastern and Western ethnic and cultural traditions. And when by the 16th Century the formation of the Belorussian people as an ethnic unit had been completed in its current form, it was completed with the creation of the Uniate National Church.

Yes, in reality it organically includes the traits of both the Orthodox and the Catholic Church. Yet this is not

imitation, not a bare imitation of one church or the other. The Uniate Church is the logical result of the internal evolution of the Eastern rite (Orthodoxy) on our land. Its uniqueness and deeply popular qualities were manifested not only in the Belorussian language, in which the church services are conducted, while the official language of Orthodoxy is Church Slavic and of the Catholic Church—Latin. They were also manifested in many other ways—in the singing, liturgy, and vestments of the priests.

The architecture of the few Uniate churches which have survived, the iconostasis of the Uniate Church—these are the quintessence of the spiritual face of the Belorussian, his culture and world outlook. For example, in the Museum of Old Belorussian Culture at the BSSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Art, Ethnography and Folklore, a collection of icons has been preserved which had been handed over from the stores of the State Historical Museum in Moscow. Whichever one of them you take, for example the "Birth of Christ", the national coloring clearly comes through.

In my opinion, without rebirth of the Uniate we cannot resurrect the truly spiritual, national-cultural traditions of the Belorussians.

It is encouraging that Pope John Paul II has understood our concerns, and has given his support and blessing to our quest. He also emphasized that the basic foundation of the Uniate Church is the ecumenical principle aimed at unification, joint work with other Christian confessions, peace, tolerance, and kindness. In short—at all that aids in the rapprochement and mutual understanding of people.

I myself have for a long time been a ksendl—the Father Superior at one of the kostels [Polish Roman-Catholic church] in Grodzenshchina. However, I came to the Uniate in order to be closer to the people and to aid in its national-spiritual rebirth.

[Correspondent] However, as far as I know, other Christian confessions are today striving to take national specifics into consideration. Thus, the Orthodox Church is completing the translation of its holy writings into Belorussian and has opened a Belorussian class in the local seminary. Its official press organ, VESTNIK BELORUSSKOGO EKZARKHATA, widely publishes materials in the national language.

[Matusevich] We are glad that our Orthodox brothers have chosen this path and that our brothers the Catholics of the Latin rite are also not denying it. But even if the kostel and the church begin to say their prayers in Belorussian, they would still not become truly Belorussian. After all, they have their own ritual singing, their rites, and their priest's vestments. All this came from Byzantium or Rome. Only the Uniates have transformed world Christian canons into a popular spiritual channel. And, we might add, not only in Belorussia, but also in the Ukraine and in Russia.

However, neither we in Belorussia, nor, I am sure, our Ukrainian and Russian brothers and spiritual teachers, are competitors of the Orthodox Church or the Catholic Church. We are not interested in any clashes or confrontations. Compared with them, the Uniates are very weak. It will take them decades to get on their feet, and they need world support and understanding of their brothers in Christ. After all, just look at what is happening. The Orthodox Church has three churches in Minsk alone, and has "staked out" another 7 or 8 plots for building new churches in the city. The Catholic Church has also been returned two wonderful cult structures lately. We have absolutely nothing. We gather for prayer in apartments and petition for the return, for example, of the one single Petropavlovskiy [Peter and Paul] Church on Nemig in the capital, which at one time belonged to the Uniates. The Uniate supolki (associations) in other cities and sites in Belorussia also have the same problems. It is good at least that, thanks to the new law on freedom of conscience, the authorities do not hinder us in our prayers.

It is true, on the whole the attitude toward the Uniates is still rather cautious, and various excuses have been given for denying us the right to register as an association.

[Correspondent] Evidently, Father Jan, there is some reason for this. The Uniates are viewed as not only a new religious confession, but also a political force with a fairly good charge of nationalist aspirations?

[Matusevich] You, like our opponents from certain organs of authority, rest on old dogmas which have been smoldering not only since Stalinist times, but since the times of the perpetual-memoried Czar Nicholas I and the Polish gentry. Both of these sides fought for their influence on the territory of today's Belorussia and each tried to impose their own religion—the kostel or the Orthodox church. But the people chose Uniacy and under its banner fruitfully developed their culture for almost three decades. Yes, in that time the Belorussian Uniate nobility fell under Polish influence, but on the whole the church has remained the people's and unmarred. For this obstinacy and recalcitrance it was persecuted by the Poles as well as by the Russian czar.

But today the times have changed, thank God. According to the new Union Agreement, Belorussia has no fewer rights than any sovereign state. I admit that even 2-3 years ago I, a priest, could not even dream of such national freedom. But now I think and call upon my congregation to prudently use the riches which we have obtained, not to lose them. I call upon them to forget all insults and disputes and to join with other Slavic and Christian people to build a common house in peace and friendship. That is the legacy which our Uniate delegation received also during its meeting with the Pope.

[Correspondent] But we still remember the conflicts which flared in the Western Ukraine between the Uniates and the Orthodox Christians. After all, your Church took over churches by force there! Will this not happen also in Belorussia?

[Matusevich] Yes, there was in fact such a conflict. But it was not because the Uniates are so mean and obstinate, but rather because the Greek Catholics there asked that they be given back the churches which previously belonged to them. However, their requests went unanswered and they did not see their hopes come to pass. And as a result the passions heated up, and the Uniate parishioners themselves entered the churches and brought new priests to them. But, you will note, they never had their eye on someone else's churches. They returned only those which at one time belonged to the confession. And the conflicts died down.

As long as we have brought up the topic of religion and politics, I must say that our authorities should not continue to view the Uniates with suspicion. Our church must and will occupy its rightful place in Belorussia. After all, look what is happening. According to the census of the population, there are around 500,000 Poles living on the territory of Belorussia. And as for Catholics of the Latin rite, by careful computations of Western specialists and according to the Vatican estimates, there are 2.5 million of them living on the territory of Belorussia. The logical question arises: Are these 2.5 million also Poles? Polish sources say yes: Every Catholic on the territory of Belorussia is a Pole. All this testifies to the fact that there is a definite tendency to consider all Belorussian Catholics to be Poles, and thereby to affirm the historical rights of Poland on the territory of Belorussia.

This is where the sphere of activity of the Uniate Church lies. Since, based on its national soil, without a doubt, it will find the way to the souls of the people and will turn them toward the faith of their fathers. Without disputes, conflicts or differences. Moreover, we are free of any administrative subordination. We are independent. Only the Pope is our advisor and spiritual teacher.

From the editors:

The opinions of Ksендz Matusevich are not indisputable. However, they are interesting in that they raise the veil over the activity of the Uniate Church which is being so rapidly reborn today in the western regions of Belorussia and the Ukraine. As we can see, referring to his spiritual teacher Pope John Paul II and his teachings, the Belorussian ksендz calls not only for national isolation and segregation in regard to other nations and peoples, but teaches peace, friendship and mutual understanding of all religious confessions in the renewed Union.

May the kind words and deeds of the reborn Uniate Church not diverge from its cause, on the road to the souls of its fellow citizens.

Clergyman On Concern For Servicemen's Needs

91UM0647A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 May 91 First Edition p 1

[Interview With Metropolitan Pitirim: "Invitation To Discussion: Religion, Morality, And The Army"]

[Text] Metropolitan Pitirim of Volokolamsk and Yuryevskiy (in secular society, Konstantin Vladimirovich Nechayev) is well known in our country and abroad. He is a professor and doctor of theology. He serves as a USSR People's Deputy and is a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Internationalist Soldiers Affairs.

In an interview, he observed:

"Indeed, I was one of the first, in the year of the millennium of Christianity in Russia, to say that it is the task of the Russian church to show concern for Afghan war veterans. Not all of my colleagues supported me. But the former soldiers themselves responded with gratitude. Representatives of the country's leadership, the USSR Ministry of Defense, and the public declared their support. The idea arose of setting up a rehabilitation service and center in Moscow Oblast. I would like to see the hospital be located in clean natural surroundings. It should have the very latest equipment and the best doctors.

"But that's not all. You have heard that the army is now being reduced and that many officers and their families don't know what is to become of them. And there are 500,000 such people, maybe even more! They have plenty of experience in life, but in most cases they lack civilian professions. Let us also recall the Russian refugees who are leaving areas where they have lived for a very long time. And there are so many people who have spent long years working in the North and now dream of moving to central Russia. Why not enlist all those who are willing in agricultural work, why not give them land and money to set up personal auxiliary farming operations and to build houses? We're also going to help these people..."

On May 14, Metropolitan Pitirim will answer questions from readers on the feedback telephone line.

We await your calls from 10:00 to 12:00, Moscow time. Telephone: 941-24-40.

Iran's Islamic 'Perestroyka,' Impact on Soviet Republics Examined

91UF0883A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 24, 19 Jun 91 p 4

[Article by Yuriy Zarechkin, Teheran-Moscow: "In Whose Sails is the Islamic Wind? Thoughts and Predictions After Rides in Jeeps, Helicopters and Aircraft, and also Based on Conversations with the Great Imam's Inheritors and Interpreters"]

[Text] "As long as a secret is not uttered, it can be a secret for the world."—(Ferdowsi)

A recent article about Islam in LG [LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] significantly eases the task of a political commentator who has returned from Iran. I do not have to explain to the reader all over again the fundamentals of the Koran or why the present and the future and night

and day are of equal value for a true Moslem. However, I am prepared to share Sharif Shukurov's conviction that it is extremely difficult to understand the Koran and to a certain extent it is impossible.

The comparison in that article of the secret of the Koran with the secret concealed behind a woman's veil seems to be extravagant only at first glance. And the point is not nearly in the Poet Rumi's philosophical dualism through whose words a woman wards off an attempt to slightly raise her veil: "I am not what you are seeking." The main Islamic secret, as I dreamt in Iran, is not simply the aspiration to overcome the burden of ends and beginnings. When the Prophet Muhammad, while ascending into heaven in accordance with the legend from the cliff of Moriah, his journey passed outside of time and only in space. So be it. But where does this philosophy of unreality come from? In my opinion, the founders of Islam introduced a psychologically precise spiritual-moral dominant idea into our daily thoughts: in order to sense the continuity of eternity and calm, we need to live slowly and calmly while prolonging the days and hours as far as possible.

I say this without irony. Because when you encounter Iranian reality, a different life style—also including political—immediately appears. The symbol of man "outside of time" is striking. A woman, tightly covered from head to toe, is only a face and a nose. On a tennis court near the river under a sun that is beating down.... And the same "symbol" on a skate board?! Yes, the complete dry law, the absence of drunks on the street.... But also the internal order dictated by the Shariat, Mohammedan prayer, the distinctive rhythm of the Islamic Faith, and the mosque.... You can accept or not accept Islamic dogma. But you must unquestionably respect it. Everything is too serious to not note the Iranian spiritual renaissance after Khomeini's Islamic Revolution. Everything is too obvious to not see the direct parallels with our history and our current social experience.

The second anniversary of the death of Imam Khomeini which was noted at the beginning of June once again forced us to think about the vitality of Islam's ideas. Nearly 30,000 envoys from various countries of the world gathered in Teheran. Several Soviet journalists were among those invited by the Iranian government. And none of us could avoid the attention to the problem of the Islamic revival.

At the ritual meeting at the mosque, the words of the representative of the Kazakh pilgrims sound strange: "Islam and Khomeini's ideas" are helping us to build and to live." We remember that quite recently we received communion with a similar phrase, other values, and a different ideology. Now with that same phraseology in another paradise? Or is some sort of hidden unrealized nature of a political game being activated in us?

Naturally, Islam as such is hardly responsible for Moslem political fundamentalism, just like the Orthodox Church is hardly responsible for the hurrah-patriotic manifestations with icons and gonfalons. I mention this once again in the development of our articles. At the same time, it would be strange not to note the resounding structures in our country and in the foreign Islamic world.

Z. Brzezinski "drew" his own "arc of Islamic instability" on the political map without considering our Moslem republics. But it seems that the renaissance that has been so persistently continued by the Imam's heirs does not bypass either Central Asia, the Caucasus, or the Volga-Urals.... Islamic parties and centers are springing up practically everywhere. On the anniversary of Khomeini's death, Moscow City and Oblast Moslems' Islamic Center opened in the capital and the Islamic Cultural Center social organization was created. Besides promoting development and propagating dogma, their activists intend to organize an Islamic religious middle school, a business club, Islamic stores, baths, restaurants, a printing plant and a newspaper. We all know how the role of Islamic parties, say, in Tatarstan (especially on the eve of the RSFSR Presidential elections) and in Uzbekistan has increased....

While speaking with pilgrims from the Soviet Union in Teheran, I once again heard about the counter Pan-Islamic movement: Saudi Arabia is sending delegations and its emissaries to Central Asia and is proposing opening missions in the Soviet republics. The emissaries are frankly pressing and insisting. Some are avoiding such pressure but others, not exclusively, cannot avoid it. It appears that the technology of moral terror is being set into motion. Together with national ideology, it can turn out to be extremely effective. For Pan-Islam. In short, the arc of instability is obtaining its continuation. And not only natural and not only on the ideological level. The Moslem structure will resound even further. The question is—in which direction. And what will become the detonator if it reaches an explosive situation?

You can hardly call my prediction optimistic.

It seems to me that the Islamic revolution is accumulating (and sooner, it has already accumulated) fatigue in Iran. And the psychological tension will obviously build up until.... But then again, it is premature to talk about methods to resolve the crisis. But I will risk talking about the factors working against the Islamic regime.

A rhetorical question: Can we consider the union of politics and religion natural? At one time, Ataturk in Turkey quite clearly answered doubts of this type. And what about right now in Iran? In my opinion, the classic example of unnatural state relations, although certain of our opponents in Teheran (incidentally, among them are also pilgrims from Turkey who are printing equipment

repairs) asserted that this is allegedly why they supported Khomeini in 1979 because he combined politics and religion.

In the discussion on this score, arguments in favor of the priority of the moral principle and the ancient good of man predominated among the Imam's supporters. Someone sort of even recalled Ferdowsi: "The only path of good is to save the soul." But I think that neither the author nor his contemporary proponents can refute the obvious. Weakness and later also the loss of a solid moral foundation are alas inherent to any rule and to any policy. While entering the state power structure, religion (ideology) inevitably inflicts a blow to itself—those costs, unsettled lifestyle of citizens, and lack of political freedom under conditions of a strict administrative regimen which economic and social life portend.

The predominance of a single ideology (Islamic) in Iran is akin to our dying one-party ideology and, essentially, totalitarian system. It is easy to list all of its productive components and just as easy to list the damage. A personal example in confirmation of "costs": according to UN data, of 160 states, Denmark and Sweden (with 98 percent) are best in the fulfillment of the 40 points of the Declaration on Human Rights and Iran is in last place (with 0 percent!).

The second factor in favor of the development of democratic sentiments in Iranian society and against today's rulers are the methods of the ban and restrictions. Here the symbiosis is also no better than our own. In the Soviet Union, they know what bans result in, how to stimulate this underground business, form a damaging psychology, and maintain a lack of political freedom. In the Islamic Republic, restrictions in some situations appear to be perhaps more severe since they are combined (or confront?) the predominant private property in the country.

They have no right to operate this contradiction. And it seems to me that President Hashemi-Rafsanjani understands the measure of perniciousness and is looking for points of reference so that Islamic ideology does not lose its external attraction among Moslems but at the same time also can more closely coexist with a pro-Western lifestyle. A transition bridge is most likely being sought from traditionalism to a European-type market and to more civilized enterprise.

It seems to some people that the president's pragmatic path is not too attractive and planned and they prefer Khomeini's previous model. They even think that allegedly the Imam's ideas are more popular right now than, say, during the period of the Iran-Iraq war. In my opinion, it is hard to divide public opinion. Supporters of the current leader of the Islamic revolution Ayatollah Khamenei are currently stubbornly retaining their positions. But they are also not homogeneous which is specifically manifested in their attitude toward the USSR. I frequently heard cries at mass gatherings: "Death to Russia!" (along with the slogans "Death to

America!" and "Death to Israel!"). It is true that a different portion here explained that it is a question not of the Soviet people but of its rulers—the Imam has already long ago exclaimed while appealing to our people: Look at what they are doing to you!... And other rulers in other countries? Is there a moral level-standard somewhere right now?

Finally, the third factor. The mood of the people and the point of view of the population of Iran. Here, perhaps, is the highest potential in the struggle with religious-state power, naturally considering the themes that I have already noted. Will information and glasnost penetrate the curtain of silence? I can predict with confidence: it will penetrate. Although it is difficult to designate the time periods. Maybe in six to seven months or maybe in two to three years. Let us recall how this process took shape in our country. Will there be the same rates here if someone succeeds in "Farsi"-rovat [speeding] access for local dissidents to the press and airwaves?

Look, they are already not afraid. A female salesperson at a supermarket told us, people she did not know: "It is so bad for us, worse than it was." On the street, a student walked with us for several blocks: "It is impossible to live with prohibitions. It is having the opposite effect everywhere, especially in the religious sphere, a backlash is occurring, and people are ceasing to believe...."

Understandably, religious ecstasy is not in a state to be replaced with analysis and reason. That is, this is what Islam itself considers to be the main thing: "And there is no religion among those who have not mastered reason." Khomeini's son has already delivered a speech in which, while assessing what was begun by his father, he stressed that a critical period of restructuring has arrived in the country and they need to consolidate the course selected.

We also have enough rhetoric in our country. We already do not talk about how here ("Revolution—is a divine and heavenly gift"), but have we gone far in the rest? In my opinion, Orwell will still be read for a long time there and there it is like a keen contemporary social novel. As a novel that is directly associated with our time. That is its force!

And nevertheless in our Islamic structure—are we lagging behind or outrunning? It seems to me that as a minimum we need to avoid repetitions of foreign practices. Let it be our own—rational and optionally eternal. But our own.

At a moment of democratic progress in Iran (social tectonics here can also be sharper or softer), our "Islamic arc" will mandatorily resound. The braking will also be turned on. It will become a cause of the suspension of the democratic process. Our homegrown Islamic renaissance is like the long familiar threat of a military coup.

This is the peak of events and we need to not simply wait. We need to fear it and to prepare for it.

The sails are full of Islamic wind. But each captain has his own course. For now....

500 Tajik Pilgrims Go to Mecca

*91US0583A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Jun 91
Union Edition p 2*

[Article by Aleksandr Karpov, Dushanbe: "Pilgrims Depart for Mecca"]

[Text] At the council mosque in Movlono, Leninskiy Rayon, Tajikstan, a solemn send-off was held for pilgrims departing for Mecca.

Five hundred people are departing on a long trip to holy places. It will probably be no exaggeration to say that this is the first time in the entire existence of the Islamic

religion that such a large number of believers have left simultaneously from Tajikstan to visit the grave of the Prophet Mohammed.

On recommendations made by the senior clergy at the council mosques, a group of believers was made up from among the most respected and most authoritative members of the religious community. With the active participation of President K. Makhkamov, the government of Tajikstan undertook the resolution of the organizational problems. The Civil Aviation Administration will carry out three charter flights along the Dushanbe-Jidda (Saudi Arabia) route. The pilgrims are traveling at their own expense, each one paying 35,000 rubles. But there is also a need for currency. USSR Zhilsotsbank has met halfway the request made by the republic's Cabinet of Ministers, by exchanging rubles for dollars.

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